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ABSTRACT 
Today, in post-war Lebanon, INGOs are in a transitional phase 
moving from relief to full-scale development organisations. Lebanon is 
a multi-communal state and has witnessed numerous internal and 
regional conflicts that many times have turned violent. The culture is 
marked by persisting primary, familial, and religious identities with a 
high penetration of patron-client relationships. 
In my thesis, I attempted to address a central and compound 
research question: Do select and specific INGO programmes produce 
the desired results stated by their personnel, programme/project 
outlines and mission statements; and to what extent do their projects 
and programmes in rural development in Lebanon in specific cases 
meet the needs and expectations from the perspective of local men 
and women who are the intended beneficiaries? 
In order to answer the question above, more than 400 interviews 
were conducted (1998-1999), the bulk of which were with local 
beneficiaries. Open-ended questions via semi-structured interviews 
with individuals and groups were the primary means of field data 
collection. 
According to local men and women living in rural areas of 
Lebanon who spoke to me, the INGO programmes that I looked at did 
not satisfy their development needs for a number of reasons; however, 
due to the near absence of state-led development, they are forced to 
be reliant on a combination of rare, if any, state programmes, INGO 
and local NGO programmes, local political agents (political parties, 
warlords, landlords, local strong-men, confessional leaders and power- 
brokers) for what scant developmental assistance they can get. The 
result is uncoordinated and sporadic development projects, many of 
which fail to reach their targeted clientele due to bureaucracy, 
corruption, lack of co-ordination and resources, the internal agendas of 
the providers themselves, the impact of international political 
demands/actions, and a fragmented and weak state. 
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DEDICATION 
To my grandmother Margery J. Sternen 
XIX 
INTRODUCTION 
What the eye does not see, the heart does not grieve about 
Old English Proverb 
Though some theorists may be writing the obituary for development as an 
intellectual concept (Sachs 1992, Rahmena 1997), its critical point of 
action is alive and well for individual practitioners and organisations 
involved in the attempt to better the lives of those less well endowed with 
the basic needs for survival and personal growth. Regardless of the 
realities, positive or negative, development continues to be redefined and 
tested throughout the globe. Whether as a prospective career choice or 
support for various organisations and developing countries' governments, 
promises of building a better future through development remain a 
powerful attraction for the continuation and growth of this phenomenon. In 
fact, interest in development in the last decade has witnessed increased 
enthusiasm from donor and funding agencies, which have channelled 
enormous sums of money into programmes and projects, especially those 
managed by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). 
xx 
My initial interest in NGOs was stimulated during my graduate and 
post-graduate studies by several professors who were interested in the 
political, economic and social transformations taking place in the 
developing world. This inspiration led me to look at deeper questions 
regarding the `NGO revolution' in poverty alleviation. One of the most 
striking features I encountered in reading about the subject in 1996 was 
that many analyses of INGOs consisted of INGO and donor reflections of 
themselves as a measure of their contribution to the advancement of poor 
men and women's lives. Only in very rare occasions were the perceptions 
of the intended beneficiaries mentioned or considered at the time. This 
project instead starts with the impressions of the intended `beneficiaries' 
concerning INGO programmes as the principal gauge of effectiveness in 
developing their areas and easing their poverty. 
The aim of this thesis was to discover whether specific INGO 
projects and programmes met the development needs of local men and 
women, who were the intended beneficiaries. This was accomplished 
through conducting interviews with people living in villages where these 
specific INGO projects/programmes were taking place. Additionally, 
xx' 
interviews were conducted with various INGO personnel, government 
officials and other individuals and organisations involved in working in 
development in Lebanon. 
This work shows that these specific INGO projects were not able to 
meet the development needs of local people, but due to many factors, 
local men and women were forced to rely on these programmes for what 
scant development assistance they do get. 
The decision to choose Lebanon as a case study was based firstly, 
on my familiarity with the country's history and culture, and my access to 
local contacts, as I had lived there previously for four years. Secondly, as 
Lebanon had been the site of 16 years of civil war, it was natural to 
postulate that it would be a rich working environment for INGOs 
concerned with post-war development, including the rebuilding of fractured 
societies and poverty alleviation. And lastly, though the literature 
covering NGOs in development is vast, there remains a great paucity of 
information concerning the work of NGOs in the Middle East. This study is 
intended to contribute empirically to this immense and unfortunate 
deficiency. 
xxii 
Rural areas in Lebanon were specifically chosen as a focal point for 
the study because they tend to be the most impoverished and least visible 
regions in developing countries, and Lebanon is no exception. Moreover, 
as INGOs stated raison d'etre is to alleviate poverty, I anticipated that 
many of their programmes and projects would be taking place in rural 
areas. 
The first chapter of this thesis introduces the reader to the NGO 
movement, illustrating the power and immensity of their place in the 
international development scene, before attempting to define these 
conceptually elusive organisations. This chapter also introduces a 
definition of the role that NGOs could play in development, as well as their 
expanding function within the post Cold War development agenda. 
Chapter Two is a basic historical, socio-economic and geo-political 
overview of Lebanon. It intends to provide the reader with an introductory 
framework of the complex interwoven fabric of Lebanese culture and 
society so that one can better comprehend the ambience that the INGOs 
in Lebanon are working in. In addition, this chapter also traces the history 
of and the current predicament of INGOs working in Lebanon. 
xxiii 
Chapter Three outlines the methodology utilised in the fieldwork, 
and attempts to give an illustration of the strategy used to observe and 
collect the data presented in this study. The following chapter introduces 
the seven INGOs, whose projects and programmes were looked at in rural 
areas of Lebanon. 
Chapter Five contains the bulk of the fieldwork data that was 
gathered from local men and women living in rural communities, most of 
which were the intended beneficiaries' of INGO development programmes 
and projects'. My rural fieldwork was a very enlightening and enriching 
experience. It provided me with an opportunity to view the development 
process from the perspective of local men and women who live far from 
the skyscrapers and office blocks where all of the decisions regarding 
development are made. 
Chapter Six presents further fieldwork material, but mainly consists 
of an attempt at an analysis of the data gathered. Relationships between 
the State, donors, INGOs and `beneficiaries' are also explored and 
analysed, by looking at concepts of accountability, transparency, levels of 
' The bulk of the fieldwork took place in 1998. 
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participation and evaluation. The complex web of interconnected socio- 
economic and geo-political factors affecting the development process are 
observed and examined. 
The final chapter presents a synopsis of the entire thesis, 
reiterating the main analytical notions of my fieldwork. 
It is hoped that this work will encourage other scholars to continue 
to explore the many facets of the development process, taking into 
consideration the perspective of local men and women who are 
considered to be the `ultimate intended beneficiaries' of development 
projects and programmes. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LOCATING INGOs WITHIN THE 
DISCOURSE ON DEVELOPMENT 
As governments absent themselves from social leadership and the power of the 
unaccountable increases, so civil society emerges from the bottom, hungry for global 
justice and radical social change. It is led by non government groups which bypass the 
centre, inform themselves of the issues and appeal directly to the grassroots. They are 
society's new moral and social watchdogs, filling the vacuum of ideas and energy at the 
centre. 
The Guardian ('Links'), 20 November 1996 
This first chapter of the thesis locates non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
including international NGOs (INGOS), in the process of development by 
examining NGOs as part of the overall international development apparatus. It 
will then explore various definitions and theories of why NGOs perform tasks that 
have traditionally been the responsibility of states, before examining their 
significance within the discourse on development. The chapter will conclude with 
a look at the political, social and economic objectives that have been set by the 
international development community as criteria for sustainable development in a 
global environment dominated by democratic political structures and market 
driven economies. It should be noted, that given the time lag between the 
generation of ideas in the literature and their actual transference to NGO 
personnel on the ground, the debates regarding NGOs in development in this 
1 
chapter will largely be limited to the pre-1996 period since this was the material 
most relevant in the field at the time of my study. ' 
The emergence and recognition of NGOs as an important phenomenon in 
the political economy of development has received vast amounts of attention 
from academics in various fields, development practitioners and government 
personnel. They have been claimed to be the front-line forces of 'neutral' 
intervention and are linked more than ever to the wider aid community -the UN, 
other multinational bodies and international governments - in a manner that could 
not have been foreseen in the days when NGOs simply filled the gaps at a 
grassroots level. One analyst predicts that `as public spending on international 
affairs and overseas aid is gradually and sometimes radically being reduced in 
most donor countries, the relative importance of NGOs within the aid system will 
continue to grow' (Tvedt 1998: 2). Significantly, bilateral government donors 
increasingly channel resources for emergencies and development through their 
favoured NGOs rather than through allegedly less accountable governments of 
the South. This change has not gone unnoticed by developing country 
governments who have had to compete with this sector for development aid. 
1 The present tense will be used for this discussion. 
2 
The institutional recognition of the role of NGOs did have a political 
aspect. The major donor organizations did see NGOs as a way of 
bypassing Third World state machines that they saw as inefficient 
or corrupt. The place of NGOs within the overall context of 
institutional development work is consequently somewhat 
ambiguous so far as recipient states are concerned (Preston 
1996: 313). 
These are indeed political implications, which are not only a by-product of aid 
transfers, but also are intentional decisions taken by foreign governments and 
the two main Washington-based institutions; the IMF and the World Bank. 
A. Searching for Definitions: What are development NGOs? 
The rise of NGOs on the world development scene is an important phenomenon 
that has implications for the development prospects of poor people, for the future 
of these organisations themselves, and for the wider political economy of which 
they form a small but growing part. What lies behind these trends? Why have 
NGOs and INGOs been given so much responsibility and where is this process 
heading? Before answering these questions, it is important to first define what we 
mean by international development NGO. The next two sections present the 
various definitions in current use as well as theories concerning the possible 
origins of these particular organisations. 
3 
The term non-governmental organisation (NGO) is a loose term and at its 
broadest encompasses every sort of organisation outside the public and private 
sectors. Uphoff concludes that it could even include private, for-profit enterprises; 
i. e., market institutions (1993: 603). Clark locates six categories of organisations 
(relief and welfare agencies, technical innovation organisations, public service 
contractors, popular development organisations, grassroots development 
organisations and advocacy groups and networks) and calls them all NGOs 
(1991: 34-5). He himself admits that this all inclusiveness can render the term 
almost meaningless. There exists a good deal of conceptual ambiguity regarding 
whether NGOs are a subset of the private non-profit service sector, or whether 
they in fact constitute a separate and distinct third sector. The Central Evaluation 
Unit of the United Nations has coined an essentialistic definition which includes 
'professional associations, foundations, trade unions and business associations', 
as well as 'research institutes dealing with international affairs and associations 
of parliamentarians'. This definition fails to recognise registration differences 
between countries and therefore makes country comparisons difficult. For 
instance, in some states trade unions, business associations and research 
4 
institutions are forbidden from registering as NGOs, whilst in others they are not 
(United Nations, Central Evaluation Unit 1993). 
1. NGOs in the Aid Channel: a common denominator? 
Tvedt moves to delineate the term NGO as `a common denominator for all 
organizations within the aid channel that are institutionally separated from the 
state apparatus and are non-profit-distributing' (1998: 16). He points out that 
community based organisations (CBOs), grassroots organisations (GROs), 
private voluntary organisations (PVOs) international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs), northern non-governmental organisations (NNGOs), 
southern non-governmental organisations (SNGOs) and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) are all sub-categories, but are still NGOs. 
Based on the fact that the term NGO is widely used and understood within 
the wider development community to mean organisations involved in the aid 
channel, it can be employed in different countries in different development 
contexts. This definition will also help to exclude organisations that are described 
as NGOs in policy documents and research papers, but which are not NGOs. For 
instance, the Grameen Bank is often lauded as an NGO in donor and NGO 
5 
circles, but it is not an NGO-it is a bank. Albeit the Grameen Bank is a different 
kind of bank, it receives money from the Bangladeshi Government and foreign 
governments as a bank, not as an NGO. Furthermore, this term is useful in 
analysing `organizational hybrids'. Many NGOs combine several characteristics, 
including a strong market orientation with a strong social commitment, with part 
of its activities engaged in contract work for the state and other parts devoted 
entirely to volunteer work and independent. Tvedt asserts that introducing 
DONGOS, QUANGOS or GONGOS as distinctive categories is not useful, as 
they are really just sub-classes of NGOs. 
Importantly, this term also makes it easier to analyse development NGOs 
as part of an international aid system, and also to examine how they articulate 
with donor communities, state administrations and different types of non-profit 
organization[s], and... allows for fruitful analyses of how other NGOs and NGOs 
in the aid system interact and influence each other, since the distinction between 
them is systemic rather than definitional' (Tvedt op. cit.: 18). 
For the purposes of this study, my work focuses on international 
development NGOs, as described and defined above, engaged in various 
development activities and issues located specifically in rural areas of Lebanon. 
6 
Though these organisations may put forward divergent solutions, they share 
common elements in their stated commitment to promoting self-reliance through 
a wide range of projects and programmes. The specific organisations that were 
included in this study were defined as non-profit distributing, institutionally 
separated from the state and part of the international aid channel. 
B. Searching for Origins: Why do development NGOs exist? 
This section examines various theories concerning the origins of NGOs in order 
to conceptualise why they exist in the global industrial-capitalist system. There is 
a considerable amount of literature dedicated to economic theories of the non- 
profit sector, which include theories on the role of NGOs and their behaviour 
(Hansmann 1987; and Rose-Ackerman 1980). Generally the phenomenology of 
NGOs is explained by the failure of the state and the market. Several influential 
theories have been put forward within an economic perspective to explain the 
rise of the 'voluntary' sector. The public goods theory or the 'performance failure 
theory' states that NGOs exist in order to satisfy the residual unsatisfied demand 
for public goods in society. It argues that the state tends to provide public goods 
only at the level that satisfies the average person. Where a significant minority 
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wants a kind or a level of public goods for which majority support is lacking, 
NGOs step in to fill the gap (see Weisbrod, 1988). James (1990) derives from 
this theory that the more heterogeneous a society is, the larger this other 
organisational arena is likely to be. 
Another important theory is contract failure theory, which suggests that 
NGOs arise where ordinary contractual mechanisms do not provide the public 
with adequate means to ensure the reliability of producers (Hansmann 1987). 
When contracts are difficult to define people will trust non-profit organisations 
more than commercial firms, because the former are seen as having fewer 
incentives to take advantage of the customers ignorance. 
An influential World Bank book on NGOs (Paul and Israel 1991) describes 
such functional perspectives as being useful also in explaining NGOs in 
development aid and Third World development in general. In their contribution to 
the book, Brown and Korten argue that since markets tend to be 'especially 
vulnerable to failure in developing countries', organisations might, as remedies 
for market failures, be particularly relevant there' (Brown and Korten 1991: 47). 
They also bring in a different perspective, what is called the lens of political 
analysis. This tends to focus on the role of NGOs in filling niches created by 
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government failure, particularly in the production of public goods. NGOs exist 
primarily because of the 'reality of social diversity and otherwise unmet needs for 
experimentation and flexibility' (ibid. ). It is problematic for governments to 
respond effectively to social diversity, since this will create different 
constituencies making different or contradictory demands for services. NGOs 
therefore arise as a response to a situation where people are sovereign but 
diverse - with competing and sometimes contradictory wishes. This theory 
stipulates that where there are many competing and contradictory wills, a great 
number of NGOs will eventually grow up to meet and institutionalise this social 
diversity (Douglas 1987). Brown and Korten also point out that 'a widely 
recognised failure of large-scale government bureaucracies is their inflexibility 
and conservatism'. This political form of state failure creates a situation in which 
NGOs emerge as innovative responses to novel problems, because of their 
abilities for experimentation and flexibility (Brown and Korten 1991: 48). In other 
words, NGOs evolve because state mechanisms are unable to perform 
adequately in order to provide basic services for their constituencies. Voluntary 
action is seen as an 'adaptive response to the constraints of the majority rule and 
equitable distribution criteria of the state' (Paul and Israel 1991: 4). 
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These analysts see NGOs as everything that governments are not: 
unburdened with large bureaucracies, relatively flexible and open to innovation, 
more effective and faster at implementing development efforts, and able to 
identify and respond to grass-roots needs (Edwards & Hulme 1996a, Fowler 
1988, FAO 1994). The common assertion that NGOs have arisen in the face of 
internal and external exigencies and where state-directed change has failed or 
faces severe limitations (Adam 1993, Ndegwa 1993) supports the view that 
NGOs are an important alternative to the state under some circumstances. As 
the World Bank (1991: 135) has noted, NGOs 'have become an important force in 
the development process [mitigating] the costs of developing countries' 
institutional weakness'. 
However, Tvedt argues that these theories may be useful to describe non- 
profit niches in industrialised, capitalist countries, but are not useful to describe 
the emergence of the variety of roles of NGOs in non-industrialised, developing 
countries. He argues using Norway as a model for a donor country that in many 
cases INGOs are in fact donor-state initiatives and not a response to state or 
market failures in developing countries. The introduction and rise of the INGO 
sector `were brought about by conscious government decisions' (1998: 45-46). 
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In the early 1960s - when government to government aid was 
undisputed as the main and best form of aid - they were invited into 
the arena by the state and did not occupy a niche in competition 
with other sectors. The initial government decision gave the 
voluntary organizations a well defined role: they were to co-operate 
in government programmes and preferably to carry out their own 
projects, but more importantly their main task was to help broaden 
the support among the Norwegian public for development aid in 
Norway in general. The state deliberately involved them in order to 
achieve a broader aim: the internationalization of Norwegian 
society. 
The emergence of aid as a project, including the plan to involve voluntary 
organisations with government support came from consecutive US governments 
in the post-World War II period. Though US president Harry S. Truman proposed 
the `Point Four' programme. In 1946 his administration already wanted `to tie 
together the government and private programs in the field of foreign aid'. In that 
same year he appointed an Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid attached to the 
Department of State composed of representatives from voluntary organisations 
and the government (Smith 1990: 45-46). This initiated an era of co-operation 
between US NGOs and the State Department, which continues to the present 
day. The general argument from the government and the Congress has been 
that support for private organisations would heighten their visibility and thereby, it 
was hoped, increase support for all foreign assistance programmes, 
11 
governmental and private (ibid. ). In addition, the help would more efficiently 
reach the most needy (bypassing corrupt governments, and UN organisations, 
where the Soviets had a hand in the administration of resources, which could 
mean setbacks during the Cold War), and would also act as a useful channel for 
getting rid of surplus agricultural produce as food aid. The majority of American 
NGOs accepted their role, and were important supporters of American policy 
during the Korean and Vietnam wars. 2 Since the US government asked its allies 
in 1962 to start giving support to voluntary or private organisations in order to 
widen and deepen the support for official development aid in the donor countries, 
all Western governments have adopted a policy of public support for 
development NGOs. The size of the support varies, as does the year when 
various Western governments began to pursue this policy, but during the 1980s 
most states had established their own national NGO channels. 
2 CARE, the Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, the American Red Cross, Lutheran World 
relief among others were all active in Vietnam, with considerable support from the US 
Government. A delegation of representatives from different organisations visited Saigon in 1965, 
when President Johnson was about to step up the war effort. They declared that the role of the 
voluntary agencies, 'whose programs vary considerably from one to another, is supplemental to 
that of the government... There should be no slackening of support for both types of activity, 
governmental and private, especially since they are working in increasingly close and effective 
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1. NGO origins and state relationships in some developing countries 
Terje Tvedt carried out research and collected empirical data on NGO origins 
and government relations in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe. 
What he found was that there is no doubt that all of these countries have 
experienced market and state failures-and that there are a great many niches 
that need to filled-and can be filled-however, this does not automatically lead 
to NGO involvement. These problems have existed for a long time. Who has 
filled them at a certain point in time `is not decided by the market or the sector's 
comparative advantages, but is primarily affected by decisions taken by donor 
governments', along with developing country governments, and `the ability of 
NGO leaders and potential NGO founders to communicate with donors' 
(op. cit.: 50). He shows that developing country governments and NGOs are 
competing (and collaborating), `but the prize is not so much market niches or 
political gains as foreign funds' (ibid). In the end, neither Tvedt or state failure 
theorists provide the complete answer to the question of NGO origin and remains 
a topic of contention. 
collaboration' (D. Marr, 'The politics of charity, Indochinese Chronicle (October-November, 1974, 
cited in Smith 1990: 65). 
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C. Development and INGOs: Discourse and Experience 
In order to comprehensively analyse NGOs in development; one must first 
attempt to define development. Additionally it is important to conceptualise the 
gradual transition towards promoting NGOs in development through the use of 
various theories, policies and agendas, which have come from major lending and 
donor institutions. 
The level of development for a country is usually related to national 
income accounts. However, critics of modern economic theory point out that 
national income accounts do not reveal how income is distributed either socially 
of territorially. They do not indicate how aggregate growth affects different groups 
of people or different regions in a country. Because of the focus on these 
aggregate figures and the information they provide on macro-economic 
performance and balances or imbalances, the theories using them as central 
inputs tend to treat countries as far more homogeneous and economically 
integrated than they really are. 
Moreover, conventional measures of economic growth are often 
misleading and do not present an accurate picture of the total production of a 
society. Specifically three major types of productive activities are not accurately 
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reflected in national accounts statistics, that is subsistence activities in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries; activities in the so-called informal sector, 
including some illegal activities; and household production activities. It can also 
be added that conventional measures of national income do not count the costs 
of environmental destruction or the consumption of non-renewable or non- 
durable sources of energy. 
Seers defines development as `the realization of the potential of human 
personality' (Seers 1972: 122). He explains that if we look at what is absolutely 
necessary to achieve this, the obvious answer is enough food. Moreover, since 
the ability to have enough food is subject to factors of income, then `the criterion 
can be expressed in terms of income levels'. The second basic necessity for 
development is a job. The third factor in development is equality, and this he 
says `should... be considered an objective in its own right... ' (ibid.: 124). 
The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: 
What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to 
unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three 
of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has 
been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or 
two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially 
if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 
"development", even if the per capita income doubled (ibid. ). 
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Importantly, he adds a footnote that in many ways applies to Lebanon: 
Of course, the fulfillment of human potential requires much that 
cannot be specified in purely economic terms. I cannot spell out all 
the other requirements, but it would be very unbalanced if I did not 
mention them at all. They include adequate educational levels, 
freedom of speech, and citizenship of a nation that is truly 
independent, both economically and politically, in the sense that the 
views of other governments do not largely predetermine his own 
government's decisions (ibid.: 128-129). 
Seers' theories fit into the category of 'alternative' development theories 
along with Amartya Sen (1988), Paul Streeten (1982), and Mahbub ul Haq (1995) 
(among others) up to 1995. They have rejected economic growth as an end in 
itself and have aimed to redefine the goals of development. These theorists have 
contended that welfare and human development along with increased choices 
are of a higher order and should be the ultimate goals of development. Included 
with the significance of human development is an increased concern for the need 
to address the causes of poverty and inequality; therefore these theorists 
conceive of 'development' as various processes which have different meanings 
and implications for different people. 
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D. Development Theory: from growth and spontaneous order to 
public alternatives 
Defining development, though controversial, has been easier to achieve than its 
actual accomplishment on the ground. This section of the thesis aims to briefly 
trace the theories that led to the recognition of NGOs, including INGOs, as 
important sources for economic, political and social change. This work explores 
trends up to and including the New Policy Agenda. Changes in theory or debate 
that occurred after 1996 will not be explored. 
The history of Third World development has been traced to the post- 
Second World War era (Escobar 1995) when the First World was becoming 
increasingly concerned with the lack of economic development in those countries 
distinguished from themselves and the Second World or communist states. 
Development theorists from both developed and developing countries have 
proposed distinctive interventions within the context of the global industrial- 
capitalist system aimed at contributing to the overall global social system. 
Initially, theoretical work used growth theory as its main development 
ethos. Later this was expressed in two widely dissimilar rationales: modernisation 
theory and institutional theory. Preston (1996: 318) explains that: 
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The former was an influential delimited-formal ideology within the 
Cold War period and was embraced by the institutions of global 
industrial-capitalism whereas the latter found a base in the 
organisations of the United Nations. 
From this standpoint, the United Nations also provided a global platform for other 
development theories, including dependency theory. Dependency theory was 
constructed in the Latin American countries beginning in the 1960s and was 
expressed via the various state apparatuses and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA), a UN agency. Dependency theory was a distinctive theory 
that stressed the linking of structure and agency. The main thrust of dependency 
theory was that the current predicament of the Third World was a product of 
those political, socio-economic, and cultural configurations associated with the 
development of the industrial-capitalist global system. The configurations that 
surround the developing countries are claimed to have developed over a period 
of time according to the interests of the major metropolitan core countries much 
to the detriment of the developing `dependent' countries. The ECLA in particular 
characterised the world as divided into the centre (the industrialised North) and 
the periphery (underdeveloped agricultural South) (Frank 1967). This relationship 
was determined by the world economy, which was created to favour those 
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countries in the North. The ECLA's solution was to promote industrialisation via 
protectionism along with import substitution and an interventionist role for the 
state in economic management and infrastructural development. This was done 
in the hope that these programmes would reduce Latin America's vulnerability to 
sharp swings in international commodity prices. 
Industrialisation actually made Latin American countries more, not less, 
vulnerable to the shifting of the world market. In the 1970s, the ECLA's 
development plans were abandoned and the militarist regimes that were in power 
followed monetarist policies that served to open rather than protect domestic 
economies. 
The New Right ushered in the 1980s with theories that included a strong 
resurgence of economic liberalism and the spontaneous order of the 
marketplace. Sometimes labelled the 'counter-revolution', the New Right theories 
found acceptance within the Washington-based institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank, both long-time supporters of market solutions to development 
problems. The main principles of the New Right were expounded by economists 
Friedrich von Hayek (1944) and Milton Friedman. New Right theorists stressed: 
19 
a) the establishment of the minimum state and the related freeing of 
market forces with privatization, deregulation, and sharply reduced 
government spending; b) the removal of socio-political inhibitions to 
market functions with repression of trades unions, removal of 
welfare legislation, and relaxation of government controls on private 
firms; c) the encouragement of enterprise with tax breaks for 
business, the affirmation of the right to manage, and the 
promulgation of ideas of popular capitalism; and d) the opening up 
of the economy to the wider global system with the removal of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, and the free movement of capital (Preston 
op. cit.: 322). 
The period following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of 
newly independent eastern European states (1989-91) has been met with a 
sequence of phases from the New Right theorists based in the North: 
a) celebrations of victory; b) the deployment of recipes for rapid 
marketisation; c) a muted and puzzled recognition of failure; and d) 
the slow growth of a realistic social scientific approach to these 
issues (ibid.: 258). 
In the developing countries the ideology of the New Right governed the 
main institutions of capitalist development: the IMF and the World Bank. These 
institutions pressed the developing world for: 
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a) the elimination of market imperfections, thus the removal of 
controls on the private sector, the privatisation of state assets, 
the liberalisation of foreign investment regulations and so on; b) 
the elimination of market-inhibitory social institutions and 
practices, thus curbing trades unions and professions, 
abolishing various subsidies, liberalising employment regulation 
and so on; c) the elimination of surplus government intervention, 
thus the imposition of restrictions on government spending, the 
reduction in government regulative activity, the reduction of 
government planning activity, the abolition of tariff regimes and 
so on; d) it might be noted that such programmes of 
liberalisation have usually required parallel programmes of 
political repression (ibid.: 260). 
A salient point that Preston rightly points out is that a great deal of political 
repression was needed in order to implement IMF and World Bank structural 
adjustment programmes. In many cases, NGOs were among the only 
organisations allowed to function in civil society outside of the formal state 
apparatus. As became obvious later, the implementation of economic growth 
policies without coterminous policies of socio-political development is disastrous. 
By the late 1980s it was clear that debates on development theory in the 
First World had reached an impasse (Schuurman 1996). Also at this time many 
development theories were being reworked and a return to concepts of the 
technical expert discipline, with planning as its central theme, were beginning to 
appear again in the mainstream of social theory with its central theme being the 
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illumination of the dynamics of social change, once an integral part of 
dependency theory. Importantly, during the period 1989-91 the political and 
intellectual climate fundamentally changed, and these changes supported a total 
reworking of development discourse. 
It is important to note that debates concerning structural adjustment have 
limited relevance to the country under in this thesis. Lebanon has had a laissez- 
faire economy since its creation. 
1. Complex Change: a new approach to development 
The legacy of dependency theories has continued to persist, and responses such 
as technical planning are held up as important tools of development for countries 
in the South as it is still argued that these countries exist in a system which is 
structurally flawed. This view has met with some general criticism as sweeping 
structural explanations miss the importance of local actors. 
In simple terms, it is suggested that as development plans are 
always translated into practice at the local level then a knowledge 
of local-level cultural patterns is seen as a logical precondition of 
the success of planning. In a related fashion the specific argument 
is also made that if social movements based on grassroots activism 
have been influential in the areas of food, health, environment and 
women then development theory should acknowledge this 
attending to the business of agency (Preston 1996: 296). 
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The reaction against structural mechanisms that were developed according to 
the needs of the planners, and the current predisposition towards agent-centred 
analysis combined with an ongoing commitment for change, brought forth a new 
interest in the work of NGOs. 
It may be argued that the formal theoretical justification for NGO activities 
within development theory has been located in the concept of the provision of 
`basic needs', which are understood to be the basic necessities of human 
existence (housing, food, medicine, schooling, and welfare) which it was argued 
might best be provided by development agencies working in close cooperation 
with the local people through NGOs. 
There was a great deal of optimism among the proponents of NGOs. This 
was derived from a general sense of NGOs `doing good' and being 
unencumbered and untainted by the politics of government or the greed of the 
market (Zivetz 1991). This was frequently reflected in the designations that 
described these associations in terms of what they are not: non-governmental 
and non-profit. NGOs are idealised as organisations through which people help 
others for reasons other than profit or politics (Brown and Korten 1989, Fisher 
1993). This idealisation of NGOs as disinterested apolitical participants in a field 
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of otherwise involved players led theorists and practitioners alike to expect much 
from them. 
E. Social Service: Basic Needs and the Role of NGOs 
The main assertion of `basic needs', when first formulated by the United Nations 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) in the mid 1970's, was a strong 
commitment to continued growth and development of industry and modern 
sectors with additional special measures that must be implemented in order to 
reach and assist the poorest 40 per cent of developing countries' populations. 
Though not inclusive, the fundamental concepts of the basic needs 
approach include attempts to provide opportunities for the full physical, mental 
and social development of the human personality (Streeten et al., 1982: Ch I). 
Importantly, three types of needs tend to recur in most of the formulations, and a 
particular mode of reasoning in favour of basic needs strategies may also be 
extracted. There is a general consensus that basic needs include; first, the 
individual human beings' and the families' need for food, shelter, clothes and 
other necessities of daily life. Secondly, access to public services such as 
drinking water, sanitation, health and education. Thirdly, access to participate in, 
and exert influence on, decision making both in the local community and in 
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national politics. Other debates concerning this approach are not presented, and 
it is important to note that `basic needs theory' is not unanimously agreed upon. 
Genuine economic development implies not only growth, but also 
persistent and measurable progress as well as social improvements for the poor 
and resource-weak groups in a society. This progress and the improvements 
concern not only incomes, but all aspects of the structure of poverty. In this 
connection it is emphasised that being poor in a developing country is not just 
synonymous with inferior purchasing power - there is a whole range of other 
symptoms associated with poverty, as illustrated in the Figure3 below: 
POVERTY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
No access to 
decision making 
Poor health 
Poor housing 
standard 
Under-/mal- 
nourished 
Little 
purchasing 
power 
Poor understanding 
of available options 
No education 
Low Unorganised 
productivity 
Low 
income 
Economic 
Social Politically 
differentiation passive 
and conflicts 
of interest 
Political 
povßrty 
The vicious circles of economic and political poverty 
Figure 1.1 
3 Adapted from Martinussen 1997, p. 299. 
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As the diagram illustrates the poor are generally under- and/or 
malnourished; they live in substandard housing and have inadequate sanitary 
and hygienic conditions etc... They are susceptible to disease and their general 
health is also far worse than that of the rest of the population. In addition, this 
theory states that usually the poor lack even the most elementary education, and 
for these reasons they are generally less productive than the rest of the 
population. They are poorly paid when employed and are unable to exploit the 
opportunities available through self-employment. They routinely have very little 
income and, consequently their purchasing power remains highly inadequate. 
They are in other words 'screwed down' in poverty and conditions where their 
basic needs are not satisfied. This whole process is repeated continuously and 
the situation of the poor can thus be characterised as a vicious circle, a poverty 
circle as illustrated above. Though this theory is an important one, there are 
many instances where this framework does not apply as concisely as the author 
contends. 
NGOs are purported to be one of the best mechanisms for reaching poor 
communities as they are viewed as being closer to the ground and hence more 
aware of the needs of the poorest communities. The following section explores 
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how NGO access is enhanced by their alleged strength in building communities 
via their position within civil society. 
1. Meeting basic needs through communities 
A separate group of alternative theories has not only divided the process of 
development and highlighted its disparate effects on various social groups, but 
has moved the entire viewpoint and point of convergence towards civil society. 4 
For the purposes of this project I will use Hadenius and Uggla's definition of civil 
society and will only bring the debate up to 1996 (1996: 1621). 
A common way of clarifying the concept of civil society is to say that 
it denotes a) a certain area of society, which is b) dominated by 
interaction of a certain kind. The area in question is the public 
space between the state and the individual citizen (or household). 
Civil society is further distinguished by the fact that the activities 
contained therein take an organized and collective form. When we 
speak of civil society, it is to groups arranged in social networks of 
a reasonably fixed and routinized character that we refer. 
4 There is an exhaustive literature available on the current and ongoing debate concerning the 
exact definition of civil society as well as its significance in state-society relations and 
development. Most present day notions of civil society resemble the conception put forth by 
Antonio Gramsci. Contrary to previous conceptions of civil society as essentially everything 
outside the domain of the state, Gramsci introduced in the twentieth century a distinction 
between 
the state, the basic economic structures and civil society. 
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For some scholars and practitioners this has meant a `romantic rehatching 
of local communities' as sufficient bases and frameworks for human 
development. For them, the state is part of the problem and should be avoided 
and disempowered. They view the empowerment and strengthening of local 
communities as a means to promote human development and an end in itself 
(Korten 1990, Kothari 1991). 
We have entered a period of great ideological vacuum- with the 
centralized state having reached its nadir and the alternatives being 
proposed to it... [the market] having little to commend itself given its 
even more centralizing and homogenizing implications. The real 
choice is not between the state and the market but between a 
socially disembodied state enjoying exclusivist powers and a 
socially responsive and sensitive framework of power -democratic, 
decentralist and participant (Kothari 1991: 558, cited in Riker 1998). 
Diamond (1992) contends that democracy requires the construction of a 
vibrant, vigorous and pluralistic civil society. Without such a civil society, 
'democracy cannot become developed and secure. A strong civil 
society... represents a reservoir of resources-political, economic, cultural, and 
moral-to check and balance the power of the state'. It is believed that NGOs 
constitute an essential part of this effort to build social pluralism within civil 
society and encourage state accountability to its peoples. Many contend that 
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NGOs, as non-state actors, offer one institutional means for gaining greater 
accountability for the economic, political and social affairs of a country. Moreover, 
when NGOs are linked with other social and political forces, it has been put 
forward that NGOs can act as a countervailing actor to both the state and private 
sectors. Consequently, international donors are increasingly supporting NGOs to 
promote this accountability process, targeting aid to support not only the more 
conventional service delivery roles but also importantly policy advocacy. 
Through this process donors are forcing governments to open up the 
political system, as they have the economic system through liberalisation and 
privatisation, and to strengthen the NGO sector within civil society (Korten 
1990: 100). Whilst this method is politically sensitive, there are signs that donors 
are now more willing to press governments for political reforms, especially where 
donors have the leverage and perceive the longevity of incumbent regimes as 
not being in their long-term interests. 5 
5For instance, the United States backed World Bank sanctions in September 1991 against Haiti 
after a military coup; in November 1991, the international donor consortium responsible for 
providing aid to Kenya gave the Moi government six months to undertake political reforms, allow 
multi-party democracy, and demonstrate its commitment to human rights or face suspension of 
aid, and again in 1992, the consortium went against Peru after President Alberto Fujimori 
suspended the Peruvian constitution and disbanded the national legislature. 
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Friedmann, though a strong supporter of local community development 
through NGOs, has criticised these views explaining that they exaggerate the 
excellence and infallibility of people (1992). He goes further to claim that they 
naively believe that alternative development can be created and sustained in 
small local communities and in consistent opposition to the state. His main 
argument is that although alternative development must begin locally, it cannot 
and should not end there. He argues that without the collaboration of the state, 
the lot of the poor cannot be significantly improved (ibid. ). Moreover, Friedmanns 
has set himself apart from this category of alternative theories, because they 
assume conflict-free and homogenous human communities, whereas the reality 
is very often quite different, and a plethora of inequalities exist as well as ongoing 
conflicts of interest. Friedmann (1992) among others are trying to alter the 
agenda and shift primary attention to the horizontal axis passing through civil 
society and the political community. 
As briefly stated above, international donor agencies have sought to exert 
pressures on some governments in the developing world to undertake both 
economic and political reforms. Some analysts contend that the donors' shift to 
6The theories of Friedmann and Polany converge in that their basic contention is that economic 
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supporting INGOs/NGOs is by and large not due to the latter's potential political 
role in strengthening civil society or democratic processes, but rather due to 
INGOs/NGOs perceived management capabilities in providing services in a more 
cost-efficient and effective manner than governments in the developing world. 
Kothari (1991: 6) argues that the prevailing ideology of privatisation embraced by 
international donors and governments alike favours INGOs/NGOs in as much as: 
`The preference for voluntary organizations as against government departments 
for carrying out development is only an extension of the preference for the private 
sector' (cited in Riker 1998). This understanding also seems to be the prevalent 
practice at the World Bank, which views INGOs/NGOs as located in the public- 
private sector (Maleraa 1995). The following section looks at this conjecture in 
some detail, and shows that the concept of `comparative advantage' is indeed an 
important factor in the INGO/NGO equation. 
F. Economic Value: NGOs and the new development agenda 
In recent years, significantly since the end of the Cold War in 1989, bilateral and 
multi-lateral donor agencies have pursued a 'new development agenda' which 
gives special significance to the roles of NGOs and GROs in poverty alleviation, 
relations and economic activity are deeply embedded in the matrix of social and cultural relations. 
31 
social welfare, and the development of a 'civil society' (Robinson 1993; Fowler 
2000). NGOs have historically, especially through Christian missionary activities, 
provided services in health and education, particularly in Africa and Asia where 
governments lacked the resources for comprehensive coverage, which was 
'service by default rather than design' (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 961). 
However, today, NGOs are typically preferred over governments as providers for 
social welfare- and this is a crucial change in policy. 
Donors are divided on what the exact definition of what the new 
development agenda constitutes. However, in every case, two concepts are 
clear. The first is economic: markets and private sector initiative are understood 
to be the most efficient mechanisms for achieving economic growth, producing 
goods, and providing services. Though this may be an imperfect mechanism it is 
argued that `imperfect markets are better than imperfect states' (Colciough and 
Manor 1991: 7). NGOs are seen to be cost-effective providers of services for the 
poor and to be more effective than states in providing value for money. (Meyer 
1992; Sollis 1992; Vivian 1994). Additionally, NGOs are viewed as an obvious 
extension of the move towards liberalisation and privatisation. 
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There is an influential belief among donors that NGOs have a comparative 
advantage in the field of development. Advocates of NGOs maintain that these 
organisations give `value for money' in service provision, have a greater poverty 
reach (meaning they are able to reach the poorest of the poor), that they 
encourage popular participation, and that they are flexible and innovative. This is 
opposed to developing states, which are viewed as gender-biased, inefficient, top 
down, corrupt and excessively bureaucratic. 
The best known proponents of NGOs and comparative advantage are 
Brown and Korten 1989, and Clark 1992. These writers generally organise their 
theories of NGO 'comparative advantage' in the context of the 'crises' of 
development thinking. NGOs are prescribed for development ills because their 
organisational characteristics are claimed to be participatory, innovative, less 
bureaucratic, flexible, cheap and able to benefit the poorest of the poor (Fowler, 
1992a; 1992b)7. Comparative advantage is a term borrowed from economics 
discourse which in the context of NGOs broadly indicates that NGOs are better at 
doing 'it' (development) than other organisations, for example 'commercial 
enterprise and government' (Fowler and James 1995: 15). However, unlike its 
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economic counterpart, `the notion of NGO comparative advantage is vague in the 
extreme, and impossible to measure' (Stewart 1997: 12). 
Significantly, many NGOs have taken the decision to scale-up their 
programmes and services, citing the need for ever-increasing demands for 
service provision and poverty alleviation. They justify scaling-up by claiming that 
small organisations cannot meet the challenges of immense underdevelopment, 
therefore it has become necessary to expand services, operations and influence 
through lobbying, whilst maintaining the assets of small organisation (Howes and 
Sattar 1992). Research suggests that as NGOs increase in size, they experience 
all of the difficulties associated with large organisations, for example an unwieldy 
bureaucracy and inflexibility (Brown and Covey 1987: 21). Importantly, as NGOs 
grow larger, their need for funding increases and this `creates organizational 
schizophrenia, ' with part of the staff working on fundraising and another part, 
usually field staff, working with target groups (Stewart 1997: 14; Brown and 
Covey 1987: 21). Stewart (ibid. ) correctly points out that: 
... smallness 
is either an advantage or it is not and it seems odd to 
suggest in one breath that smallness is a Good Thing, and in the 
next that NGOs should get bigger. 
7 Alan Fowler has revised his view of NGO performance based on the incompatibility of their work 
within an unbalanced and coercive aid system; (see Fowler 2000). 
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She goes on to argue that there is a fundamental problem with the notion 
of comparative advantage and therefore with the idea that NGOs can have an 
extensive developmental impact. The elements which combine to create 
comparative advantage are organisational traits typical of small organisations, 
whilst development problems are immense. Problems of this size require either 
massive logistically sophisticated organisations or incredibly well co-ordinated 
groups of smaller organisations (ibid. ). 
Economic concepts such as comparative advantage are not the only 
benefits NGOs are claimed to have in the development process. Many donors 
have come to the conclusion that `good governance' is the sine qua non for 
sustainable development and have shifted their resources to focus not only on 
state institutions but also to support the development of democratic institutions 
within civil society (World Bank 1992). The following section looks at the 
implications of this concept and its place in the overall international development 
apparatus. 
G. Political Organisation and NGOs 
The second concept of the new development agenda is political: 'good 
governance' is seen as essential for a healthy economy, even though the 
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evidence underlying this claim is mixed (Moore 1993; Healey and Robinson 
1992). NGOs and GROs are awarded a key role in the democratisation process 
by bilateral and multilateral agencies, as witnessed in recent policy statements 
from the World Bank (1994) and the British Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA 1993-now DFID) among others. They are seen as an 
essential counterweight to state power, opening up channels of communication 
and participation, providing training grounds for activists, and promoting 
pluralism. This role has been documented particularly clearly in Latin America 
(Loveman 1991; Lehman 1990) and is supported by many NGOs and NGO 
analysts themselves, though disconnected from the priorities of the donors 
(Korten 1990; Clark 1991). 
The NGO sector was increasingly being seen as an important actor in 
improving economic and social welfare of people, advocating for social and 
political justice, protecting the environment and in `promoting progressive forms 
of governance' and democratisation. (Bratton 1990: 104; Berg 1987; Durning 
1989; Downs et al. 1989; Shaw 1990; Breslin 1991; Clark 1991). 
In fact a number of observers in the developing world believe that it is 
essential to link grassroots development and ongoing democratic processes from 
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below (Sheth 1983; Sethi 1984; Arruda 1985; R. Kothari 1986; Diaz-Albertini 
1990; Wignararaja 1993; S. Kothari 1996). Advocates of this notion supported 
NGOs because it is believed that they contribute to democratising processes. 
The literature on NGOs relies on several key terms: participation, empowerment, 
local, and community. 
Information on NGOs is replete with examples of a growing involvement of 
GROs in representation and lobbying; and by NGOs in mediation, advocacy, 
training and `civic education' (Fowler 1991). Of course, these roles are far more 
pronounced in states where there are spaces for action and democratic systems 
in places, such as India, where pressure from NGOs and GROs can achieve 
meaningful 'micro policy reform' (Korten 1990; Edwards and Hulme 1992). 
Importantly, when organisations can join together to form alliances, they have the 
ability to influence formal political processes, as in the Philippines (the fall of 
President Marcos) and Mexico (participation in Presidential election). 
(CONVERGENCIA 1993; Constantino-David 1992). 
Although NGOs have shown themselves able to influence the democratic 
process, some commentators remain doubtful about the prospects for NGO or 
GROs involvement in the political process. Lehmann (1990: pp. xiv and 205), 
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writing on Latin America, shows that it is the leaders of social movements who 
have an interest in formal politics not their members. Even though Latin 
American social movements are vital to the survival of the poor, they have made 
little impact on the formal political process and should `leave political parties to 
get on with the real business of ideological struggle', while being proud of their 
record in rendering `liberal democratic movements more sustainable and helping 
to cement human and political rights in society'. Fowler (1991,1993) reaches the 
same conclusion in his writing on Africa. He concludes that NGOs are unlikely to 
have a significant impact on political reform, largely because African 
governments have become skilled at containing such a possibility through 
regulation and fragmentation of the NGO movement, ' and partly because NGOs 
themselves have failed to develop effective strategies to promote 
democratisation, especially what Fowler (1993: 328) calls 'citizenship ... the 
organic link between the state and the citizens that is missing in much of Africa'. 
Inherent in giving NGOs a crucial role to play in advancing democracy and 
pluralism is a conception of a dichotomous relationship between state and civil 
society. For Tvedt there is a perceived zero-sum game between NGOs and the 
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state -a competitive relationship in which one actor's gain is the other's loss 
(Tvedt 1998: 34). 
Such relational variables about political nearness to or distance 
from governments neglect historical and cultural differences in 
these relations from society to society and from time to time (what 
is regarded as anti-government in some countries may be seen as 
pro-establishment in other countries and vice versa), and it also 
downplays the different role and importance of physical distance 
between the NGO and the 'centre' in different countries. The 
enormous differences in character of state formations and the size 
and character of the 'third sector' and the role of 'voluntary 
organizations' - if it is at all possible to talk about the third sector 
and voluntary organizations in many countries (ibid. ). 
Furthermore, the principle of state sovereignty is contentious, and is 
argued by some scholars in the case of Lebanon to be an artificial construction. 
Many developing states, including Lebanon, still struggle to justify their 
supremacy over other institutions-especially ethnic groups and religious 
societies. 
In recent years a dominant perspective in much research on NGO- 
government relationships has focused on the contrasts between the political role 
and characteristics of states and those of NGOs. This theory assumes that 
NGOs are conceived of as instruments for organising local initiatives and 
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promoting local participation and diversity as opposed to the state, whose 
approach is seen as dirigiste and top-down, and expressing the interests of a 
bureaucratised, alienated elite in search of illegitimate control. Irrespective of 
time and place, the emergence of NGOs has been analysed as an organisational 
expression of particular interests or objectives within the body politic, which are 
not adequately represented within the political system. They are therefore seen 
as implicitly expressing democratic interests on behalf of civil society. (Tvedt 
op. cit.: 207). Importantly, a consistent criticism of NGOs and GROs in the 
literature is their failure to develop participatory mechanisms for internal debate 
and decision making, despite their stated values and principles (Bebbington and 
Thiele 1993; Wellard and Copestake 1993). In many cases, the disappointment 
with the inability of NGOs and GROs to promote democratisation `reflect[s] the 
paradox of organizations promoting democratization which are themselves only 
weakly democratic' (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 965). 
Funding from Northern governments for NGO projects/programmes 
complicates the picture considerably. Bebbington and Thiele (1993: 182) describe 
the politicisation of NGOs in Central America during the 1980's when the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) funded a range of right-wing 
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groups, and Northern NGOs funded a range of left-wing groups. Edwards and 
Hulme (1996) ask the question; `Is this strengthening civil society or is it merely 
an attempt to shape civil society in ways that external actors believe is 
desirable'? Will this promote endogenous and sustainable forms of democracy or 
call forth a backlash of authoritarianism against foreign interference'? (Brautigam 
1992 as cited in Edwards and Hulme 1996). What role can opportunistic NGOs 
with no mission other than the winning of donor or government contracts play in 
democratisation (Bebbington and Thiele 1993: 3)? This is of particular concern 
where new NGOs are being formed very rapidly on the back of readily available 
official funding. 
1. Sub-contracting 
David Korten (1990) coined the term public service contractors (PSCs) to 
indicate those NGOs or INGOs geared more to serving as non-profit market- 
oriented businesses working for public purposes. He argues that these 
organisations sell their services to aid donors and governments in order to 
implement their projects and programmes. They are different from voluntary 
organisations in that they are motivated more by market considerations than by 
values, and have much more in common with private businesses. According to 
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Brown and Korten (1991: 62): the conceptual difference between a voluntary 
organisation and a PSC is clear: `A value-driven NGO defines its program based 
on its social mission, and then seeks the funding required to implement it. The 
market driven PSC starts with an assessment of prospective funding sources and 
defines its program on that basis. ' The authors admit that it is hard to make a 
clear distinction between the two types of organisations. Korten admits that many 
PSCs are in fact hybrids, combining a strong market orientation with a clear 
social commitment and high ethical standards, and that such hybrids are likely to 
be an important trend in the future. 
Korten asserts that donors search for NGOs to implement projects that 
have technical competence, well-developed management systems and a 
concern with cost-efficiency. Increasingly, he argues that there are pressures on 
voluntary organisations to turn into PSCs. The reasons include: uncertain and 
inconstant financing, and the availability of donor money; the inability to maintain 
a challenging atmosphere against deeply embedded norms and practices; the 
difficulty in maintaining a consensus based on value as the INGO grows; the 
responsibility to provide job security to paid staff; the belief that resources 
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received from contracting can be used for high priority work; and increased 
pressure from donors to professionalise the staff (Korten 1990: 103). 
Robinson argues that there is more than just funding difficulties, 
organisational growth and staff professionalism at question, `there are also 
broader structural and ideological determinants at work which reflect economic 
realities and neo-liberal influences' (Robinson 1997: 61). Due to the adjustment 
measures in the 1980's, sharp reductions in public expenditure led to the 
expanded role for INGO's delivery of social goods; health, education, rural 
development and others. This was actively encouraged by donors, who 
participated in the form of grants, but `increasingly by means of contracts'. 
(Robinson ibid. ). For NGOs maintaining their idealised role as advocate for the 
poor and the underprivileged along with their role as fast, cost-efficient 
mechanisms for development is becoming increasingly incongruent. 
Many of the INGOs in my study were in fact PSCs and not value driven 
organisations. They definitely tailored their projects according to the available 
funds and agenda(s) of the donor, instead of having a clear mission and 
attempting to locate funds in order to implement that mission. 
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The USAID agenda relies heavily on short-term solutions to poverty that 
consist mostly of infrastructure projects and not on long-term poverty alleviation 
strategies aimed at finding a solution to the grinding destitution that many men 
and women live in. My conclusion concurs with Sara Roy's from her work in the 
Gaza Strip. We both argue that USAID's work emphasises immediate, visible 
and quantitative results over long-term, sustainable, qualitative solutions to 
poverty. In the end of the day, they (USAID) are developing projects not people. 
The main problem of the USAID program is its lack of emphasis on 
developing human resources, the areas primary if not sole asset. In 
my view, this is a critical and dangerous failing. In USAID's new, 
longer-term strategy, there is little if any attention paid to 
educational reform, mental health rehabilitation, health reform 
generally and the long-term alleviation of poverty. The emphasis 
remains on infrastructure, not on people, on employment 
generation through reconstruction and renovation. While immediate 
results are important, and it clearly helps the peace process to have 
tangible, visible improvements such as better sewage systems, 
these are not as important as sustained employment, adequate 
food, and access to quality education and health services (Roy 
1996 : 25). 
Finally, INGOs that depend on official funding often perform poorly in the crucial 
task of local institutional development (Esman and Uphoff 1984), the gradual 
strengthening of capacities and capabilities among GROs to enable them to play 
a more effective and independent role in development. This is so because many 
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official agencies are unwilling to support the long time horizons, careful nurturing, 
and gradual qualitative results that characterise successful institutional 
development (Carroll 1992; Fowler 1992). Such work is difficult to sell to 
politicians and their constituents back in Europe or North America, on whom aid 
bureaucracies depend for their budgets (LaFond 1995). 
H. International Donor Driven Development 
The prominence awarded to NGOs, INGOs and GROs as implementers of the 
New Policy Agenda, as stated above, has led official agencies to channel 
increasing amounts of money to and through them. Although the data vary 
considerably from country to country, two trends are visible. First, the proportion 
of total bilateral aid channelled through INGOs is increasing. The proportion of 
total aid from member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) channelled through INGOs rose from 0.7% in 1975 to 
3.6% in 1985, and at least 5% in 1993-1994, some US$2.3 billion in absolute 
terms (OECD 1988; 1994; 1995). For some bilateral donors the figure is much 
higher, for example, 30% of total Swedish aid was channelled through NGOs in 
1994 (OECD 1995). INGOs have, in fact, become much larger players in the 
delivery of official development assistance than is generally appreciated; 
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receiving as much as 29% from Switzerland, 25% from Norway, and 14% from 
the Netherlands of official aid budgets (ODA Briefing Note 1995, as cited in 
Smillie 1997). Nearly 28% of US Agency International Development (USAID) 
spending was channelled through northern and southern NGOs combined 
(Sholes and Covey 1996). Second, and perhaps more significantly, individual 
NGOs are becoming increasingly dependent on official aid, especially recently as 
there has been a perceivable decrease of voluntary income from the public in 
many Northern countries. For example, the five largest development INGOs in 
the United Kingdom all show a significantly rising trend, with levels of 
dependence on government grants oscillating between 18% and 52% in 1994, up 
from between 7% and 15% ten years earlier. Levels of dependency are much 
higher in continental Europe and North America; for example, it is common to 
find government grants making up between 50% and 90% of the budgets of 
major INGOs in Scandinavia, the United States, the Netherlands and Canada, 
most of which is eventually passed on to NGOs in the South. 
Increased support for NGOs during the late 1970's and throughout the 
1980s greatly increased this sector's visibility as well as increased demands for 
its broader participation in the development process. Moreover, NGOs have 
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gained official recognition and greater legitimacy as spokespersons at the 
international level. 8 One analyst posits that with respect specifically to Africa, if 
donors seek to have a greater impact on political development, then Fowler 
(1991) concluded that `strengthening civil society must therefore be a deliberately 
designed and targeted activity of aid' advocating that: 
Financing NGOs in Africa as potential agents of democracy should 
be at the top of donor agendas in the 1990s because the degree of 
inequity, injustice and deprivation on the continent does not allow 
us simply to expect that development in the economic realm will 
spin-off into democratization. This outcome must be consciously 
sought (Fowler 1991: 78). 
One justification for advocating expansion and strengthening of NGOs advocacy 
role is that this sector could possibly serve as a countervailing force to the 
dominance of the state or the market. 9 
A focus on the channel as an international donor-driven system also 
enables a more realistic analysis of the theory of a global associational 
revolution, and the processes and distribution of power within it. This approach 
8Uphoff notes that, 'One of the most interesting trends in less-developed countries is the 
increasing institutionalization of NGOs as a category... That the World Bank and other United 
Nations bodies have granted NGOs observer status and other special recognition has enhanced 
their ability to affect policy pronouncements and resource allocations over and above their 
respective abilities to exercise power or influence. ' (1993: 616) 
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pays attention to the role of donor money and donor policies in shaping 
organisational landscapes in other countries, the dilemma between organisations' 
external dependency and their roots in society and the fact that aid NGOs from 
donor countries do not necessarily reflect the national traditions in those same 
countries (Tvedt.: 4-5). 
NGO growth and official funding of NGOs are not new phenomena, but 
the trends outlined above do give rise to important questions concerning NGO 
performance and accountability, NGO-state relations, and the ability of NGOs to 
act independently in pursuing their goals. Specifically, Edwards and Hulme 
(1996: 962) put forth four hypotheses surrounding the effect of official funding on 
NGO performance: 
-encourages NGOs to become providers of social and economic services on a 
much larger scale than hitherto, even though their long-term comparative 
advantage in this field is doubtful. 
-compromises the performance of NGOs and GROs in other areas of 
development activity such as institutional development and advocacy. 
-weakens the legitimacy of NGOs and GROs as independent actors in society. 
-distorts the accountability of NGOs and GROs away from grassroots and 
internal constituencies and over emphasises short-term, quantitative outputs. 
9This point was made by Alexis de Tocqueville based on his observations of voluntary 
associations in America in the 1830s. (cf. de Tocqueville 1945). 
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It follows in their analysis that if the above hypotheses are valid then: 
`this must cast doubt on the ability of NGOs and GROs tö hP 
effective vehicles for the delivery of the New Policy Agenda and its 
long-term aim of sustainable poverty alleviation' (ibid.: 963). 
It is believed among donors that NGOs or GROs give more 'value for 
money' and this explains to some extent why official bodies have increased funds 
for NGOs, especially in the health and education sectors, credit schemes, and 
small-scale infrastructure projects. These funds sometimes fall under the 
classification of `Investment Funds' or `Social Funds' intended to moderate the 
social and economic effects of economic and structural adjustment packages 
(Voorhies 1993; Arellano-Lopez and Petras 1994). 
Almost all service-delivery NGOs operate on large funds that come from 
external donors, resources that are increasingly denied to governments. Edwards 
and Hulme (1996: 964) point out that: 
Were ministries of health and education allowed access to 
resources on this scale, it is argued, then over time they too would 
be able to provide services as cost-effectively. Indeed, the widening 
gap between government and NGO resources makes state 
inefficiency a `self-perpetuating reality' (Farrington and Lewis 1993: 
333). 
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Moreover, it is important to note that this phenomenal increase in the 
number, size and financial status of NGOs in the 1980s and the 1990s has to a 
large extent happened without close inspection of their actual performance. 
Questions concerning service provision, including poverty reach, cost 
eff ectiveness, popular participation, flexibility and innovation, and 
democratisation exist and need to be researched. Other questions concerning 
the measurement of performance, including legitimacy, accountability and 
sustainability also remain open and require satisfactory documentation from 
sources other than NGO personnel. Most of the literature and studies regarding 
NGO performance are anecdotal, produced within the NGO community, and 
based on small, selective samples (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 963). 
Critics of NGOs have pointed to a lack of accountability, mutual 
competitiveness and poor co-ordination as perhaps the three most serious 
charges levelled at NGOs working in development. Concern has also been 
expressed about the fact that some NGOs have crowded out governments by 
offering better services and salaries and, in some cases, have made little secret 
of their wish to replace government structures. Another severe criticism is that 
INGOs have almost completely failed to transfer skills to their Southern 
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counterparts. Bennett (1995: xiv), among many others, argues that there is a 
need for increased NGO transparency. 
For all their laudable success, some NGOs have been guilty of poor 
practice, wastage and a lack of professionalism, which to a large 
extent has gone unchecked. They tend to throw a veil of secrecy 
over actions that would not stand up to public scrutiny and rarely 
are NGO programmes evaluated from the standpoint of a broader 
analysis of their political as well as humanitarian impact. 
In summary, donors have found significant political and operational flexibility in 
NGOs at a time when total aid budgets are declining. Duffield (1994) pinpoints 
the resulting dilemma: 
Tragically, as Bosnia has shown, donor flexibility has contributed to 
the erosion of ideas of collective international responsibility for the 
Southern predicament. The UN Charter and Geneva Conventions 
have been weakened... In their place narrow perceptions of 
national interest, or calculations based on media exposure or 
domestic political advantage, have become the arbiters of 
engagement... [This flexibility] has been helped by the emergence 
of a private and competitive NGO sector... NGO financial and 
media dependency, plus their ability to work in a variety of 
situations, has been important in allowing donor governments to 
shape humanitarian programmes around national interests -a 
major charge that many NGOs appear unable to contemplate, let 
alone accept. 
Increasingly, NGOs are being sucked into a foreign policy vacuum with which 
they are ill equipped to deal. The use of humanitarian or development aid as a 
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tool to encourage stability in politically volatile situations has disturbing 
consequences (see for example, Fennell 1994). 
I. Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored the evolution of development theory and practices, as well 
as the growing involvement of NGOs in the development process up to 1996. At 
this time NGOs were increasingly being called upon to fill the void of the 
'incapable' state, repair infrastructure and societies, and build democratic 
institutions. The New Policy Agenda located NGOs front and centre in the bid to 
develop communities through allegedly providing basic needs, economic 
alternatives and skills in participating in the political processes of their local 
communities and state. 
The importance of this chapter for my thesis is to provide a backdrop for 
looking at the specific, selected work of seven INGOs within the context of a 
particular country. As was stated in this chapter, the impact of INGOs must be 
analysed as concretely as possible. Their role within the political economy of a 
state depends mostly on the specific character of the state system they are 
working in. In this case, we will be looking at Lebanon; a state that has been 
slowly recovering its influence and jurisdiction following 17 years of civil war. 
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The next chapter will look at the political economy of Lebanon-both in a 
historical and current perspective. Additionally, the chapter will locate the birth, 
growth and change of INGOs within the context of the country's political 
economy. The chapter will also include a section specifically on rural areas and 
agricultural development. It will conclude with remarks concerning INGOs as part 
of civil society at the time of the fieldwork. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LEBANON: `A HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS' 
There is a growing sense of distrust and a feeling of powerlessness. I am seeing 
history repeating itself--nothing has changed in Lebanon. 
Lebanese INGO field worker; July 1998 
This chapter will attempt to outline the basic historical, cultural, socio-economic 
and political constituents of the country under study: Lebanon. This is done in 
order to provide the reader with a general understanding of the particular 
landscape within which the INGOs studied in this research project were working. 
This chapter will also briefly trace the history and development of NGO/INGOs in 
Lebanon, and will look at their unique position in the political and socio-economic 
fabric of the country as it attempts to recover from more than 16 years of 
devastating warfare. Additionally, due to the fact that the INGOs looked at were 
working in rural areas, the end of the chapter includes an overview of the 
agricultural situation in the country. 
Lebanon is the smallest of the Near Eastern countries, and lies at the 
eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea. It measures just 210 kilometres from 
north to south, and ranges between 30 and 90 kilometres in width. The most 
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populous city is the capital, Beirut, followed by Tripoli (Trablous) to the north and 
Sidon (Saida) to the south. Lebanon has a very mild climate and breathtaking 
natural beauty. The country's topography is marked by a rugged mountain range 
that stretches from the north with mountains that reach a height of 3000 metres 
above sea level, to the hills of Galilee in the south, and a coastal plain that is 
divided into several isolated sections by gorges, which are cut by streams that 
pour down the mountains in winter and spring. Unlike other countries in the 
region, Lebanon's water resources are plentiful, and rainfall during winter months 
is sufficient for terraced farming in the mountains. ' 
1 Map adapted from: http: //almashriq. hiof. no/lebanon/900/910/912/maps/lebanon. gif 
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Lebanon is a multi-communal state made up of many ethnic and religious 
groups. Habib Kourani (1949) called this country a refuge for heretics, non- 
conformists, the oppressed and discontented. Pierre Rondot (1947: 5), one of the 
most perceptive writers on Lebanon, noted how the country's topography has 
contributed to its history and social development. 
A rugged country difficult of access, Lebanon has given refuge to 
dissidents of all sorts. The isolation of its peaks and valleys has 
enabled tribes and religious groups to survive with their character 
intact. But the small size of the territory and the need to defend it 
has compelled these varied groups to practise solidarity and 
cooperation... The opening to the sea has invited frequent foreign 
intervention, both for better and for worse. On account of its 
proximity, the Occident has had a strong influence,... encouraged 
the development of education and emergence of new ideas. 
Notwithstanding this, tradition has a strong hold on this country. It 
remains essentially an alliance of families. 
Philip Hitti remarked that this 'mosaic' society in which 'self contained 
nationalistic or semi-nationalistic communities' are able to co-habit has much to 
due with the fact that `the Lebanon especially through its valleys and hills, tends 
to divide its inhabitants' (Hitti 1957: 7). When Rondot and Hitti wrote these 
passages, more than 50 per cent of the Lebanese population were working in 
agriculture and living in rural or semi-rural areas. Today this number has dropped 
considerably to less than 20 per cent. Massive urbanisation, especially in the 
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years just preceding the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), has made Beirut one 
of the most densely populated cities in the Middle East. 
A. The Lebanese Culture 
Successive upheavals, including foreign conquests and internal conflicts in this 
limited area have forced some groups to migrate and others to collectively 
change their religion in order to remain, and have also provided an environment 
where one can observe corresponding features which form a distinct cultural 
identity of the Lebanese Mountain and its surrounding areas. Lebanon's unique 
culture has greatly influenced the overall political and socio-economic history of 
the country, and it is essential to appreciate before attempting to analyse the 
overall Lebanese political economy. 
1. Primary solidarities 
If there has ever been a culture with an exclusive 
kinship orientation, Lebanon comes close to being 
such. Kinship has been, and is likely to remain, 
Lebanon's most solid and enduring social bond 
(Khalaf 1987: 164). 
Firstly, the importance of family unity is historically intertwined with the 
organisation of peasant farmers, the distribution of agricultural land, and the type 
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of agrarian exploitation, both when there was a greater distribution of small 
properties (up to the eighteenth century) and later, when the growing 
indebtedness of the peasant farmers opened the way for the amassing of private 
land by the tax-collecting notables. Peasant labour and economic units of 
production were based on the kinship system and greatly influenced Mount 
Lebanon's fiscal and administrative structure. For centuries, from the Ottoman 
conquests (1516) to the mid 1800s, the Mountain and outlying areas were 
organised around a category of notables who collected lump-sum taxes for the 
authorities, as in neighbouring Syria and Palestine, with the exception that in 
Lebanon these tax collecting families were considered hierarchically superior to 
other families. Significantly, prestige and political power (independent of 
economic power) were maintained and passed through the channel of familial 
lineage from generation to generation. 2 
The Lebanese culture forms a pattern of solidarity, which begins with the 
family (nuclear and extended), expands to the sect or religion3, then the village, 
2 These are extended family relationships, rather like tribal clans with several branches. Being 
born in the same area of the village, having the same patronymic, or ties forged through 
endogamous marriage are also included within these extended family relationships. 
3 Muslim sects will align with each other when faced with a Christian challenge (e. g. In 
February 
1984 Shi'ite, Druze, and Sunni factions allied together against the Lebanese Army and the 
Lebanese Forces (a Christian militia) in a maelstrom of violence to take control of West Beirut). 
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and finally to the region of the country. For example, a Druze from Baakline will 
typically first identify with his/her family, the Druze sect, then with various 
groupings within the sect (the Jumblatt or the Arsian clan), the village of 
Baakline, and lastly the region of the country (the Shuf). 
The population of Lebanon is estimated at approximately four million, with 
over 1,600,000 persons living in Beirut, and 600,000 in Tripoli. Lebanon's 18 
different communities include; Sunni Muslims, Shi'ite Muslims, Druzes, Maronite 
Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Gregorians, Catholics 
and Protestants; various other Christian groups include Roman Catholics, 
Protestants, Syriac-speaking Christian communities (Jacobites, Syrian Catholics, 
Nestorians and Caldeans). a dwindlina Jewish community. and the recently 
added Alawite sect. An official census has not been taken since 1932 and is 
opposed by nearly all of the communities because of a fear of upsetting the 
'balance' and hence a possible loss of power. 
However, in most cases this solidarity of religion breaks down when the challenge recedes 
(e. g. 
The coalition mentioned above disintegrated into fratricidal war after gaining control of 
West 
Beirut). The same notion applies to Christian sects. Historically, there have 
been some 
exceptions to this rule, but they remain scarce. 
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What is known about Lebanon's sects is that none of the communities 
constitute a majority. Somehow the absence of actual figures provides a dubious 
sense of comfort for many Lebanese as legends of persecution still circulate, and 
the various communities that populate Lebanon continue to live in fear of 
subjugation and expulsion. 
Called the 'Switzerland of the Middle East', Lebanon in the 1960's and 
early 70s attracted the rich and famous, was a regional business centre, and a 
safe haven for outspoken Arab intelligentsia. Today, the term Lebanization has 
been coined as a pejorative to describe the utter collapse of a state under 
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Lebanon 
Presently the Lebanese are coming to terms with the causes and 
consequences of the most recent civil war (1975-1990). The abrupt end of the 
fighting came with the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War and the initiation of peace 
talks between Israel and the Arabs, but most importantly, the war ended because 
the Lebanese people had exhausted themselves. The literature on the subject of 
pre-war and wartime Lebanon is abundant. Studies by Binder (1966) and Hudson 
(1968) look at Lebanon's prospects for coexistence in better days. Khuri (1975); 
Khalaf (1987), and Dubar and Nasr (1976) examine aspects of Lebanon's 
massive social transformation in the pre-war years. Beydoun (1984) and Salibi 
(1988) provide a historic analysis of the growing self-awareness of the various 
communities and their eventual mobilisation. Barakat (1977) and Messara (1977) 
illuminate the adaptability and reformability of the Lebanese socio-political 
system. Salibi (1976) provides an account of the immediate prelude to civil war, 
and Khalidi (1979); Rabinovich (1985); Fisk (1990) and Picard (1988), (1996) 
have published precise and balanced studies of the war in Lebanon. For post- 
war reconstruction and its problems see Hanf (1993); Collings (1994) and Kiwan 
(1994). There is no complete synthesis on the contemporary economy of 
Lebanon, however Gates (1998) and Owen (1976) are very complete accounts of 
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the pre-war Lebanese economy and its effects on the political establishment and 
society. Additionally, Saidi (1999) has published a collection of essays covering 
the economics of the reconstruction period and Najem (2000) has published a 
comprehensive account of the political economy of the reconstruction of the 
country following the civil war. 
Before looking at Lebanon's current state of affairs, a brief summary of its 
history will aid in understanding the country's recent experience. At this point, it is 
important to point out that discussing Lebanon's origins is not straightforward as 
there is considerable internal disagreement concerning the history of the 
Republic. Whilst it is true that written history is rarely neutral, it is of great 
importance that a newly independent state takes an equitable stand on its origins 
and ensures that this information is disseminated among its population. Without 
this basic building block, all attempts at state-construction will almost certainly 
come tumbling down. Consecutive Lebanese leaders have failed to understand 
this basic premise and have chosen to ignore building long-term foundations for 
coexistence in favour of constructing personal kingdoms based on temporary 
alliances and permanent divisions. 
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The next three main sections of this work examine the political, economic 
and social history of Lebanon, and follow with a section on its agriculture and 
rural political economy. References to the social, political and economic 
significance of NGOs/INGOs will be made throughout this chapter in order to 
illustrate their evolution and importance during the Mandate period, 
Independence, Civil War and the Second Lebanese Republic. 
B. Historical Background: The Ottoman Period 
Before the creation of a distinct Lebanese state in 1920, Lebanon was 
considered to be the mountain range only and was called "The Lebanon". For 
more than 300 years it fell under the administration of the Ottoman Empire. A 
governor, or one of their adjutants, who resided in Damascus, Sidon, Tripoli and 
eventually Beirut, ruled the area of Mount Lebanon. The coastal cities were more 
or less under direct jurisdiction, but the mountain region or Mount Lebanon, like 
many other mountain districts in the Empire, whilst paying formal recognition to 
the Sultan in Istanbul, enjoyed relative autonomy from Ottoman government 
administration. Though the mountain inhabitants (Druzes, Maronites and Shi'ites) 
enjoyed great freedom in running their own affairs, they could not default on their 
obligation to pay taxes and tribute to the central authority of the Sunni Islamic 
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Empire. In fact, several punitive campaigns were launched against the mountain 
communities whenever the authorities felt that the inhabitants of the 
'autonomous' region were getting out of control or when tax payments were in 
arrears. 
The minority non-Muslim peoples of the area were classified according to 
their religion and were organised into a religious grouping called a 'millet', which 
was based on the ancient Muslim system of 'wardship'. The millets were granted 
some autonomy in the administration of the personal status affairs of their 
followers, which was the continuation of a long-standing Islamo-Arabic practice 
and remains a practice to this day. 5 
These two factors, autonomy in political and social spheres contributed to 
the various religious communities aligning themselves with foreign sponsors or 
protectors, a practice that has proved to be both salutary and pernicious. The 
Maronites' historical relationship with the West, especially the French, became 
solidified; the Greek Orthodox sought help from Russia and the Druze received 
support from Great Britain. 
5 All laws concerning personal status are left to the religious communities. For instance civil 
marriage is forbidden, and inheritance, marriage, divorce, custody of children, adoption etc... all 
must conform to the rites and regulations of the individual's religious sect. 
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Maronites, Druzes, Shiites and other Christians shared the mountain, but 
it was presided over by Druze and Maronite 'feudal lords', who were considered 
to be Princes by the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and surrounding areas. The 
'feudal' system originally introduced by the Egyptian Mamluk sultans was 
adapted to something like the Ottoman administrative system. The new Ottoman 
rulers maintained the system, though they instigated some changes in the fief 
holders and promoted certain families over others. According to Philip Hitti 
(1965: 358): 
As a rule the Lebanese vassals acted independently on the 
domestic level, transmitted their holdings to their descendants, 
offered no military service to the Sultan, exacted taxes and duties 
as they pleased, and even exercised the right of life and death over 
their subjects, and at least one of them concluded a treaty with a 
foreign power. 
The term feudal, however, is somewhat misleading if used as an analogy 
to medieval Europe. The system in the Lebanon was not based on the ownership 
of land, but on the right to collect taxes. The tax-farmers were from leading Druze 
and later Sunni and Maronite families, and control of these offices typically 
remained within the respective families. Characteristically, these princely families 
would rely on prominent local families to collect the taxes at the local level. From 
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this `a stratum of notables gradually developed' (Hanf 1993: 54). These powerful 
tax-farming and tax-collecting families would in turn use their income to purchase 
land, and then lease it for cash or for a share of the harvest. Importantly, local 
level tax-collecting offices were never hereditary, and the families were not 
considered to be nobility. 
Their influence derived from their function. Whether they retained 
this influence depended on whether they were able to raise the tax 
revenues required of them without alienating the taxpayers (ibid. 
54). 
The Maronites and the Druze dominated Mount Lebanon with primarily the 
Maronites holding the northern part of the mountain and the Druze governing the 
southern part. The 'feudal' system was well established here as well as in other 
areas of the region including the Akkar, the Beka'a and the South. 
Bloody sectarian feuds and massacres marked a twenty-year period 
(1840-1860). Several elements contributed to this breakdown in relations, 
however the dissolution of the `feudal' system was probably the greatest 
contributing factor (Kerr 1959: 1-31). Other reasons included the Druze frustration 
and fear at the ascendance of the Maronites with their growing influence, 
prestige and wealth. Moreover, Great Britain, along with other European powers, 
was trying to gain a foothold and hence influence in the country. Great Britain 
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sided with the Druze in order to counterbalance French influence with the 
Maronites. Additionally, the Porte of Constantinople wanted to utilise this time of 
chaos and uncertainty to strengthen and centralise Ottoman rule in the area. 
The clashes of 1860 were not between peasants and notables, instead the 
notables were able to deflect this struggle into confessional warfare. Fighting 
took place throughout the mountain, in the Bekaa, the South and even in 
Damascus. In less than four weeks from mid-May to June 20, an estimated 
10,000 Christians were killed, 4000 more died from deprivation, 100,000 were 
made homeless, and there was approximately 4,000,000 pounds worth of 
property damage (Khalaf 1987: 70; Churchill 1862: 132; Hitti 1957: 438; Salibi 
1965: 106). 
Eventually, the European powers intervened to end the fighting and 
agreed to send in French troops. Under pressure from the French, the Ottomans 
were forced to pay symbolic indemnities to the Christians, for Ottoman garrisons' 
participation in the massacres. France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, 
Turkey and later Italy signed a new organic statute, called the Reglement 
Organique, guaranteeing the autonomy of the Mutasarrifyah of Mount Lebanon. It 
was concluded that a Christian Mutasarrif (governor-general) appointed by the 
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Sublime Porte, but approved by the signatory powers, would rule the country. 
The new constitutional agreement granted equal rights to all citizens and nullified 
all feudal privileges in the mountain. Mount Lebanon under this new regime was 
divided into seven sub-districts and each district was ruled by a Qai'm Maqam 
(sub-governor) of the religion or sect prevailing in the area. This political 
arrangement was clearly a Christian preserve, three were Maronites, one Greek 
Orthodox and one Greek Catholic, and only two of seven were non-Christians; 
one Muslim and one Druze. It is important to note that the `confessional' system 
had already taken solid roots, and at this time many other appointments were 
made on the basis of religious affiliation (el-Khoury 1960: 29-30). 
The European powers that intervened in the Near East considered the 
problems in the Lebanon to be based on communal identities, and therefore dealt 
with each community separately. Picard (1996: 20) argues that this European 
understanding of the Near East is responsible for transforming conflicts rooted in 
socio-economic inequalities and change into inter-communal ones. 
It is important to note that prior to the intervention by the great powers, the 
Sublime Porte had in 1842 established a regime of territorial division. This was 
an attempt to put an end to the near-autonomy experienced by the Lebanese 
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emirate and was the first time that a division between Maronites and Druzes was 
officially recognised politically. There was to be, along with a Maronite and Druze 
prefect, a council of representatives from each community-which has 
symbolised the Lebanese political system since that time. 
During the Mutasarrifiyah era, Mount Lebanon's contacts with the West 
were stepped up and missionary activities increased exponentially; especially by 
the French, Americans and the British. In 1866 and 1875 respectively, the Syrian 
Protestant College, later known as the American University of Beirut (AUB), and 
its French counterpart, Universite Saint Joseph (USJ) were established. 
Legislation governing social service organisations dates back to this 
period and in 1909 the Ottoman Turkish regime decreed that the establishment 
of a voluntary association must be made known to the authorities ('notification'). 
The origin of this requirement relates to the desire on the part of the state to 
criminalise the existence of secret societies. Most of the work at this time was 
carried out through religious institutions and the Church, which had established 
several charities. For nearly half a century, until the beginning of World War I, 
Lebanon experienced a period of unity, peace and prosperity reminiscent of the 
Ma'anid and Shihabi emirates. 
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World War I brought this peace to an end. The Turkish pound was 
devalued, the Allies blockaded the sea, and the imperial army had become an 
occupation force and had claimed the grain harvests at a time when Lebanon 
experienced a devastating plague of locusts. This combination of factors caused 
a severe famine in which thousands perished, and thousands emigrated. There 
were calls among the population for independence from the Ottoman Empire- 
some desired autonomy with French protection, some complete autonomy and 
others wished to be part of a unified nation that comprised the entire Syrian 
region. In the end, French ambitions and the desires of their local clientele 
prevailed, and France was granted mandate powers over Syria and Lebanon 
following the war. 
C. The French Mandate: reinforcing the power of the merchants, 
bankers, and notables 
The San Remo conference of 1920 following WW I granted France the mandate 
over Syria and Lebanon. The King-Crane Commission sent by US president 
Woodrow Wilson to determine the wishes of the people of Syria, Mount Lebanon, 
Palestine and Iraq reported that the majority of Syrians favoured a special 
autonomous status for Mount Lebanon within a larger Syrian state. The 
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Maronites called for an enlarged Lebanon (one closer to the Shihabi and Ma'anid 
eras of the Mutasarrifiyah period) under French protection. Others in the region 
rejected this proposal and called for an Arab Syrian kingdom under Emir Faisal. 
However, in the end French and Maronite economic interests and prestige 
proved to be much more powerful than the appeals of the majority of the people 
in the region, and in September 1920 General Gouraud, the French High 
Commission in Syria and Lebanon, proclaimed the `restoration' of Greater 
Lebanon. In Syria, opinion was deeply outraged. This new Lebanon was almost 
double the size of the mountain and the population had been increased by 50 
percent. 
The new Lebanon, though it was much more economically viable due to 
the addition of the outlying regions, lost its internal cohesion and equilibrium. 
Muslims, who rejected being brought into a country where they were considered 
a minority, mostly populated the annexed areas. `As events were to show it was 
like introducing a Trojan horse into the body politic of Mount Lebanon' (McDowall 
1986: 10). The population of the attached territories were largely Sunni Muslim 
from Tripoli, the Akkar and Sidon, and largely Shi'ite Muslim in the Beka'a valley 
and the southern districts east of Tyre and Sidon. The main opposition came 
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from Sunni Muslims because, although they welcomed the end of Turkish rule, 
they wanted no part in a state characterised by Franco-Maronite domination. 
They still retained nostalgia for their privileged position under the Muslim Turkish 
Empire, and desired a connection to a greater Arab nation. Under the French 
Mandate, which ruled that political representation in Lebanon functioned through 
communal organisation, the Sunnis became a minority. From this time until the 
present day, arguments over the distribution of power between Maronite 
Christians and Sunni Muslims have basically dominated the political scene. 6 
The French were particularly concerned to keep the central administration 
of the government weak. This had something to do with the fact that merchant 
and banking interests dominated the Lebanese economy. But maybe more 
significantly, it was also the result of a situation in which the ability of the notables 
to satisfy their political 'clienteles' depended on their capacity to provide them, 
personally, with resources and services, which in a better developed 
administration would have been catered for by the bureaucracy itself. The High 
Commission insisted that the seats in the new parliament be allocated to the 
6 Significantly, during the recent civil war Shi'ite and Druze leaders have been able to take 
advantage of this struggle for central power between Maronites and Sunnis in order to galvanise 
and build mini-kingdoms in their respective regions the South and the Shuf. 
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sects in rough proportion to their numbers within the population at large. It was 
inevitable that most of those elected would come from the country's leading 
families, whose power was based on their control over important economic and 
social resources (Owen 1976: 234-235). Their presence in parliament and hence 
availability for Cabinet office, then offered the possibility for a further increase in 
power. The fact that this option was open to Muslim notables as well as Christian 
provided an enormous encouragement for them to forget their opposition to the 
division of Lebanon from Syria and to participate in the new system, which they 
eventually did. 
Initially the French tried to assuage Muslim fears of Maronite domination 
and secured the appointment in 1926 of a Greek Orthodox, Charles Debbas as 
President of Lebanon's constitutional Republic. As an Orthodox, he was much 
more acceptable to the Muslim and Druze sects than a Maronite would have ever 
been, and he was re-elected for a second term in 1929. Although the Mandate 
powers did make attempts to acquire Muslim loyalty, these measures were 
superficial, since their overall policy instead intensified the rivalries between 
communities and boldly favoured Christian interests, especially those of 
Maronites. Importantly, In 1932 Muslim fears were dramatically re-awakened 
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when the French authorities suspended the constitution for five years in order to 
avert the election of a Muslim, Sheikh Muhammad al-Jisr as president. This 
measure stunned the population of Lebanon, including Christians, who felt that 
they were forced to chose between the Mandatory power and their fellow 
countrymen. 
There was a divergence of opinion within the Christian elite between those 
who believed that the French presence guaranteed the survival of the country, 
led by the Maronite Francophile, Emile Edde. Edde viewed Lebanon primarily as 
a homeland for Christians with a Mediterranean culture similar to France, and 
that Muslims should be seen as a potential threat to this concept of the nation 
and culture. The opposing opinion was that led by another Maronite, Bishara 
Khoury, who believed that Lebanon could only survive if the various sects shared 
an independent national identity and unity that came before all other concerns. 
He saw that the Maronites must choose between their French protectors and a 
positive relationship with the Muslim sects of Lebanon. Moreover, he believed 
that if the initial push for independence came from the Christians, the Muslims 
would be much more willing to commit to an independent Lebanese state. 
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1. NGOs During the Mandate 
During the Mandate period trade unions and associations of all kinds were 
viewed with some suspicion. Irene Soltau (1949: 310) who wrote in the 1930s 
and 1940s about social responsibility in Lebanon describes the situation: 
Trade unions were still very weak (1930s), and this not only 
because of economic and social circumstances. The Turkish 
Government-and a fortiori the French mandatory Power-adopted 
the suspicious and hostile attitude of Napoleonic Code towards 
associations of all kinds, an attitude which looks upon all groupings 
of citizens for common action as a danger to the unity and security 
of the State. In the early days of the period under review, the only 
groups resembling unions were temporary sporadic associations for 
the organization of a strike, or the urging of some particular 
grievance. 
Large international voluntary organisations were quite active at this time. For 
instance the YWCA worked to raise awareness of child labour laws in the mid- 
1930s. Lebanon was going through a period of nascent industrialisation and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), working through the Mandates 
Commission, tried to pass some kind of labour legislation. However, Lebanon 
was one of the last countries in the region to pass and enforce labour laws. In 
1935 women and children were officially forbidden from working night shifts, the 
minimum working age was raised to 13, the maximum working day for women 
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was decreased to eight hours, and for a young person (13-16), seven hours. 
However, these laws came from outside influence and were not brought about 
because of domestic pressure, therefore, most of the laws remained unheard of 
and unenforceable. The YWCA, through classes, clubs and co-operation with 
other associations, worked to build awareness of this legislation. Gradually these 
labour laws were accepted and administered. 
The work of organisations like the YWCA, the YMCA (founded by a 
Frenchman in 1930), the Beirut Rotary Club, the Franco-Lebanese Red Cross, 
and many others including religious organisations, was hastened due to the 
onset of World War II, and some were even given financial support by the Free 
French, who expressed their views on social questions through the `Section 
Sociale du Haut Commissariat'. 
D. Patrons and Clients 
To a large measure, much of the socio-political history of Lebanon 
may be viewed as the history of various groups and communities 
seeking to secure patronage: client groups in search of protection, 
security and vital benefits, and patrons seeking to extend the scope 
of their clientage (Khalaf 1977: 187). 
Pursuing the commercial metaphor, one could say that even during 
the Mandate and even more so after independence, social and 
political relations in Lebanon were essentially those of clientelism, 
and that "bosses" or patrons dominated the whole of public life, 
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from the village to the capital and the whole national territory (Picard op. cit.: 49). 
Nearly all of Lebanon's political institutions and their functioning have to be seen 
in terms of patron-client relations, which are `highly personalised, tightly 
circumscribed and reciprocal' (Khalaf 1977: 201). As stated previously, 
Lebanese culture is marked by persisting primary, familial, and religious 
identities. Strong village solidarities, especially local attachments and personal 
loyalties, are essential and extremely important in Lebanon. The country's history 
is one of principal communities seeking protection, security and the redistribution 
of benefits. Clients in turn promise patrons fidelity and loyalty, which will give him 
great latitudes in political autonomy and opportunities to extend and strengthen 
the clientelist relationship (Khalaf 1987). The patron-client relationship involves 
mutually beneficial, but unequal relations, that both parties have an interest in 
maintaining (Lemarchand 1972: 75-76). 
The patron-client system in Lebanon can partially be explained as a 
legacy leftover from the mediating role played by tax collectors and warlords up 
until the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire represented by the Pasha of 
Damascus or Sidon was replaced by the Mandate represented by the French 
High Commissioner; and eventually the Mandate was replaced in 1943 by an 
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independent state as the centre of political authority-the Republic of Lebanon. 
The one constant theme in the evolving Lebanese political system is the 
presence of the Lebanese patron, who plays a fundamental role in mediating 
between the centre and periphery. 
The cessation of 'feudalism' did nothing to impair this system, which 
developed and grew stronger by enlarging and altering its mechanisms, modes 
of operation and spheres of intervention. The institutions of the independent state 
which were developed at the beginning of the Mandate and transformed before 
and after independence were imprinted with Lebanon's system of patronage. 
The Lebanese government became, in the words of Malcolm Kerr, a "broker" 
distributing `guarantees to the recognized factions coexisting in the country of the 
means to defend their minimal interests' (1966: 188). 
This fact left little room for organised political parties, because on the one 
hand, most economic and social interests could be represented at government 
level, either directly by the notable politicians or indirectly by one of the many 
sect-based organisations, like the Maronite Church or the Maqasid Society, the 
leading Islamic charity. The zu'ama `preferred to subsidize development 
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programs through non-governmental, rather than governmental, agencies' 
(Joseph 1984: 152). 
The vacuum at the state level and the channeling of 
public resources through patron-client relationships 
and sectarian non-governmental agencies controlled 
by the zu'ama, reinforced the primordial affiliations 
rooted in family, patronage and ethnic-sects. There 
was a state, but no nation in Lebanon. The 
emergence of national loyalties was continually 
obstructed by an archaic ruling class attempting to 
reproduce the basis of its own existence. In the 
process, they reinforced social and political 
fragmentation and undermined the development of 
civic commitments (ibid. 152). 
Moreover, an economy based largely on services did little to encourage 
the unionism or any of the other urban solidarity movements that might have 
provided scope for class based parties. What is more to the point is the close fit 
between the system of parliamentary representation devised by the French, a 
weak central administration and the type of economic and clientelist social 
structures that already existed in the area in late Ottoman times (Owen 1976: 
234). 
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Realizing that the age of British protection was long gone, the 
Jumblatts of the Shuf played the French card as early as 1920. 
Members of the great Shiite families in the south like the Zeins and 
the Osseirans entered parliament in 1920 and 1922, respectively. 
But this represented a collaboration between "patrons" replacing 
collaboration with Istanbul during the empire, and [was] not 
comparable to the popular movement that inclined the Maronite 
community toward France (Picard op. cit.: 66). 
The officials of the Mandate `excelled at the art of manipulating rivalries 
and alliances' led the patrons to declare themselves indispensable middlemen 
between the French Mandatory power and the local populations, who for the 
most part, regarded French authorities as 'alien and hostile'. `Their clients trusted 
only them and only they could muster the clients at the request of the French 
authorities... on the other hand... it was only through them that it was possible to 
reach the Mandatory power' (Picard op. cit.: 51). 
E. Moves Toward Independence and the National Pact 
of 1943 
The British had put considerable pressure on General De Gaulle and the Free 
French to grant sovereignty and independence to Syria and Lebanon in 1941, 
and though they acquiesced, the French did not really lesson their influence. In 
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1943, Bishara Khoury was elected to the presidency and on his election 
convinced the Chamber of Deputies to delete the parts of the constitution, which 
granted the French control over Lebanese sovereignty. The French reacted 
hastily and imprisoned Khoury and his government. This single act, exclaimed 
General Catroux, `unified the whole Lebanese nation against France in a single 
night' (Longrigg 1958: 333). The French, faced with British insistence, eventually 
backed down and reinstated Khoury and his government, and official 
independence was declared a few months later. 
Lebanon's first elected President, Bishara Khoury, and Prime Minister, 
Riad el Solh, devised an unwritten agreement called the National Pact. This 
gentlemen's agreement was designed to foster security to the different religious 
confessions through Christian and Muslim compromises on power-sharing and 
the identity of the country. Lebanon would be 'neither Eastern or Western', but 
independent with its own 'special character. ' The Christians agreed not to seek 
protection from the West and the Muslims agreed not to pursue union with Syria 
or any other Arab state. Lebanon would remain neutral in all intra-Arab conflicts, 
but would work closely with all Arab states whilst maintaining its sovereignty, and 
would continue its cultural and spiritual contacts with the West (Hanf 1993: 71). 
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Khoury and el Solh agreed that the president would always be a Maronite, 
the prime minister a Sunni, and later it was agreed that the speaker of the house 
would be a Shi'ite. All communities were to be represented in the civil service and 
cabinet along confessional lines and based on the population census of 19327. A 
ratio of six Christians to five Muslims in the government was eventually agreed 
upon. 
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Figure 2.3 
Maronites 226,378 29 
Greek Orthodox 76,522 10 
Greek Catholics 45,999 6 
Armenians 31.156 4 
Others (Jews, Latins, 22.308 3 
Protestants, various eastern 52% 
Christian groups) 
Sunnis 175,925 22 
Shi'ites 154,208 19 
Druzes 53,047 7 
48% 
Total 793,426 
7 This census was disputed at the time by the Muslims, mainly Sunnis, who claimed that they 
were a demographic majority in Lebanon. 
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In 1958, Lebanon had a foreshadowing of what was to come in 1975. The 
government of Camille Chamoun ignored the basic tenets of the National Pact 
and sought to align Lebanon with the West by joining the Baghdad Pact with 
Jordan and Iraq in the face of ardent and vociferous Arab nationalism led by 
Gemal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. This proved to be a deadly and dangerous 
political path, and when in 1958 he sought to extend his term in office, the state 
became immobilised in the wake of sectarian warfare. The army, led by General 
Fouad Shehab, refused to intervene on the grounds that the army could not act 
in order to maintain a particular government in power as it would destroy the 
army's impartiality and cohesion. After the fall of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, 
US Marines were deployed in Beirut. Both Christians and Muslims were anxious 
for Chamoun to be replaced and a new president was soon elected. 
General Shehab was viewed as a President of reconciliation (McDowall 
1986: 12). His shrewd neutrality during the 1958 Civil War earned him respect 
from all quarters. He initiated aggressive development programmes and was 
largely successful as a president, `though he failed to resolve the contradiction 
between the need for strong government and public sector, and well established 
patterns of political and economic behaviour' (McDowali op. cit.: 13). Moreover, 
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although his presidency is generally hailed as an achievement, issues 
concerning the National Pact were not modified. 
The influential Lebanese political scientist, Rene Aggiouri exclaimed that 
the National Pact was `the unwritten expression of the will of the different 
Lebanese minorities to coexist within the structures of an independent and 
sovereign state' (Aggiouri cited in Hanf: 1996: 72). However the vagueness of the 
pact has been blamed for Lebanon's unstable foreign policy since independence. 
`The conflict between the pro-French and pro-Arab orientations soon became 
outdated with the collapse of the French colonial power; this 1943 arrangement 
had nothing to say about the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1948, the US-Soviet Cold 
War, or the various inter-Arab Cold Wars' (Salem 1992: 2-3). 
Implicit in the National Pact had been an assumption about the relative 
proportion that each confession constitutes in the Lebanese State. These 
proportions were based on the only official census Lebanon has ever had, which 
was carried out in 1932. Obviously, the numbers have not remained static, and 
though this is widely acknowledged, no government dares to carry out another 
census because of its political sensitivity. Demographic surveys in the 1970s 
revealed that the birthrate among Lebanese Shi'ite women was on average 58 
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per cent higher than the birthrate for Christian women (UNDP 1997). Therefore 
the Muslim population, especially Shi'ites, have experienced a dramatic increase 
over the last 70 years and it is the Shi'ites in particular who are believed to have 
become the largest sect. The Lebanese government's persistence in clinging to 
the myth of the 1932 census is damaging to all of Lebanon's communities, 
because without an accurate statistical record any measurement of the 
effectiveness of development programmes will be defective. The Lebanese 
government and its people must summon the courage to face basic demographic 
facts concerning their state. Moreover, it is understandable that those groups 
who feel disadvantaged by this lack of transparency will eventually demand their 
fair share of state benefits, especially in view of the fact that positions in the 
government and other offices are allocated according to the size of the 
community. 
1. NGOs after Independence 
Due to the fact that the political leadership established the sects as the basic 
political element instead of the Lebanese citizen, most of the Lebanese voluntary 
organisations emerged through various religious channels. Soltau (1949: 317) 
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describes the work of voluntary organisations as a welcome addition to the work 
of the state. 
The idea that society and the State are responsible for the welfare 
of citizens is growing, while the State accepts and welcomes co- 
operation with voluntary agencies. 
During the 1960s under General Shehab's regime, an attempt by the government 
was made to work with NGOs (voluntary associations) in capacities such as 
social work and community building. During this time many organisations went 
beyond charity and relief and worked to establish a spirit of unity and co- 
operation. A group of NGOs was established which aimed at `deepening social 
consciousness and building a society of justice, equality, freedom, participation, 
development and peace' (Lam'ha Tarikhiyah 1997). NGOs were present in most 
regions of Lebanon. At the time NGOs which had been established for 150 years 
in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, 120 years in Tripoli and Sidon, 30 years in the 
Shuf, and 25 years in the South, Beka'a and the southern suburbs (ibid. ). 
However, the majority of these organisations were sectarian, and it is important 
to stress the familial and sectarian nature of the local NGO sector, which is still 
an influential component of the local NGO sector today. 
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Family associations are also a unique and important feature of the 
Lebanese society. As far back as 1860, these associations began to appear in 
order to provide security, protection and welfare, where prevailing patron-client 
networks or the administration could not (see Khalaf 1987: 161-184), and they 
have continued to exist and even flourish during the recent civil war. 
Since its independence, consecutive Lebanese governments have failed 
to provide a strong state capable of even providing the minimum for its citizens 
(education, health and security) therefore family associations, local NGOs and 
INGOS have had to provide a large variety and number of services. 
F. The Creation of the Merchant Republic 
Although General Henri Gouraud, the first French High Commissioner in Beirut 
wrote that military control of the Levant allowed for the entrance of French 
capital, this in reality had been taking place for some time before the end of the 
Ottoman Empire. By the time that Ottoman rule was coming to an end, the 
Lebanese economy was fully a part of the world capitalist system `through the 
export of silk and primary agricultural foodstuffs; local markets had been opened 
to products manufactured in Europe, and capital had been invested on massive 
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scale by the major industrial countries' (Picard 1996: 37-38). French intervention 
in the Lebanese economy just quickened the pace of this ongoing growth. 
The French did accomplish a great deal towards building infrastructure 
and pursuing administrative reform and organisation. However, due to the type of 
economy that was envisioned they also advocated a large repressive apparatus 
and a rudimentary civil administration with limited administrative services. For the 
most part medical, educational and social services were left to the non-profit 
communal organisations or NGOs. 
And while France's effort to equip the country remained limited, 
some of the Lebanese landowners, traders, and bankers with 
connections to French capitalism profited from closer relations with 
France and enjoyed an undeniable prosperity. The tradition of a 
liberal state with modest financial resources and power of 
intervention was thus inscribed in Lebanon's history during the 
Mandate, and from then on, this tradition carried great weight in the 
country's political economy (Picard ibid.: 39). 
Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has adopted a liberal economic 
system that gave the private sector freedom of movement in the economic field, 
including financial and monetary aspects, with no restrictions imposed on 
currency transfers and external trade. The creation of the service economy was 
solidified after independence from 1948 to 1958. There were various internal and 
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external forces since the 19th century that worked to create an outward looking 
environment. Following the declaration of independence the Lebanese state 
reached its zenith in the 1950's Merchant Republic (Gates 1998: 136). This 
openness gave Lebanon a comparative advantage in the region and enabled it to 
attract Arab and foreign capital and investment. Beirut became an important 
regional trade and financial centre. Beirut banks were able to garner a large 
share of Arab deposits, especially those obtained through oil revenues from 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. 
The vision of developing a mercantile capitalist country expounded by 
Lebanon's 'New Phoenicians' leadership established policies that would support 
a strong currency, mobilise domestic private capital and attract foreign 
investment, promote a growing variety of service exports, and maintain healthy 
fiscal and external accounts. For ten years (1947-1957) both the Khoury and 
Chamoun administrations adopted policies based on these general principles. 
Consequently, macroeconomic fundamentals improved, as policies and 
institutions sustained a strong gold-backed currency, a multi-based exchange 
rate, low (if repressed) inflation, and surplus fiscal budgets. This economic 
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environment instilled international confidence in Lebanon. However, Gates (ibid.: 
137) points out that these guiding principles and policies: 
... 
did not aim at promoting socio-political stability in the new nation- 
state, nor at executing public development programmes. Instead 
the power bloc attempted to counter opposition to negative 
economic outcomes by a generous application of patron-client 
politics and pork-barrel projects. 
The establishment of a strong currency that facilitated international trade, finance 
and services was highly successful. The growth of surpluses and gold reserves 
also endowed policy makers with a high degree of control over money 
management. 
The FAO described Lebanon's fiscal policies from 1948-1958 as 
conservative, deflationary and designed to promote trade and services. Today 
the same policies continue to be implemented. However, unlike stylised fiscal 
management in the East Asian export-oriented model, Lebanon's budgetary 
management was not conducive to industrialisation and employment creation. 
And though Lebanon's private credit system favoured tertiary over other 
economic activities, the government did not try to offset negative consequences 
by employing fiscal policies to develop labour intensive, export-oriented industry 
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(as in the East Asian model) or to transform traditional agriculture (Gates op. cit.: 
140). 
Given Lebanon's economic model and the primary roles of the private 
domestic and foreign sectors, public spending was concentrated on meeting the 
physical infrastructure needs of rapidly growing trade and services. Policy 
makers did not seek to fund publicly other (large) supply-side requirements of 
industrialisation, nor to fill any investment gap in industry or agriculture, which 
required much larger capital flows and stocks with their high capital-output ratios 
than the tertiary sector. Moreover, these policies were not counterbalanced by 
tax and other measures to encourage private investment in the neglected 
sectors. 
In short, the objectives of an open economy in Lebanon did not 
include industrialising rapidly, strengthening the role of the state, or 
increasing efficiency through market mechanisms. Rather, they 
aimed at developing an external service economy, which required 
greater international confidence, and second, sustaining its 
agriculture and industrial sectors by expanding exports to the 
region. As planning was not part of this strategy, the issues of 
promoting long-run economic growth, structural change, and equity 
among others were avoided (Gates op. cit.: 86). 
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High profits and rapid turnover rates encouraged investment in other services. By 
contrast, lower incentives, such as lower profits and higher uncertainty, and 
higher capital requirements in agriculture and manufacturing reduced their 
attractiveness to potential investors (Gates ibid.: 145). 
Whilst Lebanon's model of an open service-oriented economy was 
relatively successful in mobilising and intermediating financial capital, it paid little 
attention to developing human capital and employing its labour force effectively. 
Typical of underdeveloped economies, surplus labour in Lebanon's traditional 
agriculture sector was high, and employment creation in other sectors was not a 
major priority of the state at all. 
Without the investment incentives for the expansion of labour-intensive 
industries their growth in Lebanon was too slow to absorb more than a fraction of 
labour in the traditional sector. Furthermore, the fastest growing areas of the 
economy; finance, transport and trade simply did not have the job generating 
capacity on the scale that was needed to absorb the unemployed, 
underemployed and new members of the labour force. Consequently, Lebanon's 
time-honoured method of dealing with this problem, large-scale immigration, 
persisted. 
94 
Prewar Lebanon did not have a genuine free market economy. 
Cartels and even monopolies were tolerated in the import trade and 
certain areas of manufacturing; the beneficiaries were politicians or 
persons closely associated with them (Gates op. cit.: 185). 
This stratum had little understanding of the upwardly mobile middle classes in 
industry and services, and even less understanding of the resurgent 
dissatisfaction of the rural population. Following its economic philosophy and 
interests, the governing elite neither formulated nor executed policies to reduce 
income inequality in Lebanon. Gates (op. cit.: 142) hints that income inequality 
was a major contributing factor in the country's 1958 Civil War. 
The impact of income inequality in Lebanese society during this 
period is difficult to evaluate, but for reasons that went far beyond 
the economic, it probably contributed significantly to latent 
instability. 
In 1959, President Shehab commissioned a comprehensive study on the 
overall situation of development in Lebanon. The Institution for Research and 
Training for Development (IRFED) Chairman of the Dominican Louis Joseph 
Lebret noted that 'the differences in living standards of both regions and social 
strata are excessive and an enormous effort is largely required to overcome 
them' (Lebret 1960: 25). Some direct consequences of the Lebret study were 
numerous electricity, irrigation and road-building projects initiated in less 
developed parts of the country. The telephone and power networks were 
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extended to some of the most remote areas and the national health system was 
improved. These policies did meet with resistance from the majority of Shi'ite and 
Sunni landowners in the south and north respectively, who feared that these 
projects and the concomitant strengthening of state influence would weaken their 
own economic and political eminence, as well as their dominance over the local 
population (Lechleitner 1972 as cited in Hanf 1996: 99). 
The Lebanese miracle was without doubt based on Beirut's intermediary 
position that made possible the high growth of income in financial and 
commercial services, construction, transport and communications. It diverged 
greatly from structural changes traditionally once thought to be associated with 
economic modernisation (industrialisation). This is taken to mean a relatively 
rapid rise in investment, employment and value-added in the manufacturing 
sector; a decline in the weight of the primary sector; the transfer of surplus labour 
form the traditional to modern sectors, thereby increasing labour productivity; and 
a growth in domestic services with the rise of internal demand. 
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Lebanon's choice of a service-orientated open-economic model was 
successful in the medium run, in the first decade following WW II and its 
leadership elite implemented a Merchant Republic political economy that 
supported Lebanon's sovereignty and material sustainability. 
Lebanon's open, service-oriented economy furthered the interests 
of the dominant elite, but it was less successful in contributing to 
nation-building and to constructing a socio-economy that met the 
needs of the majority of the population. Although the economy 
enjoyed high growth, its dependence on the foreign sector made it 
vulnerable to regional and international shocks and pressures, and 
its sustainability was always in question (Gates op. cit.: 150). 
Gates goes on to answer the question: Did this mode of development, 
however, have a tangible effect on domestic political and social stability? 
Although available evidence shows no tidy relationship between 
Lebanon's economic model and political stability, conventional 
wisdom holds that it contributed to socio-political disharmony (ibid. 
150). 
G. The 1975-1990 Civil War 
The detailed events of the civil war in Lebanon have been well documented 
elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, there is some 
general agreement on the factors that brought on and influenced the war, and will 
be put forth so as to give the reader a basic understanding of these theories. 
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Major Dates in the War in Lebanon 
April 13,1975 Beginning of the war between the Lebanese Front and the 
National Movement supported by the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization. 
June 1,1975 Entry of the Syrian troops at the request of President 
Frangieh in order to prevent a victory of the radicals. 
April 1978 Operation Litani: 2,000 deaths and 250,000 displaced 
persons following the Israeli invasion. Positioning of the 
UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. 
July 1978 Beginning of clashes between the Syrians and the Lebanese 
front. 
April 18,1979 Proclamation of the State of Free Lebanon by Major Saad 
Haddad. 
July 7,1980 Forced unification of the Christian militias under Bashir 
Gemayel. 
April-June 1981 Syrian-Israeli missile crisis. 
July 17,1981 Bombardment of Beirut by the Israeli Air Force: 300 dead. 
The UN arranges a cease-fire. 
June 5,1982 Operation "Peace for Galilee"; two month siege of Beirut by 
Israeli forces: approximately 22,000 dead. 
Sept. 24,1982 Following the massacres at Sabra and Chatila, a 
multinational force moves into Beirut for the protection of 
civilians. 
May 17,1983 Signing in Naqoura of a Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement. 
Shuf war; the Druzes drive out the Lebanese Forces and 
clash with the army. 
October 23,1983 suicide attacks on American and French members of the 
Multinational force: 299 victims. 
Nov. 1-8,1983 National dialogue conference in Geneva. 
December 1983 The Syrian army besieges the PLO at Tripoli. 
February 1984 The Amal movement and its allies drive the army our of 
West Beirut. 
March 12-20,1984 Second national dialogue conference at Lausanne. 
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Feb. -June 1985 Operation Iron Hand of the Israeli army in southern Lebanon 
ending in its fallback to the "security zone". Beginning of the 
"camp wars" between Amal and the Palestinians. 
Dec. 28,1985 Damascus Accord between Amal, Jumblatt's PSP, and the 
Lebanese Forces. 
Jan. 15,1986 President Gemayel rejects the Damascus Accord. 
Feb. 20,1987 Syrian army returns to West Beirut. 
Sept. 11,1987 An agreement between the Amal and the Palestinians brings 
the war of the cams to an end. 
Sept. 22,1988 End of President Amin Gemayel's mandate. In the absence 
of a successor, he appoints General Michel Aoun to form a 
government. 
Nov. 28,1988 Beginning of clashes between Amal and Hizbollah on the 
outskirts of Beirut and in the South. 
February 1989 Clashes in east Beirut and central Lebanon between the 
Lebanese Forces and General Aoun's army. 
March 14-Sept. 22 General Aoun's "war of liberation" against Syria. 
1989 
Oct. 22,1989 Taif Accord. 
Nov. 5,1989 Rene Moawad elected President. 
Nov. 22,1989 Rene Moawad assassinated. 
Nov. 24,1989 Elias Hrawi elected president. 
Jan. 30,1990. Beginning of clashes between the Lebanese Forces and 
General Aoun's army. 
Oct. 12,1990 Syrian air attack puts an end to General Aoun's separatist 
government. 
Nov. 6,1990 Cease-fire between Amal and Hizbollah 
Dec. 24,1990 First post-war coalition government formed. 
The pattern of political activity that emerged during the period right up to 
the Civil War was that of shifting alliances and coalitions between the various 
political groupings which, whilst having the merit of achieving compromise 
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between different interest groups, also prevented Lebanon from enjoying the 
strong government it needed in order to deal with the deepening economic and 
social problems in the country, which were discussed in the previous section8. 
The cause of the war in Lebanon was very complex and multi-factorial, 
however three dimensions are readily recognisable: socio-economic inequalities, 
outside pressures and the Palestinian presence (Picard 1996). Socio-economic 
inequalities were very obvious as early as the 1960s. During that time, Lebanon 
was a prosperous country. It was a banking centre and the West's main gateway 
to the Arab World, not only politically, but also in trade. The main cornerstone of 
the economy was geared towards non-productive areas such as import-export, 
transit and retail, which-in addition to Western trade-lead to the destruction of 
Lebanon's productive capacity. This fact left the industrial/manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors weak and backward. Lebanon's choice of a laissez-faire 
economy lead to inequalities in economic development and in the share of wealth 
(Gates 1998). Concentration of income distribution and the existence of social 
discrepancies were apparent and posed a considerable dilemma. Thirty per cent 
of the national income went to four per cent of the population, whilst the poorest 
8 See Kamal Salibi's Crossroads to Civil War, Caravan Books, 1976, and Robert Fisk's Pity the 
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50 per cent obtained only 18 per cent of the national income in the early 1960s 
(Corm 1994). The disparity in wealth cut across all sects. 
The dimensions in society were also apparent geographically; in 1960 per 
capita income in Beirut was $803 compared to $151 in the South (McDowall 
1988: 13). The divisions in society contrasted between prosperous Lebanon: 
Greater Beirut and the mountain society within its range (Kisrawan, the Matn, the 
Gharb and Shuf) and the 'forgotten' areas, the Akkar in the north, Jabal 'Amil in 
the south and the Beka'a in the east, where agriculture stagnated and the 
political economy of the poor inhabitants was controlled by absentee landlords or 
wholesalers. "Belts of Misery" which encircled affluent Beirut (and also Tripoli, 
Sidon and Tyre) illustrated the economic disparity within Lebanese society. 
These belts were formed by impoverished Lebanese hoping for the possibility of 
casual work in the city. For those groups living on the outskirts of this wealthy 
metropole, poverty and lack of political representation exacerbated feelings of 
alienation (Picard 1996). 
Also during the sixties, various left wing ideologies flourished including 
those belonging to the Nasserist, Syrian and Ba'athist. These movements 
Nation, Oxford University Press, 1990. 
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provided a focus for those alienated from the system, and due to Lebanon's 
liberal milieu many disaffected groups from other Arab countries pursued these 
causes and their vendettas against followers of other groups on Lebanese soil 
(Salibi 1976). Lebanon also became a site of feuding between Arab governments 
and these exiled dissident groups. Many Lebanese felt that Lebanon's 
democratic and open society was being abused by neighbours who would not 
have allowed such liberality within their own borders. 
The Palestinian issue is closely connected to the problem of outside 
influence detailed above, however it is worthy of a section on its own. The 
Palestinian community in Lebanon-a direct result of the Arab-Israeli War-were 
the catalyst that hastened the eruption of the civil war in Lebanon (McDowall 
1988). 
By 1971, the estimated number of Palestinians living in Lebanon as 
refugees was 350,000. The camps, where a majority of the refugees lived, were 
used as training grounds for war with Israel. Weapons, ammunition and 
equipment steadily flowed into the camps. By 1969 the Palestinians were 
conducting raids across the southern border of Lebanon, and Israel regarded 
Lebanon as responsible for this breach of security. 
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The Lebanese establishment, particularly the Maronite leadership, viewed 
the Palestinian movement with increasing frustration and anger. In their eyes, it 
was recklessly provoking Israeli military reprisals and more seriously it was 
undermining the character and institutions of the state. They viewed the 
Palestinians as lacking gratefulness for Lebanon allowing them refugee status, 
and as having no regard for Lebanon as a sovereign state (Hanf 1993). It was in 
this divided environment that the initial clashes between the Palestinians and the 
Lebanese army attempting to impose its authority occurred in 1966. President 
Charles Helou and Prime Minister Rashid Karameh came into direct public 
opposition; the President insisted on Lebanese sovereignty, while the Prime 
Minister declared Lebanon indissolubly linked to the fedayeen `s freedom of 
action. Syrian Ba'athists reacted against Lebanon, accusing it of betraying the 
fighters in a holy Arab cause, however the Saudi leadership asked the Lebanese 
President to stand firm against the fedayeen, arguing that the Palestinian 
movement was a threat to regional order through its spreading of revolutionary 
propaganda. It was obvious at the time that the governments in the region were 
quite willing to encumber the Beirut government with the Palestinian problem that 
they themselves wished to avoid (McDowall 1998). 
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In 1969, Nasser brokered the Cairo Agreement regulating relations 
between the Lebanese government and the PLO, which partially gave way to the 
PLO to carry on its war of liberation using parts of south Lebanon. A few months 
later Kata'ib (a mostly Christian militia) militiamen ambushed a Palestinian 
commando funeral procession leading to several days of fighting between the 
two in Beirut suburbs. 
Officially the Lebanese Civil War began in April 1975 when bloody clashes 
erupted between the Kata'ib and the Palestinian fedayeen. Between this date 
and the end of the war in 1990, many wars have been fought on Lebanese soil, 
which involved local, regional (Israel, Syria, other Arab states, and Iran), and 
international (the United States, France and Iran) players. 
1. INGOs and their Contribution during the War 
During the war, a plethora of NGOs, a number of them international, began 
working in relief and emergency aid. The war witnessed a quantum leap in the 
role and numbers of NGOs whose work was based mostly on the following (Abi 
Khalil, M. personal communication; January 1998): 
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a) the direct effects of the war: loss of life, massive population 
displacement (estimated at 800,000), huge numbers of people affected 
by disability, unemployment, the destruction of infrastructure, and other 
social calamities; 
b) the near total absence of the state and therefore the cessation of 
public services and the further concentration of these services in the 
private sector. 
During this period Lebanese NGOs were practically alone in supporting the 
needs of the Lebanese community. A handful of internationally accredited NGOs 
stood out as `reliable' channels. They included Caritas-Lebanon, YMCA- 
Lebanon, the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC), the Maronite Social 
Fund and Al Maqassed Al Islamiyya. It has been stated that these organisations 
were sustained by a deliberate policy of European and American donors 
(Mardelli-Assaf 1988), and that other local NGOs emerged at the time, which 
were secular, specialised and the result of energetic concerned individuals. 
During the fighting and indiscriminate bombing that affected the majority of 
civilian areas, NGOs provided emergency services and relief supplies to afflicted 
and displaced individuals and families in extremely difficult circumstances. 
However, between 1988 and 1991 many of the international NGOs left due to 
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fears for expatriate staff security and the link between foreign aid and the release 
of foreign hostages. 
Co-ordination of relief efforts during the war was sketchy. International 
NGOs tended to rely of consortia that had originated overseas for specific 
purposes. One of those initiatives was put together by the Vatican in the 1980s. 
Initially 15 NGOs came together under the general direction of Caritas, and was 
comprised of large church-based organisations. In 1991, only four remained - 
Caritas, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Pontifical Mission for Palestine and 
World Vision, which formed the NGO Coordination Committee for Lebanon. 
In 1988, several co-ordination arrangements were formed on an as 
needed basis. Encounter was one of those formed as an ad hoc committee of 
the larger NGOs after an International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) 
mission to Lebanon in 1987. 
Two main groupings emerged from these efforts and became very 
important efforts in the following years. La Coordination des ONG en vue du 
Developpement au Liban (CDL-ONG), headed after 1991 by Kemal Mohanna 
and the Lebanese NGO Forum or LNF, headed by Ghassan Sayah. The main 
difference between the two is that the CDL-ONG included a mix of foreign and 
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local NGOs, and the LNF included only local NGOs. One other difference is that 
the LNF has what is called a confessional membership base. Two of its members 
were Shiite, two were Sunnite, one was Druze, five were Christian, and three 
were non-confessional. Some international donors, especially NOVIB and 
Oxfam-UK, did not want to support an interconfessional group and had advised 
against the ICVA sending a mission to Lebanon. However, 35 other 
organisations opposed this and the mission went ahead. 
One writer comments that `Most of the major NGOs in Lebanon, for 
example, do not have large and active membership bases. ' That they are not, in 
that sense, the organic outgrowth of social movements but, rather, have come 
about due to the initiative of a few `entrepreneurs' who have filled in for the failing 
state in a time of crisis (Kingston 1995: 8). As Bratton has written in the context 
of Africa, they are narrowly conceived institutions, which have come about due to 
"default" (1990: 21). 
Often in Lebanon, welfare service provision originated first as initiatives by 
private citizens; indeed the distinction can still be confusing with a plethora of 
local NGOs sponsored by self-serving politicians. Many of these NGOs came into 
existence during the war, especially in the 1980s when it was easier to attract 
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foreign funding through non-governmental sources. Moreover, most of the 
organisations reflect the lack of heterogeneity in Lebanon, as they are usually 
formed by ethnic, religious or political groups. 
The thesis will now move on to explore Lebanon's relations with its closest 
neighbours, Syria and Israel before looking at the country's current political and 
economic situation. Following this the state of agriculture in the country will be 
described in depth. This is done in order to provide the reader with a complete as 
possible picture of the environment that the INGOs are working in. 
H. Lebanon's Relations with Syria and Israel 
1. Syria 
Lebanon's relations with regional players-especially Syria-are very intricate 
and complex. In 1920, French annexation of neighbouring districts to Mount 
Lebanon declaring the birth of the Republic of Greater Lebanon left Syrian 
opinion deeply outraged. Between the early 1920s until Lebanon's 
independence in 1943, relations between Syria and Lebanon were governed and 
regulated by the French Mandate. In World War II political movements in both 
countries grew closer together in the struggle for independence from the French 
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(The Lebanon Report; June 1991: 3). In 1945 both countries signed the Arab 
Pact, which implied mutual recognition and respect for each other's territorial 
integrity. The Lebanese advocates of a liberal economy, however, were fearful of 
Syria's economic nationalism and the dirigisme of its new military government in 
power since 1949; some even feared political unification and attenuation of 
Lebanon's ties with the West. In March 1950, the "Customs Union"-established 
by the Mandate-collapsed, and although this was economically 
disadvantageous for both countries, it gave further proof of their diverging 
political and economic directions. 
Syria's policy towards Lebanon ever since has been based on three 
elements: the Pan Arab ideology of the Ba'ath Party, the historical loss of integral 
areas of "Syria" to form the Greater Lebanon, and the strategic imperatives in the 
region since 1948. This policy was manifested by providing arms and ammunition 
to Lebanese pan-Arab enthusiasts in 1958, the encouragement of the Palestinian 
fedayeen military presence in Lebanon during the 1960s and 1970s, direct 
military intervention in 1976 when Syrian troops were deployed in Lebanon, and 
whose presence remains on Lebanese soil until this very day. 
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In the late 1980's when the balance of political influence was tipping its 
way, Syria pushed for a treaty with the Lebanese government. In May 1991, the 
'Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination' was signed between both 
countries. It established 'distinctive relations' with Syria, created linkages on the 
political, military, internal security, and economic planes. It also consolidated 
`... their brotherly relations in facing their common future and fate' (Article One: 
Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination). Some Lebanese leaders 
praised it as a long overdue formalisation of co-operative relations, others 
criticised it as being a contract between unequal partners; therefore bringing 
Lebanon under greater Syrian control. 
Clearly the Syrian leadership has applied itself to placing the Lebanese 
state under Syrian tutelage through avenues of military interventions, political 
pressures, manipulating various Lebanese rivalries and alliances, and 
orchestrating close co-ordination between the two countries' economies. 
2. Israel 
Like Syria, Israel developed an ambitious strategy in Lebanon. Since the settling 
of the Palestinian resistance on Lebanese territory, Israel's policy has been 
dominated by several factors; ensuring the security of its northern borders, 
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undermining the PLO, and signing a peace treaty with Lebanon. At one point, 
Israel was embarking on a close relationship with the Maronite leadership. To 
Israel, however, this alliance was far from being strategic and always came 
second to its own interests. 
In the 1960's and 70's, the sequence of violence of Palestinian-Israeli 
incidents accelerated enormously. In 1978, Israel invaded south Lebanon then 
launched a complete invasion four years later in 1982, ostensibly to drive the 
PLO out of the country, and to deal a significant blow against Syria's growing 
influence. Subsequently, both goals proved to be evasive. This invasion in 
particular dealt a severe blow to the already frail Lebanese central government, 
which lost its ability to collect revenues, and created a de facto situation of 
geographical, political and economic division in the country. Under the wake of its 
army, Israel pushed for a peace treaty with Lebanon. In May 1983, that treaty 
was signed; it made provisions for the Syrian army's pullout from Lebanon while 
it guaranteed Israel "security arrangements" and recognised its right to police the 
South. It was clear at the time of signature that it was not going to stick without 
Syria's acquiescence. For the first time in its history, Israel found itself 
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withdrawing unilaterally and empty-handed. In 1985, Israel withdrew to a 15Km 
border zone, which it occupied until May 2000. 
The most disastrous effect of the war of 1982 was the chain 
reaction of confrontations between and within communities... a new 
outburst of civil war that was to leave Lebanon wounded and bled 
white (Picard op. cit: 121). 
Briefly, Syria and Israel have both fuelled sectarian politics in Lebanon 
through manipulating various religious and political parties as well as individuals. 
They have also impacted the system through direct and indirect military action. 
I. The Current Political Situation 
Despite nearly ten years of peace following 16 years of war, the confessional 
system in Lebanon has been strengthened and cemented. Geographical areas 
that used to be characterised as multi-confessional are now mostly homogenous, 
the result of the forced dislocations of war which affected more than 50 per cent 
of the population. 
Confessionalism has, however, also become more equitable, with the 
decline of political and demographic weight of the Christians-especially 
following the intra-Christian war of the late 1980s and early 1990s-and the rise 
to greater national prominence of the Shi'ite community after many years of 
social, economic and political neglect. This change has been reflected in the 
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Ta'ef Accords of 1989, which declared the birth of the Second Republic, and 
equalised, fortified and legally recognised the confessional system for the first 
time. Parliamentary seats are now divided on a 5: 5 ratio and the power of the 
executive offices of the state have been realigned to reflect this new balance 
altering Lebanon's republican structure for one where the President is pre- 
eminent to one where power is more evenly divided between the president 
(Christian), the prime minister (Sunni) and speaker of the assembly (Shi'ite)-a 
system which has been dubbed "the troika". 
Finally, the modification and solidification of the confessional system have 
also thrown up a slightly mutated pool of elites. Along with the traditional elites 
whose positions have been revived since the end of the war are new elite 
groups, such as the current Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, a multi-billionaire who 
had previously renounced his Lebanese citizenship for Saudi nationality, and 
wartime militia leaders, who made tremendous profits from the war (Picard 
op. cit.: 144). An amnesty was granted to those involved in wartime atrocities9, 
9 An exception to this pardon is the ex-leader of the now banned Lebanese Forces, 
Samir 
Geagea. The Lebanese Forces were a Christian, mostly Maronite. 
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and most of the militia leaders have had their participation in wartime Lebanon 
fully legitimised by being included in the post-war government (ibid: 155). 10 
Rarik Hariri has put a massive amount of effort and investment into his 
reconstruction plan, called Horizon 2000". The cornerstone of Horizon 2000 is 
Solidere, a private holding company granted the responsibility for reconstructing 
the entire downtown area. The overall goal is to make Lebanon and Beirut into a 
major regional financial and commercial centre. 
Despite early visible progress the programme remains narrowly focussed 
and work has come to a near standstill in the last three years (1999-2001). There 
is a clear lack of planned investment in the social infrastructure of the country, for 
example, allocations for upgrading the Beirut airport receiving almost as much as 
the health and education sectors combined. Moreover, in order to maintain 
investor confidence, both the Hariri and the Hoss12 governments were forced to 
implement an austerity programme, which has meant among other things the 
10 Picard wams that this participation can be expected to produce a qualitative change in the 
orientation of the system toward what she calls a "war induced" notion of political responsibility 
based not so much on generating and maintaining a national elite consensus, but on the 
promotion of the more parochial interests of their own respective factions and communities. 
11 See Tom Pierre Najem's Lebanon's Renaissance, The Political Economy of 
Reconstruction, Ithaca Press, 2000. 
12 Salim el Hoss was Rafik Hariri's predecessor. 
114 
freezing of public sector wages, whilst private sector profits soar. The result has 
been a significant degree of social tension. 
All of this is entirely consistent with the logic of the confessional 
system-effective at providing the minimum conditions for the 
pursuit of private profit, powerless and immobile when it comes to 
promoting a more equitable socio-economic development process 
(Kingston 1998: 10) 
Thus, along with the Ta'ef Accord, the nature of the reconstruction programme 
provides a strong indication that the confessional system has returned more 
powerful than ever, proving, as Picard argues, that it is `the most immediately 
operative part' of Lebanon's structure (Picard op. cit.: 157). 
J. Current Economic Status 
The outbreak of war in 1975 interrupted the normal course of development in the 
country, and resulted in large-scale economic destruction and decay, as well as 
the disruption of Lebanon's regional role as an intermediary. 13 If one takes the 
evolution of the minimum wage as an example of the collapse in standards of 
living that resulted from the war, one finds that in terms of 1990 US dollars, the 
minimum monthly wage fell from $279 in 1975 to $65 in 1990, thus losing three- 
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quarters of its purchasing power. The UNDP has outlined Lebanon's major 
losses due to the Civil War: 
9 The large number, estimated at 65,000, of citizens killed (Labaki and Rjeily 
1993) in addition to thousands of cases of permanent disability. 
9 The large number of Lebanese who emigrated, and migrated. 
" Deterioration in the standard of the labour force at all levels, causing Lebanon 
to fall behind in scientific development, technological innovation and progress 
in management techniques that were taking place at the global and regional 
levels. 
" Material losses estimated at approximately US$25 billion (United Nations 
1991: 33) 
The impact of the war on public finances and on the country's financial 
conditions in general is very profound. The erosion of government authority 
gradually paralysed the administration and rendered it incapable of collecting and 
administering public revenues. From a budget surplus of 4.2 per cent in 1974, the 
situation turned into a deficit of 21.8 per cent of total expenditures in 1975. The 
deficit continued to rise reaching more than 50 per cent in 1981 and to peak at 
more than 90 per cent in 1988 and 1989. 
13 For instance, macroeconomic data, notoriously unreliable before the war, became almost 
completely unavailable thereafter. 
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However, in view of the lack of reliable statistics and the limited coverage 
of collection of public revenues, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the tax 
burden during that period, which in its totality (including parallel taxes) may have 
been heavier than in the period preceding the war. Deficits were also caused by 
the fact that wages continued to be paid to employees of a largely non- 
functioning administration. Whereas the ratio of public expenditures to GDP did 
not exceed 12 per cent, on average, in the early years of the war, the ratio is 
estimated to have climbed to 50 per cent in 1991 (EIU report: 1996). 
To finance increasing budget deficits, the government resorted to issuing 
treasury bills bearing high interest rates, and to borrowing from commercial 
banks and the Central Bank. This led to a chain reaction: the resulting sharp 
expansion in the money supply causing in turn higher inflation rates and a sharp 
deterioration of the exchange rate of the Lebanese Lira. The Central Bank found 
itself obliged to intervene in the exchange market, selling dollars to reduce the 
pressure on the Lebanese Lira. However, it lost a considerable portion of its hard 
currency reserves without succeeding in stabilising the rate of exchange, and 
repeatedly had to abandon its attempts. Thus, the Lebanese economy entered a 
vicious cycle with a deficit in the general budget being financed by inflationary 
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means, causing the national currency to weaken, the spread of the dollarisation 
phenomenon on a large scale, as well as capital flight. (UNDP 1997: 35). 
A distinctive feature of Lebanon's economic performance during the war 
years was the growth of the internal debt. The loss of state revenues, and the 
increase in defence spending are considered as the two main factors explaining 
this phenomenon. The ratio of the internal debt to GDP rose from 4.2 per cent in 
1974 to 111 per cent in 1982. In absolute terms, the debt rose from LL 14 billion 
at the end of 1982 to LL 194 billion at the end of 1987, and further to LL 22,181 
billion ($14.8 billion) at the end of March 1998. Over 90 per cent of the debt was 
in the form of treasury bills denominated in Lebanese pounds, the bulk of which 
was subscribed to by the commercial banks, bearing real yearly interest rates 
ranging between 25 per cent and 35 per cent between 1987 and 1992 (UNDP 
1997: 36). The public debt now stands at 115 per cent of GDP (The Lebanon 
Report; Spring 1999 : 8). The recent (1998-2000) government's external 
borrowing programmes over the past two years have caused the level of foreign 
debt to rise from US$5 billion at the end of 1997 to an estimated US$8.9 billion, 
or 52 per cent of GDP, at the end of 1999 (EIU 2000: 11). 
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As a result of government policy and steady population growth, average 
income has risen only slowly since the end of the war. Indeed, the standard of 
living of many Lebanese dipped in the first few years after the war as inflation 
destroyed their wages. According to independent Lebanese economists, price 
rises between 1991 and 1995 led to a 10-15 per cent decline in the purchasing 
power of salary earners, who make-up at least two-thirds of Lebanon's workforce. 
Around one million Lebanese, roughly one-quarter of the population, live 
below the poverty line, according to a 1995 report by the UN Economic and 
Social Council for Western Asia (ESCWA). Of these, ESCWA says more than 
250,000 people live in extreme poverty, defined as a family of five living on less 
than US$306 per month. The poverty line was defined as a family of five living on 
US$618 per month. According to Antoine Haddad, a Lebanese economist, nearly 
90% of workers aged between 20 and 39 earned less than $1,000 per month in 
1995. Regional disparities in living standards and income, which have long 
existed between rural and urban areas, have been exacerbated by the conflict 
and the focus of reconstruction on Beirut. 
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K. Agricultural and Rural Development in Lebanon 
One of the most serious problems facing the Middle East and North Africa is the 
region's growing inability to feed itself (Richards 1987: 287). 
No, the FAO doesn't co-ordinate with the NGOs. Are they working in agriculture? 
They don't know what we are doing and we don't know what they are doing. We 
try to co-ordinate mostly with the Ministry of Agriculture, but even this co- 
ordination is greatly lacking (FAO Country Representative in Lebanon: 1998). 
This research looked specifically at INGOs working in rural areas of Lebanon. 
The choice to focus on this type of development work was based on interviews 
with an official from the Ministry of Agriculture who told me that rural area s were 
particularly vulnerable, and that INGOs working outside of the capital were 
typically given a large degree of control. I was also told that there was a great 
deal of work to be done in agricultural areas due to that fact that there is an 
ongoing gap left by the lack of state intervention. 
Lebanon's Ministry of Agriculture showed that agriculture in 1946 
contributed between 16-20 per cent of the GDP, and more than one half of the 
population was dependent on agriculture for their livelihood (The American 
University of Beirut: 1946). Today that figure has dropped to about 8 per cent 
with only 7.8 per cent of the labour force directly dependent on agriculture (Jaber 
1998: 10). The agricultural population was estimated in 1996 at approximately 
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10.5% of the total population (see table below), and is an important source of 
foreign currency contributing close to 25% of total exports (ibid. ). 
Table 2.1 1974 1990 1991 1993 1995 1996 
Agri. as % of GDP (a) 9 23 19 978 
Agric. Population as % of total population (b) 14 16 15 12 11 10.5 
Agric. labour as % of total labour (b) 20 99987.8 
Source: (a) Saade, Annual Report 1993, (b) Ministry of Agriculture, Census 1997. 
1. Agricultural Regions and Crop Production 
Tropical and European crops can be grown in Lebanon because of its diversified 
topography and climate. The interior plateau of the Beka'a valley and the narrow 
western valleys sweeping down to the sea have three advantages: mild winters, 
fertile soils, and large irrigation potential (Iskandar 1995: 12). Several distinctive 
agricultural regions can be identified14: 
a) The narrow coastal strip, extending from Tripoli in the North to Tyre in the 
South. This strip is mostly utilised for intensive horticultural production. Citrus 
fruits, bananas, and vegetables are cultivated in small land holdings, especially 
from the town of Damour southwards. The northern section of the coastal strip is 
cultivated mainly with bananas and vegetables, particularly in greenhouses 
extending from Zouk, south of Jounieh, to Chekka in the North. Most crops in this 
region are irrigated. 
14 Map adapted from: 
www. Iib. utexas. edu/Libs/PCL/Map_colIection/Atlas_middle_east/Lebanon_Iand. jpg 
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b) The plains of the Akkar in the North and Beka'a where crop rotation patterns 
are employed for the cultivation of cereals, vegetables, forage, industrial crops 
such as tobacco and ground nuts, citrus fruits, and grapes. The production of 
cereals is necessary in crop rotation to maintain soil fertility. 
c) The mountainous region, constituting the Mediterranean facade of Mount 
Lebanon, and extending from Jezzine in the South to Tripoli in the North. The 
narrow terraces cut into the steep slopes and valleys are cultivated with 
deciduous fruit trees, mainly apples, peaches, cherries, and other fruits. Some 
heated greenhouses for growing vegetables and cauliflower are also used in the 
region. 
d) Other areas of agricultural production include the gentle slopes of the western 
side of the Beka'a Valley, the terraced region near Tripoli on the lower slopes of 
northern Mount Lebanon, and the calcareous terraced hills of South Lebanon. 
The slopes on the western side of the Beka'a Valley are cultivated mainly with 
grapes, while the terraced region near Tripoli is planted mainly with olive trees 
and the terraced hills of South Lebanon with olives, almonds, cereals, tobacco, 
and vegetables. 
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Local needs for products such as cereals, dairy products, livestock, and 
fish are not met by local production, and must be imported. However, products 
like apples, potatoes, tomatoes, cucumbers, garlic and onions, as well as other 
fruits and vegetables, which exceed local needs are exported. Citrus fruits, which 
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are produced mainly for export, are the exception. However, two of the largest 
citrus fruit producers in the country have greatly reduced or halted production 
due to inability to compete with growing foreign competition. 
Lebanon's agricultural competitiveness is closely tied to import and export 
patterns. Importantly, the ratio of agricultural exports to imports 'indicates the 
significance of exports in financing imports' (Jaber op. cit.: 10). According to the 
Central Bank, the share of agricultural imports as a portion of total imports 
increased from 18.9% in 1993 to 19.9% in 1996. Although the increase seems 
rather insignificant, it does reflect a growing food gap problem. Additionally, the 
ratio of agricultural exports to agricultural imports is increasingly low. It has 
declined from 14.8% in 1993 to 10.6% in 1996, which indicates a widening deficit 
in agricultural trade and an augmenting dependence on food imports. 
The major destinations for Lebanese agriculture exports are the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. In 1996, Lebanon exported 23% of 
agriculture and agro-industrial exports to the UAE and 13.6% to Saudi Arabia. In 
1997, the countries were reversed with Saudi Arabia absorbing 15% of the UAE 
only 9%. Export to Syria has declined by 70%, from LL1 10 billion in 1996 to 
LL57.8 billion in 1997. This is probably due to the fact that Syria has a fully 
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developed agriculture sector and is in a position of exporter and not the reverse. 
Substantial (recorded and unrecorded) imports of cheaper Syrian agriculture 
products into Lebanon are also a contributing problem to the demise of Lebanese 
agricultural production. Lebanon imports over 60% of its agriculture and agro- 
food products from the European Union, with the majority of imports coming from 
Italy, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
Lebanon's main strength in competitiveness in the agro-food industry is its 
physical resources; fertile soil, diverse climate, and abundant water resources. Its 
geographical position is also advantageous providing the country with access to 
European and Gulf markets. However, Lebanon greatly lacks capital resources 
for investment and growth, knowledge of modern technology and market 
information, distribution, adequate infrastructure, as well as well thought out and 
planned government policies, which meet the needs of local producers. 
2. Lack of Capital Resources 
Capital resources, or the amount and cost of capital available to finance the agro- 
food industry are either non-existent or available at a very high cost. The 
problems are as follows: 
- The rates of interest are extremely high, ranging from between 18% and 
22% 
in Lebanese pounds and 12% to 14% in dollars. Moreover, collateral 
requirements are excessive; 
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- The standard duration of the loans given by banks is short and medium term, 
therefore inappropriate for long-term capital investments, which are needed for 
agriculture production. Many large landholders did not invest in long-term 
requirements-as they could take a decade to see profits. Tree cultivation, 
irrigation and the introduction of modern methods to produce fruits and 
vegetables comprised long-term investments. many owners did not see results in 
increased output, revenues and profits for a decade or more. 15 
- An important condition for the provision of loans is founded on `personal 
relations and connections' instead of the feasibility of the projects; 
- Bank procedures for taking out a loan are difficult and very bureaucratic; 
-The Central Bank requires several conditions on loans subsidised to the order 
of 5%. 
Touma and Attallah (1998: 11) point out that: 
Consequently, three quarters of all working and investment capital 
is derived from personal sources, which include savings, business 
profits, family money, and land sales. 
3. Lack of Knowledge and Poor Infrastructure 
In Lebanon there is a general lack of research and development for production 
and distribution. Though departments exist at the Ministry of Agriculture for 
providing this type of information, they are not working due to a lack of funds. 
151n the 1950s there were state funds available through the SCAIL (Societe Libanaise de Credit 
Agricole et Industriel du Liban). However, the loans were only available to large land-holders who 
regularly defaulted on payments. Seeing that many of these landholders were in government, the 
government did not enforce repayment and the system eventually collapsed. 
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There are three main obstacles related to Lebanon's infrastructure that 
hamper agriculture production and related agro-food industries: 
-- The cost of electricity is extremely high at 11.20 per kilowatt. For the region 
this is expensive compared to Egypt at 0.160 per kilowatt and 0.30 per kilowatt in 
Syria. 
- Lebanon's main highway system is moderately developed, however, the road 
system surrounding rural areas where agricultural production and distribution 
takes place is highly inadequate. 
- The high price of land has increased storage costs and the lack of modern 
storage rooms has negatively affected the quality of products. 
4. Insufficient Inputs and Distribution of Local Products 
There are other domestic impediments to agricultural development in Lebanon, 
which include problems of land availability, lack of inputs and obstacles in 
distributing local production. 
-Urbanization in most fertile areas is decreasing the total area of arable land. 
-Land tenure and farm holdings are badly distributed in Lebanon. According to 
the Ministry of Agriculture 70 % of cultivable land is owned by only 15 % of land- 
owners. The remaining 30 % are small parcels, one or two dunums, owned by 
farmers for subsistence and production for the market. Moreover, land tenancy 
and share-cropping contracts are concluded verbally, and are of short duration, 
ranging from one season to one year. The short duration of contracts has had 
negative effects on the use of land. 
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-Certain agriculture inputs, such as pesticides sold to farmers, are often spoiled 
since they are not subjected to adequate controls by the government or 
independent agencies. Moreover, there are often a small number of firms 
distributing such products. The lack of regulation and the monopoly over certain 
inputs has increased the costs to farmers. 
-Lebanon's main form of irrigation, which is based either on furrow and basin 
flooding or digging wells, is considered inefficient, Moreover, farmers pay for 
irrigation water on an hourly or per dunum basis, a tradition dating from Ottoman 
times, which fails to encourage efficient water allocation. 
-Lebanese production techniques, whether they involve cultivation, pruning, 
weeding, fertilizer application, spraying, irrigation, and plowing are labour 
intensive and are considered to be primitive. The exception is in the Beka'a valley 
where techniques are more capital intensive. 
-Farmers have no access to bank loans, which have prevented the purchase of 
new machinery and equipment needed to improve production. 
Consequently, suppliers and distributors have filled the gap and 
provided credit, which has given them leverage to buy agricultural 
produce at low prices (Touma and Atallah op. cit.: 12). 
A second factor is the distribution of agriculture products. Distribution 
involves several intermediaries and different types of channels. Generally, the 
intermediaries include primary and secondary wholesalers, retailers, and 
dammans, who either rent land from a farmer and take over the agricultural 
production process, or who buy produce from a farmer at a predetermined price 
and market it. Various distribution channels are used depending, among other 
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things, upon the volume of produce, the type of crop involved, and the region of 
plantation. 
The various types of distribution channels are described below: 
1)Prod ucer-Damman-Wholesaler-Secondary Wholesaler-Retailer- 
Consumer; 
2) Producer-Damman-Wholesaler-Retailer-Consumer 
3)Producer-Wholesaler-Secondary Wholesaler-Retailer-Consumer 
4) Producer-Wholesaler-Retailer-Consumer 
5) Damman-Wholesaler-Retailer-Consumer 
6)Damman-Wholesaler-Secondary Wholesaler-Retailer-Consumer 
7) Producer-Exporter 
8) Damman-Exporter 
9) Producer-Exporter/Wholesaler 
Channels one to six are used for domestic trade, while channels seven and eight 
are used for external trade. Channel nine represents a combination of domestic 
and export trade. It is estimated that, in terms of domestic distribution, 38% of 
farmers use channels one or two; 21 % channels three and four; 5% channel five; 
and 36% channel six. 
Generally, 62% of agricultural products are handled by wholesalers and 
exporters, compared to only 38% handled by dammans. This serves to underline 
the importance of wholesalers and exporters in the distribution channels. 
Though, the strong bargaining power of the intermediary is often contingent on 
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the size of the farms and its geographical location. For example, farmers who sell 
exclusively to exporters are usually the owners of large farms in the Beka'a 
Valley and the Ba'albek-Hermel region. Therefore, exporters play a very 
important role in the Beka'a, wholesalers in the South and the Shuf, and 
dammans in the North. 
The marketing situation in Lebanon? Ha! That's capitalism! That's called letting 
the market decide. And the market is not the buyers-it's the middlemen-the 
sellers. They decide. This is capitalism uncontrolled. And what happens? It 
becomes like a Mafia! There is no one responsible in the government to provide 
the checks and balances. 16 
know of a farmer who tried to market chicken himself. He put the chicken in 
front of the store and then some of the main dealer's men stole it. The farmer 
caught them and the dealer's men beat the farmer up. You don't market your own 
chicken! 17 
The lack of a strong farmer's co-operative has relegated farmers to a 
secondary position in the distribution chain. Consequently, farmers are stuck 
between strong importers-distributors of agricultural inputs and strong 
wholesalers and dammans. 
The duration of distribution is of concern since it affects the competitive 
edge of the agro-food sector, for example in cases when the expiration date of 
16"Ali" Personal communication: Ministry of Agriculture, Spring 1999. 
17lbid. 
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delivered produce is set to expire. Another problem is the lack of contract 
enforcement between farmers and intermediaries. This has, obviously, increased 
the transaction costs of distributing products in the market. 
Marketing is one of the biggest problems. There is a syndicate and they decide 
the prices. Go speak to Saad Samhoun and Elie Maalouf. For instance, a farmer 
has 20 cases of apples and the price should be LL 1,000. The middleman will tell 
the farmer LL 800 and subtract another 10% for damages. Damages that are not 
actually there, but which he expects in transport! This is so bad for the farmer. 
The government! Huh.. . they do nothing. But I think that things may change. 
There is word that they are going to do a study. They are going to look at it. This 
could be potentially good. 18 
5. Deficient Government Policies 
Historically, successive Lebanese governments have both lacked a coherent 
strategy and adopted few policies towards the agriculture and agro-food sectors. 
Prior to the civil war, the government embarked on several agricultural projects 
which were limited to the provision of agricultural infrastructure, including rural 
roads and irrigation canals, as well as land reclamation. These plans included: 
a) The Green Plan: The best known major agricultural project, the Green Plan, 
was initiated in 1963 but continues until the present day, and has set forth 
several objectives: 
a) to increase the area of arable land; b) to rehabilitate rural roads and build new 
ones; c) to reforest land and conserve water resources; d) to introduce 
greenhouses and hydroponics in order to increase crop production; and e) to 
18 Amine Jaber, personal communication, Ministry of Agriculture, Spring 1999. 
131 
develop water retention techniques, such as canals and reservoirs, and improve 
irrigation. 
To this end, the Green Plan did several things. It rented out tractors, 
ploughs, and other terrace-building equipment to farmers. It also distributed citrus 
seedlings for free and seed wheat for credit, it constructed rural roads, and 
developed water retention techniques, such as canals, and reservoirs. The 
government worked closely with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Food 
Programme (WFP), and benefited from American and French technical 
assistance and expertise. 
b) Irrigation projects: Lebanese governments have implemented several large- 
scale irrigation projects, the objective of which was to upgrade the irrigation 
network through the construction of dams, reservoirs, canals, and pumping 
stations. This included the Litani and Qassmiyeh irrigation projects in the South 
and the projects in the Akkar plain and the Miniyeh region of the North. However, 
all of these projects were terminated after the outbreak of war in 1975. 
c) Research, extension and education programmes: Successive 
governments have also financed ongoing agricultural research, extension and 
educational programmes to develop and improve farmers' agricultural 
techniques. They began in the 1950s until this present day and resulted in the 
establishment in 1954 of the Agricultural Extension Department at the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The department's main responsibilities are publishing agricultural 
bulletins and disseminating research results to farmers. The department is 
currently inactive due to a lack of funding. 
Currently, the government does a few tasks to assist agriculture. Among 
its most prominent efforts is providing price supports for cash crops, such a 
tobacco, sugar beet, and wheat to encourage southern farmers to stay in the 
South under Israeli bombardment and not migrate to the already over-crowded 
city of Beirut. It is also meant to encourage farmers in the Ba'albek-Hermel area 
to discontinue the production of illicit crops. 
d) Import control policies: The government has adopted an agricultural 
calendar to protect domestic production of fruits and vegetables. The policy bans 
the import of specific agricultural products such as citrus fruits, apples, and 
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potatoes, and allows the import of some agricultural products after the 
authorisation of the Ministry of Agriculture. It also allows the import of particular 
products without a license during specific periods of time. The agriculture 
calendar has been used since the 1960s, although it was modified in 1992 and 
1995. 
e) The Five Year Agricultural Plan: In 1997, the Agriculture Minister announced 
the government's adoption of an agricultural development plan for the year 2000, 
within the framework of, what he termed, a `general agricultural policy'. This plan 
was to be financed by both the government and international organisations such 
as the FAQ19, and it aimed to: 
" Increase net farming income; 
" Maintain stable and competitive farm prices for agricultural inputs and 
outputs; 
" Increase agricultural output by increasing productivity; 
" Reduce agricultural imports by diversifying agricultural production; 
" Conserve agricultural resources and achieve balanced and integrated rural 
development; 
" Increase the efficiency of the marketing system for agricultural products. 
The plan is currently on hold because of a lack of funding. 
The Ministry of Agriculture in Lebanon has no plan! The Ministry does not exist. 
The Minister himself doesn't understand agriculture, and he says it. At least he's 
honest. He placed his key people in positions-as they all do-but he placed 
them as "consultants". If we have a question, we are told to go to them. They are 
told to take what they can. He says it-he's honest. 20 
191 was told by the FAO country representative that one of the main difficulties in getting work 
done is that the FAO only gives one or two year contracts, so by the time one gets acquainted 
with the country and the situation on the ground, he is transferred to another country. 
20"Ali", personal communication: Ministry of Agriculture, Spring 1999. 
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Additionally, the government of Lebanon has also signed several 
agreements with international organisations and other countries. These include a 
loan agreement concluded with the International Bank for Development and 
Reconstruction in the mid-1990s to develop the agricultural sector, with a 
particular emphasis on land reform. The loan is valued at $31 million, of which 
$28 million must be channelled to the Green Plan for a period of five to six years. 
The government also agreed in the mid-1990s to a $12 million loan from 
the UNDP to extend the first phase of the Rural Development Programme for the 
Ba'albek-Hermel region. The objective of the programme is to encourage farmers 
to abandon the production of illicit crops. However, the project is on hold because 
of a lack of financing. 
In 1997-8 the government concluded a $10 million six-year loan 
agreement with the World Bank and the International Fund for Rural 
Development. The money is to go towards financing irrigation projects. 
The Ministry of Agriculture also concluded a deal with the United States in 
the mid-1990s for the importation of 3,000 cows to be distributed to small 
farmers. And a number of other agreements were set up during the Friends of 
Lebanon conference in 1996, amounting to $600 million. However, none of the 
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financing has ever materialised, and as will be shown in Chapter Five, the cow 
programme turned out to be a disaster for the Lebanese farmers. 
The final section in this chapter looks at the space that NGOs/INGOs 
occupy in today's socio-economic and political climate in Lebanon. It also 
explores how they are trying to change their raison d'etre from that of relief 
providers to that of development institutions. 
L. NGOs in Post-War Lebanon 
The Lebanese government after the end of the war launched a plan to rebuild 
national infrastructure. The sectors which most benefited were construction, 
industry, and the services sector, particularly the banking sector. However, the 
plan was largely deficient, as there was a lack of even distribution between 
infrastructure and social welfare in addition to prioritising urban areas over rural 
areas have left a large space for the potential of NGOs. 
Today, there is no accurate register of the number of NGOs operating in 
Lebanon. Actual written numbers vary from 1500 (Mohanna 1991) to 4000 
(Mardelli-Assaf 1989). Of these, the number of actually functioning NGOs/INGOS 
is much smaller with estimates as low as 100 organisations. Many foreign INGOS 
established offices in Lebanon during the war and have in many cases become 
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ostensibly `localised', i. e. run entirely by a national staff and occasionally even 
registered as a national entity21. For instance, the YMCA is registered as a local 
and an international NGO, and its functions-whether local or 
international-depend on the type of project and where the funds come from 
(e. g. from the UNDP for local NGOs or from USAID for international NGOs). 
However, in nearly all cases, primary funding and direction for the majority of 
INGOs in Lebanon continue to come from their headquarters abroad; for this 
reason, they are still considered international NGOs. In other cases for instance, 
Caritas-Lebanon, although part of a world-wide federation, have become wholly 
independent and therefore are now considered a local NGO. 
Exact amounts of funding disbursements by NGOs in Lebanon are 
incredibly difficult to accurately assess. Local Lebanese NGOs protectively guard 
their sources for fear of competition, and funds passed to INGOs may be 
accounted for twice-once through the INGO and again either through the 
multilateral or bilateral donors. 
These qualifications aside, the UNDP reported that in 1996, the total 
external assistance to NGOs, including INGOs in Lebanon was 19.3 million 
21 In most cases, international staff were forced to leave due to the war and the high occurrence 
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(UNDP 1997a). However, this number was way down from 1991, when total 
external aid was reported to be $161 million (UNDP 1991). This massive drop in 
funds has caused Lebanese NGOs and INGOs search for a new raison d'etre. 
Their new role has begun to evolve towards self-reliance and a gradual 
transformation of their programmes from relief during the war to development 
afterwards. 
M. Chapter Summary 
As we can see from the discussion above, a look at the Lebanese political 
system gives a strong indication of the type of environment the INGOs exist in. 
Significantly, Lebanon's socio-economic and political development has not been 
conducive to the emergence of a strong, centralised state. This has been due to 
a number of factors; including the confessional/sectarian composition of the 
country, which has resulted in delicate political structures that try to balance 
interests and thereby prevent the emergence of a primary national identity. This 
differential confessional system is reinforced by a patriarchal, kin-based social 
structure. Moreover, foreign intervention, first Ottoman, then colonial and finally 
of kidnappings of foreigners. 
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Syrian/Israeli (plus other players like Iran, Iraq and the US), through the pursuit of 
self-interest mobilised and strengthened these social cleavages. Finally, in 
important ways, the geography of the country, which historically was not 
conducive to communal integration but rather saw many groups living in near 
isolation in mountain enclaves. 
The consequences of this absence of a strong centralised state have been 
that political and economic resources are distributed through patron-client 
structures as much as through formal institutional channels. Hence, the 
distribution of resources by the state, and national economic planning in general, 
is determined less by economic rationale and more by the political clout of 
individuals and groups, and the political bargaining between major groups. Small 
groups, economically weaker groups, and groups distant from urban political 
centres (or groups without foreign patrons) find themselves disadvantaged when 
it comes to receiving their share of national resources. Economic differentiation is 
therefore exacerbated by government policies rather than ameliorated by them. 
Lastly, rural areas, which are poorer than the urban areas and which are 
inhabited by less powerful sects/confessional groups/clans, find themselves 
neglected by the state. 
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In this context, room is created for INGO activity, particularly in rural 
areas. However, although the state may be weak or disinterested in these areas, 
that does not mean that INGO activity is unaffected by the same socio-economic 
and political factors. INGOs must be constantly aware that unequal distribution 
of INGO resources between confessional groups can be a source of tension. 
They must therefore distribute resources with reference to the confessional 
distribution of the population, as much as according to where the need is 
greatest. Moreover, INGOs must operate in an environment where kinship and 
patron-client relationships are important determinants of resource allocation and 
political capacity. Lastly, INGOs also find themselves working in rural areas close 
to neighbouring countries that have a vested interest in Lebanon and which may 
have economic links with the local population which are more important the 
economic links with Beirut. 
Since the end of the Civil War, INGOs working in Lebanon have had to 
redefine their role. From initially acting as relief-based organisations, they now 
have to reorient their aims towards a more developmental role. This change 
presents its own challenges and prospects for INGOS wishing to contribute to the 
rebuilding and development of the country. 
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The next chapter presents an overview of the methodology used in my 
fieldwork, as well obstacles and difficulties faced whilst attempting to obtain the 
data, which is presented in Chapters Five and Six. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The most salient aim of this project of this project was to see if the development 
needs of local people living in rural areas of Lebanon were being met and to what 
extent by INGOs? The obstacles to achieving this goal were many. The project 
was limited by time, funding, numbers of field researchers and access to certain 
areas. ' 
Initially, I will present the main research question and hypothesis, followed 
by a selection of subsidiary questions that were used in my fieldwork in order to 
answer the main research question and prove or disprove the hypothesis. This 
chapter will also attempt to explain the research design before presenting the 
methods utilised to collect the data. 
An overview of the selected INGOs is presented in Chapter Four. The bulk 
of the fieldwork data concerning how the intended 'beneficiaries' view the work of 
INGOs and an introduction to the development scene in this country is located in 
Chapter Five. Data on the various relationships between the INGOs, the state, 
non-state actors, donors, and `beneficiaries' is presented in Chapter Six. 
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Analysis, implications and applications of this data are also explored in Chapter 
Six. 
A. Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The principal research question and hypothesis that guided this research are 
presented below: 
Research Question 
Do specific, selected INGO programmes in rural Lebanon produce the desired 
results stated by their personnel, outlines and mission statements; and to what 
extent do their projects and programmes meet the needs and expectations from 
the perspective of local men and women who are the intended beneficiaries? 
Research Hypothesis and Purpose 
Due to the absence of state-led development in rural areas of Lebanon, local 
men and women rely on INGO programmes along with other sources of support 
in order to meet their development needs. My hypothesis is that select and 
specific INGO projects will illustrate an ability to fill the development gap to a 
reasonable extent within the specific geographic contextual locations that they 
are situated. 
1 This fieldwork was conducted during the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. 
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I arrived at this hypothesis through research using secondary sources and 
speaking to academics working in the field and NGO personnel. The majority of 
the readings that I was exposed to prior to my fieldwork led me to conclude that 
non-governmental organisations were in many cases able to successfully provide 
some basic needs for impoverished farmers living in rural areas of the developing 
world and were working with the most marginalised groups in society. 
My fieldwork attempted to answer several planned questions, which were 
intended to prove or disprove the stated hypothesise. The main ones are 
presented below according to those dealing with the agents (INGOs and 
`beneficiaries') and those dealing with the structural context within which INGOs 
work and beneficiaries live. It was not possible to obtain answers to all or even 
some of the questions in every context. The main questions included, but were 
not limited to the following: 
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Agent Centred Subsidiary Questions 
INGOs: 
1. What are the objectives of the INGO programmes/projects (general and 
specific)? 
2. Is the ideology of the organisation expressed in the programmes/projects? If 
yes, how? 
3. Are the needs of local men and women assessed? How? 
4. How are the villages that are part of the organisation's projects/programmes 
chosen? 
5. How are issues of transparency and accountability handled between donors 
and INGOs, and INGOs and local people? 
6. Does the INGO include `good governance' and/or democracy building skills in 
its development work? If yes, how is this accomplished? 
7. Is sustainability measured? If yes, how? 
8. Does the organisation monitor programmes/projects after they have been 
completed? If yes, how? 
9. What is the level of co-ordination with the State, the UNDP and other 
development partners (e. g. the World Bank, local universities, the FAO etc... )? 
10. Do donors influence the work of the INGO? If yes, how? 
2 The actual list of questions that were used as a framework for the semi-structured interviews 
are located in the appendix. 
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Local men and women: 
1. How and to whom do local men and women express their development 
needs? 
2. What is their level of contribution and participation in these 
programmes/projects of local people? 
3. To what extent are women included in these programmes/projects? 
4. Are INGOs accountable and transparent to local people? 
5. Do INGOs include `good governance' and/or democracy building skills in their 
development work? If yes, how is this achieved? 
6. Are these programmes/projects sustainable according to local men and 
women? 
7. Are the beneficiaries satisfied with the work done by the INGO? 
8. Do the beneficiaries believe that their development needs are being met? 
Whilst doing my preliminary research I postulated that the environmental 
context within which these organisations work has a significant impact on the 
positive or negative outcome(s) of the programme or project. Therefore, I also 
pursued the following questions, with the hope that I could have a greater 
understanding of the environment that this type of development work takes place 
in, and then better analyse the micro-programme/project within the macro- 
environment. 
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Structurally Centred Subsidiary Questions 
1. What is the historical and current level of state development in the rural areas 
of Lebanon where I visited? 
2. From the perspective of the interested parties that spoke to: What are the 
obstacles to rural development in Lebanon? 
3. How does Lebanon's political and socio-economic environment affect the 
development work of INGOs according to the men and women I spoke to? 
4. How do the regional political-economic pressures affect Lebanon's 
development process according to the people included in my fieldwork? 
5. Do the political parties/militias affect the work of INGOs according to INGO 
personnel, local men and women and others that I spoke to? How? 
6. To what extent do clientelism and patronage affect the development scene? 
7. To what extent does confessionalism affect INGO's development work? 
8. How do donor agendas impact the overall development process? 
I realise that there are assumptions implicit in my questions. The questions point 
to the fact that the outcomes intended by the INGOs may not be the ones desired 
by the `beneficiaries'. The questions assume that `beneficiaries' are not a 
homogeneous group with identical perceptions of the needs of the village. It is 
perceived that the various interested parties (INGO headquarters, field personnel 
and donors) may have different perceptions of what constitutes development or a 
successful programme/project. It is assumed that the interests of the state will 
somehow impact the work of these organisations. It is also presumed that the 
confessional patron-client cultural context that these organisations are working in 
will influence the outcome of the programme/project. 
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B. Research Design 
Units of Analysis and Points of Focus: Generally in social science research 
there is a wide variety in what or who is studied. This work specifically takes 
individuals and to a lesser degree organisations as its units of analysis. 
More than 400 interviews were conducted with local `beneficiaries', INGO 
mission heads and field staff, and Lebanese government representatives. 3 
Additionally, I interviewed representatives from various international 
organisations, including international donors, local political leaders, independent 
consultants, and academics. 
Regionalisation is a striking phenomenon in Lebanon that greatly affects 
the development scene. Therefore it was necessary to view each region 
separately, as each region bears the mark of its particular socio-economic, 
political and historical predicament. This includes uneven state development, 
different climates and access to agricultural inputs, connections to powerful 
zu'ama or patrons, the weighty influence of Syria, the ongoing conflict with Israel 
in Hasbaya and the South, violence and destruction in the Druze/Christian 
3Many of the given names of interviewees are pseudonyms, due to political sensitivities and the 
wishes of the informants. 
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villages of the Shuf, and the strength and influence of political parties/militias 
(Hizbullah and Amal in the South and Baalbek/Hermel). 
1. Units of Analysis 
a) INGOs: Initially I interviewed personnel from several INGOs working in 
Lebanon, they included; Oxfam UK, The Quakers, Norwegian People's Aid 
(NPA), Save the Children Federation (SCF), the Young Men's Christian 
Association (YMCA), The Pontifical Mission, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 
World Council of Churches (WCC), The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), 
Mercy Corps International, The Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), and 
World Vision. 
b) Individuals: Local men and women were interviewed from more than 30 rural 
villages in Lebanon where INGOs were currently working or where INGO projects 
had been completed within the previous year (1997). In addition, I went to 
several villages close to target villages, where INGOs were not working or had 
never worked and interviewed local people in an attempt to better comprehend 
the type of village chosen for INGO project inclusion from the point of view of 
local people. 
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The projects/programmes that I looked at included, but were not limited to, 
agricultural roads, construction of schools, sewage treatment facilities, irrigation 
networks, income generation programmes, child development programmes, 
provision of agricultural inputs, factory construction, semi and total rehabilitation 
of war damaged houses, and the installation of water supply networks. 
c) Government ministries: Interviews with personnel from ministries connected 
to developing rural areas were carried out in order to determine the government's 
level of involvement in rural development, as well the level of co-ordination 
between the INGOs, government and other interested entities. The ministries 
included in this study were; the Ministry of Agriculture, The Ministry of Public 
Works, Electricity and Water, the Ministry of Rural Affairs and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. 
d) Other organ isations/institutionsldepartments: Interviews with personnel 
from other local and international organisations, institutions, and departments 
were also conducted in order to better understand the total development 
environment. Those interviewed included: the FAO, the UNDP, Green Line, 
Greenpeace, the World Bank, USAID, ChristianAid, UNIFEM, and the 
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Department of Agriculture at the American University of Beirut, as well as 
independent development consultants. 
2. Points of Focus 
In order to gain a broader perspective of my units of analysis, at this juncture it 
would be beneficial to delineate several points of focus, including various 
characteristics of individuals and organisations, their orientations and actions that 
occur in the political economy of the development environment in Lebanon at the 
time of my fieldwork. 
a) Characteristics: The local men and women who were interviewed were for 
the most part characterised according to their gender, region of origin, marital 
status, educational attainment, income, occupation and level of participation 
and/or knowledge of INGO projects/programmes4. Specific INGOs as organs 
of social intervention and implementers of development programmes/projects 
were examined in terms of where they were working, when they were 
working, who they worked with, and according to the kinds of 
projects/programmes they implemented. 
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b) Orientations: As units of analysis, local people's orientations were also taken 
into consideration. These included; religion, political awareness and 
involvement, status in local, regional and international power relations, 
attitudes towards patron-client practices, feelings toward the state and INGO 
development initiatives, and their interpretation of the impact of foreign 
(Syrian, Israeli and American) interventions. INGOs orientations were 
examined according to their purpose, policy and procedures. Moreover, as 
organs of social intervention, the motivation behind their actions was also 
explored to some extent. 
3. Time Dimension 
The fieldwork for this study took place from January 1998 till August 1999. On 
several occasions it was necessary to re-visit villages where INGOs were 
working in order to see if projects where difficulties were encountered were 
actually executed. 
4 Please note that due to the wishes of my respondents, some of the characteristics related to 
their identity are not included or in some cases altered slightly. 
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C. Research Methods 
The two types of interview techniques utilised in this fieldwork project were semi- 
structured individual and group interviews using both open and closed-ended 
questions. The decision to utilise semi-structured interviews for my fieldwork was 
based on positive previous fieldwork in Lebanon using this method. As will be 
explained below, in many cases individual interviews spontaneously turned into 
group interviews also using semi-structured techniques5. 
a) Semi-structured interviews: Semi-structured, open and close-ended 
interviewing techniques were utilised in rural settings with men and women 
farmers, as well as with local government officials, and local non- 
governmental personnel. Semi-structured interviewing techniques were used 
in all initial non-governmental meetings, and were also used for the most part 
with government and donor officials. 
51 am aware of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), and I utilised one of its central techniques; 
semi-structured interviews. However, visual-based tools, a key ingredient in the "basket of 
techniques" for PRA were not utilised. 
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b) Group Interviews: Group interviews occurred in the villages and were 
spontaneous as neighbours or passers-by would commonly join in the 
conversation. They seemed to be very curious and interested in participating in 
discussions concerning their lives and development in their village. 
D. Subjects of inclusion: 
b) INGOs: As my stated intention was to look at the work of organisations that 
had established projects/programmes in rural areas, only seven of the 
INGOs from the list above qualified for the study, they included; Oxfam UK, 
Save the Children Federation, the YMCA, the Pontifical Mission, the MCC, 
Mercy Corps International, and CHF. Importantly, four of the organisations 
were receiving substantial amounts of funding from USAID, they included; 
the YMCA, the Pontifical Mission, CHF and Mercy Corps International. 
c) Villages: The villages where fieldwork was carried out were chosen based 
on the existence of ongoing or completed projects in the village, area of the 
country as I intended to sample all regions, and the accessibility conditioned 
by the agreement and co-operation of the INGO field officer or mission head. 
The villages chosen are located in six separate rural regions; the Akkar, 
Ba'albek-Hermel, the Bekaa, Hasbaya, the South and the Shuf. 
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d) Individuals: Men and women were chosen according to their availability and 
willingness to participate in individual interviews and group interviews. 
Typically, I went door to door in rural villages asking if individuals would 
agree to participate in my study. 
e) Government ministries: The ministries that I chose to include were the 
ones whose work is somehow related to INGO projects or rural development. 
They included: the Ministry of Agriculture, The Ministry of Public Works, 
Electricity and Water, the Ministry of Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. 
f) Other organisations/institutions/departments: The individuals interviewed 
from other organisations, institutions, and departments (e. g. the FAO, the 
World Bank, the UNDP, USAID, independent consultants etc... ) were 
chosen because of their knowledge of the local development process, the 
work of INGOs in rural development in Lebanon, and/or closeness to the 
projects or programmes being carried out in these areas of Lebanon. 
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E. Data Collection 
In order to facilitate my work in rural areas, I hired two female assistants; Miss 
Michelle Obeid an MA graduate in Anthropology from the American University of 
Beirut (AUB) who is fluent in all Lebanese dialects, and Miss Lama EI Zataari, a 
sociology undergraduate student from the Lebanese American University (LAU). 
The decision to hire only female assistants was taken because I believed that I 
would be able to gain easier access to female participants. 
All interviews with local men and women were conducted in Arabic. 
Interviews with INGO and government officials were conducted in both Arabic 
and English. One interview with an international development consultant was 
conducted in French and Arabic. 
F. Obstacles and Difficulties 
The obstacles and difficulties that I encountered were primarily associated with 
data collection. Below are examples of some of the difficulties I confronted: 
" Some INGO personnel were unwilling to allow me to enter villages where 
they were working, or would only allow me to enter if I was accompanied 
by one of their representatives at all times. 
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" Some government officials were uncooperative and delayed interviews on 
numerous occasions; 
" My own and my assistants' physical welfare was threatened on one 
occasion after leaving a project site; 
91 was warned on numerous occasions by field workers that my life could 
be in danger should I chose to reveal the names of individuals and 
organisations in a public medium; I was also warned by a member of one 
of the political parties whilst working in the South "... you might disappear. " 
"I was working in areas, which were undergoing bombardment during 
interviews; 
" Statistics concerning Lebanon, if available, are very unreliable; 
" In some areas, female respondents were less willing to speak in groups 
with men; 
"I was not able to travel to the Israeli occupied zone, where one INGO was 
working; 
"I had to constantly protect my respondents from possible retribution from 
patrons, political parties, INGO representatives, landlords and government 
officials; 
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" On rare occasions, I encountered dialects that were very difficult to 
understand though my assistant, Michelle, was fluent in most Lebanese 
dialects. 
G. Limitations 
My fieldwork research was limited by several factors, including time, budget and 
language considerations. 
9 Due to budget and time considerations I was only able to visit a limited 
number of project sites where the INGOs were working. 
" Tape recorders were only used in interviews with INGO personnel and in 
many cases they refused to be interviewed on tape. Tape recorders were 
never used in village interviews. Notes were recorded in Arabic and 
occasionally in English. The notes were then translated into English. Most 
of the quotes in the text are exact translations of the Arabic notes, though 
importantly the notes in Arabic from the fieldwork are not claimed to be 
exact. I am very confident that I was able to get a good sense of what was 
being said by the respondents. 
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" All travel was conducted in my own personal vehicle, a 1986 Volkswagon 
Golf GTI. At times it was difficult to access villages where there was no 
pavement, and on one occasion my car got stuck in mud next to a bridge 
between two villages. Luckily, there were men working on the bridge and 
they helped to push us out. 
" Due to the size of the country, in most cases, we returned to Beirut every 
night. However, in a couple instances we slept in villages with local 
families. 
9 We had to dress conservatively, with long sleeved-shirts and trousers at 
all times and seasons in villages. 
" Although I have the Lebanese nationality, I was viewed initially by some 
people as a possible spy or someone from an INGO who could deliver 
promises of aid. This made it very important from the beginning to explain 
that I could not deliver any financial benefits to their village and that I did 
not work for any foreign government. 
" Representative samples were impossible in the context of this study. 
Access to respondents was constrained by a combination of practical and 
political factors, therefore this work is more illustrative than representative. 
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H. Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored the methods used in the fieldwork, including the basic 
research questions utilised for obtaining information. It also looked at the 
research design, techniques and data collection. Additionally, it pointed out the 
various obstacles, difficulties and limitations encountered in the field. 
The following chapter aims to provide a general overview of the seven 
INGOs that were included in the fieldwork. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INGO PROGRAMMES IN LEBANON 
The INGOs that were explored in this project are vastly different in terms of 
budgets, ideologies, motivation, capacity as well as their history of working in the 
country. Most began working in Lebanon during the war as relief agencies and 
have now shifted their focus from relief to development. This section will look at 
the INGOs, their motivation, history and programme ideology. 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the aim of this project was to look at 
INGOs with established projects and/or programmes in rural areas of Lebanon. 
Seven INGOs were chosen based on the fact that they were international as 
opposed to local NGOs, and that they were working in rural areas of Lebanon. 
The following section is an overview of each INGO. It includes information on the 
historical development of the organisation as well as its current structure and 
stated objectives. The section also provides information on funding (if available) 
and an overview of their projects and/or programmes in Lebanon. 
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The discrepancy in the amount of information given for each INGO is 
explained by the fact that not all of the organisations had the same particular type 
of material available or documented, and some INGOs were more transparent 
than others concerning their funding amounts and sources. 
1. Mercy Corps International 
Mercy Corps International exists to alleviate suffering, poverty and oppression by 
helping people build secure, productive and just communities. ' 
This organisation is based in Portland, Oregon and has been around since 1979. 
Its roots stem from Cambodia's 'killing fields', when the movement of vast 
numbers of refugees sparked the interest of church leaders, media and 
entertainment personalities, and individuals in political circles in the United 
States. Initially, this organisation was set up as a one-year task force called Save 
the Refugees Fund. It was later incorporated into a global organisation now 
known as Mercy Corps International. The organisation's vision is located in the 
faith values that include Catholic social teaching and Quaker-Mennonite peace 
philosophies. It is stated that Mercy Corps provides assistance exclusively based 
1 www. mercycorps-orci/profile/profilel. html (p. 1) 
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on need, without regard to religion or politics. In 1998 Pax World Service merged 
with Mercy Corps in order to broaden civil society and peace initiatives. 
Mercy Corps states that in 1998 they have delivered food, shelter, health 
care and economic opportunity to over two million people in 21 developing and 
emerging countries, sent emergency goods and material aid to eight additional 
countries, and delivered $57 million in humanitarian aid. They have provided 
more than $500 million in aid to people in more than 73 countries since 1979. 
Their year 2000 budget was stated as exceeding more than $100 million. The 
sources of funding are not clear, but it seems that a large portion of their funds 
come from government aid programmes. 
The organisation's stated objectives are: 
Mercy Corps believes in innovation, and we have become a world leader in 
helping communities recover from emergencies, build stronger societies and find 
long-term solutions to poverty. 2 
" We believe humanitarian aid should be an investment rather than 
a one-time consumption of resources. Mercy Corps targets 
countries in transition to democracy or plagued by civil, religious 
and ethnic conflict. 
" We believe humanitarian assistance must not only meet basic 
needs, but also help lay the foundation for building societies that 
are more peaceful, open, democratic and economically strong. 
2 www. mercycorps. orci/profile/profilel. htmi (pp-1-2) 
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" We believe no single agency can meet the challenges of poverty 
and oppression, so we forge partnerships with other international 
and local organizations to build a broad coalition for humanitarian 
action. 
(Mercy Corps International 1999) 
a. The Mercy Corps Programme in Lebanon 
Mercy Corps has worked in Lebanon since 1993 `to rehabilitate homes and 
community infrastructure'. At the time of the fieldwork, Mercy Corps had 
approximately 15 employees, not including consultants. This organisation is 
currently part of a team of international American based NGOs participating in a 
USAID funded grant titled `Reconstruction and Expanded Economic 
Opportunities in Lebanon. ' This programme initiated in October 1997, aims to 
rehabilitate the economic and social viability of six targeted, geographic clusters 
of villages in the North and South of Lebanon. Over a four-year period, Mercy 
Corps will receive $7.3 million intended for their projects and programmes in 
more than 49 rural communities. 
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They state that they have: 
Designed and implemented a number of training programs to help 
vulnerable individuals including rehabilitating damaged 
infrastructure, and encouraging redevelopment of the agriculture 
sector by repairing a number of agricultural roads and terraces. In 
addition, Mercy Corps has helped open access roads between 
communities of varied religious 
and trade among the villages 
reconciliation of diverse groups. 
beliefs, improving communication 
and easing the interaction and 
In the past year, more than 1,110 families in 12 villages have 
benefited from our program activities. Activities included irrigation of 
247.5 hectares of land, rehabilitation of 11 agricultural roads, 
construction of a school that now benefits 260 students, and civil 
society training workshops that benefit more than 335 local non- 
governmental organizations. 3 
The entire staff of Mercy Corps is Lebanese, though I was told that some 
employees have dual-nationalities. 
2. Save the Children Federation 
Save the Children Federation (USA) was founded in 1932 to help Appalachian 
children in the United States during the Great Depression. The headquarters of 
the organisation is located in Westport, Connecticut. It began its international 
work in 1938, in response to an appeal launched for European children displaced 
by World War II. Today, Save the Children maintains international programs in 42 
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developing countries, and in 16 states in the United States. They have 
participated in several countries in the Middle East including, Egypt, the West 
Bank, Gaza, Jordan and Lebanon. 
Most of their funding comes from donations, grants from various sources 
including the UN, but a substantial portion of their funding has typically come 
from USAID. For the year 1999, they were able to raise more than $113 million 
aimed for operation support and programmes. 
During the past 62 years of operation, Save the Children has 
continuously refined its program strategies to meet the growing 
needs of children and their families in an increasingly complex 
world. The underlying principles inherent to all Save the Children's 
work are: a focus on children and women, participation and 
empowerment, multi-sectoral integration, sustainability, reaching 
large numbers of people and evaluation of impact ('making a 
difference', Save the Children: pamphlet no date given, p. 2). 
3 www. mercvcorps. org/news/press. n_lddeast. htmi (p. 2) and 
ww=ycors org/program*-Aebanon. s ttmI 
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Save the Children's Mission statement claims that women and children are the 
focus of their development work: 
As this turbulent century nears an end, many of the world's children 
face both unparalleled opportunities and intolerable perils. In this 
uncertain and unsettled environment, Save the children designs 
and implements programs that meet the most pressing needs of 
children and those who most often care for them: women. With 
women and children first, Save the Children continues to activate 
and support community-based groups to ensure that change will 
not only be positive, lasting. (ibid, p. 3. ) 
a. The Save the Children Programme in Lebanon 
Save the Children have been working in Lebanon since 1953, and they have 
been involved in various projects, including public health projects. During the 
recent civil war they were extremely active in emergency relief, employing some 
450 people. In 1992, they changed their focus to working in areas of community 
development with women and children. Save the Children also initiated a micro 
loan project for women, which was transferred to a local NGO. 
Save the Children works primarily in the following areas: 
1) Primary education; early childhood development, female literacy programmes, 
developing educational curricula and training trainers. 
2) Economic opportunities: social security loans. 
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3) Developing institutions: gender awareness issues, developing human 
resources counselling, technical evaluation and social interaction. 
Save the Children concentrate their work in the Akkar, the Hermel, and the 
South. As stated above, at one time during the war, their office employed more 
than 400 people, who worked in humanitarian relief. Their office has scaled down 
considerably, though they remain active in the country. The focus of their 
programmes is primarily helping needy women and children. They run 
programmes to combat female illiteracy in the rural areas of the Akkar, the 
Bekaa' and the South, as well as children's camps and training programmes in 
early childhood development. They have also participated in infrastructural 
development with UNCHS-Habitat, rebuilding 300 homes in the South. 4 
The staff at Save the Children is approximately 30 men and women, not 
including consultants, and is made up of a team of experienced and energetic 
men and women, who are all Lebanese, with the exception of the Mission Officer, 
who is Canadian. 
4 Save the Children staff employee, interview, January 1998. 
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3. The Mennonite Central Committee 
MCC was created in 1920 in response to hunger and related human need 
brought on by war and revolution in Russia and the Ukraine. In 1940 MCC began 
to grow in response to the Second World War and their desire to help bring about 
peace. Relief and refugee programmes were set up in Europe at the end of the 
war. In the 1950s and 1960s MCC programmes expanded in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. 
At the present time, MCC has more than 900 personnel serving two to 
three year assignments in around 50 countries, including volunteers and staff in 
North America. The MCC's North American headquarters are located in Akron, 
Ohio and Winnipeg, Canada. 
The bulk of MCC funding comes from contributions from the North 
American Mennonite and Brethren in Christ constituency. Other sources of 
funding come from earnings from contributions from volunteers, relief sales, MCC 
shops, SELFHELP crafts, grants from private Canadian government agencies 
and contributions from Mennonite churches abroad. In 1999, total funding 
received for MCC was $69.4 million. 
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This organisation states that it is motivated by two things: `The Bible and 
Mennonite experience' in : no date given, p. 1). MCC believes `it can best 
serve by looking for people who have fallen between the cracks of larger 
programs. ' In their Development Monograph Series 1 (Stoesz 1977: 7-8), 
`Thoughts on Development', MCC answers the question what is development? 
People are what development is all about. If it is not for people it is 
not worthy of the name. People with a liberated spirit are the most 
essential development ingredient. People are at the same time the 
objects of the process. 
Development is the conscientization process by which people are 
awakened to opportunities within their reach. Development is 
people with an increased control over their destiny. Development is 
freedom, wholeness and justice. 
People-oriented development is concerned equally with male and 
female. The incompleteness of past efforts, which have too often 
been by men to men, must be corrected. A society cannot be 
developed by concentrating on one-half of its members. Women 
and men must both be permitted to benefit and participate directly. 
True development begins as an attitude in the hearts and minds of 
people. People need resources but the key is their own minds and 
wills. Money and technology produce disappointing results is a 
development attitude is missing. Where this attitude is present the 
people will ultimately make progress. The only true measure of 
development is how it affects people, their attitude and their quality 
of Iife. 
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a. The MCC Programme in Lebanon 
The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) started working in Lebanon in 1978. 
They work mainly with rural communities in South Lebanon, especially in the 
UNIFIL areas. Their budget is quite small $250,000 annually and they have 
changed their programme from relief to development. `Now we don't give 100 per 
cent donations, we give 50 per cent. The problem is that the mentality of the 
people has not changed. They are still waiting for handouts. We are facing a lot 
of difficulties with this change. '5 
The MCC is working in crop diversification, road building, agriculture, 
especially tobacco, and summer camps for children. However, their new priorities 
are: 
1) Working with Islamic institutions for understanding; 
2) Working with local churches; 
3) Working with the marginalised, the handicapped, Palestinians and front line 
villages (those located on the border of the Israeli occupied territory); 
4) Peace-making and conflict resolution. 
56assam Chamoun, MCC, personal communication, July 1998. 
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The staff at MCC is quite small, with less than 10 employees and nearly all 
are Lebanese with the exception of the Mission Heads, who are both from North 
America. They often have volunteers working at their office in Beirut and on field 
sites. These volunteers are typically from North America. 
4. The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) 
The World Alliance of YMCA's is a confederation of national Councils of YMCAs 
around the world. The National Councils are composed of local associations 
within their countries. The World Alliance was established as early as 1855, at 
the first International Conference of the YMCA held in Paris. It is said to be the 
oldest voluntary organisation in the world today. 
Their mission statement says the following: 
The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) is a world-wide 
Christian ecumenical, voluntary movement for women and men 
with special emphasis on and the genuine involvement of young 
people, which seeks to share the Christian ideal of building a 
human community of justice with love, peace and reconciliation for 
the fullness of life for all creation. The YMCA is present in 122 
countries with 14,000 local associations and 45,000,000 members. 
The national associations from the World Alliance of YMCA's an 
international organisation which has consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. 6 
6 Wiwwumca int/mission/challenge2l . 
htm 
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The stated objectives of the YMCA are listed as the Kampala Principles, which 
were put forth in 1973: 
1. Sharing the good news of Jesus Christ and striving for spiritual, intellectual 
and physical well-being of individuals and wholeness of communities. 
2. Empowering all, especially young people and women to take increased 
responsibilities and assume leadership at all levels and working towards a 
equitable society. 
3. Advocating for and promoting the rights of women and upholding the rights of 
children. 
4. Fostering dialogue and partnership between people of different faiths and 
ideologies and recognizing the cultural identities of people promoting cultural 
renewal. 
5. Committing to work in solidarity with the poor, dispossessed, uprooted people 
and oppressed racial, religious and ethnic minorities. 
6. Seeking to be mediators and reconcilers in situations of conflict and working 
for meaningful participation and advancement of people for their own self- 
determination. 
7. Defending God's creation against all that would destroy it and preserving and 
protecting the earth's resources for coming generations. To face these 
challenges, the YMCA will develop patterns of co-operation at all levels that 
enable self-sustenance and self-determination! 
Information concerning YMCA's funding sources or funding amounts are not 
available, however, considering the size and reach of this organisation, they are 
sure to be substantial. The YMCA International division headquarters are in 
Chicago, Illinois. This office oversees the work done in Lebanon, though the 
Lebanese YMCA typically has substantial autonomy in most of its programmes. 
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a. The YMCA Programme in Lebanon 
The YMCA of Lebanon was established in 1890 as part of the international 
division linked to the YMCA headquarters in the United States. 
The purpose of the YMCA Integrated Rural Development Project is to 
address identified problems in rural Lebanon, including uneven post-civil war 
economic recovery, lack of economic opportunities, rural to urban migration, 
environmental degradation, and disintegrated structures of civic participation in 
rural areas. In order to adequately address these problems, the YMCA proposes 
that the USAID method of cluster groups of village communities will work best for 
the overall goals of development, which they set out to be: 
1) agriculture infrastructure, 
2) public works infrastructure, 
3) health and education infrastructure, 
4) agricultural income-generation for women, 
5) community environmental management, and 
6) civic participation and community education. 
www. ymca int/mission/challenge2l. htm 
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The YMCA (1997: 1) claims that: 
The overall impact of implementing the integrated set of project 
activities in each cluster over a three-year period will be a 
measurable and visible increase in the sustainable socio-economic 
development and viability of the targeted rural clusters 
characterized by increased economic opportunities, increased 
community participation in civic life, and improved basic needs 
services for community members. 
The entire staff at the YMCA is very large with close to 60 employees, and nearly 
all of them are Lebanese, including the head of the organisation in Lebanon, 
Ghassan Sayagh, who is called the CEO of the YMCA. They occasionally have 
foreign volunteers working for them, usually in their office in Sin el Fil. 
5. The Cooperative Housing Foundation 
The Cooperative Housing Foundation began by building affordable housing in 
rural and low-income neighbourhoods in America. They were approached by the 
U. S. Agency for International Aid and Development (USAID) in the 1960s so that 
CHF could `apply its models of cooperative housing, microlending, self-help 
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construction, and community organizational development in Central America'. 
These initial projects led them to work in many other countries. 8 
Every CHF housing project promotes self-reliance, democratic 
principles and private sector involvement. 
We root our programs in financially sound approaches which can 
become self-sustaining without the continuing need for an 
organization such as CHF. In this sense, we aim to work ourselves 
out of a job. 
The touchstone of CHF's approach is developing local community and 
institutional capacity to participate effectively within the housing delivery system. 
With that basis, CHF's objectives also include economic development, 
democratic governance, and environmental improvement. 
The total amount of funding for the year 1999 was $157.4 million. They 
receive(d) funding from a variety of sources, however the bulk comes from 
USAID, along with various American corporations and other American funding 
institutions. 
8 www. chfhq. ora/aboutl. htm 
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a. The Cooperative Housing Foundation Programme in Lebanon 
Their programme in Lebanon is called: Rural Economic Development Initiative 
(REDI) 
Their stated goal is: 
To assist in establishing a vibrant, sustainable economic 
development program which improves rural families' incomes and 
makes it possible for displaced families to find and participate in 
economic opportunities in their home villages. 9 
REDI is a five-year program focusing on six village clusters in North Lebanon and 
the northern Beka'a Valley: El Hermel North, EI Hermel South, EI Fakiha, Zgharta 
South, Wadi Khaled and Beino. CHF states that village clusters were selected 
because of significant economic need, their limited access to national and 
international assistance programs, and a strong desire of community residents to 
improve their economic conditions. Key elements of the REDI include: 
" Full participation of community members and leaders, including women, in all 
aspects of project identification, design and implementation 
" Implementation of economic improvement projects in an environmentally 
sound manner that are responsive to community priorities and provide visible 
results 
" Creation of formal sources of credit for both individuals and community 
groups and organizations (ibid). 
9 Lebanon: Rural Economic Development Initiative, (REDI), February 4,1998. 
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The staff at CHF includes about 15, not including consultants, and nearly 
all are Lebanese, including the head of the organisation. CHF routinely has at 
least one American on staff, typically young college grads, who are trying to get 
experience following their education. This office is very close to their 
Washington-based headquarters. The head of CHF in Washington is regularly 
featured in local newspapers visiting project sites as well as the local CHF office 
in Beirut. 
6. Oxfam UK 
In 1942, the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief met for the first time. By the 
1970s Oxfam became very vocal with their campaign on the behalf of the people 
it was working with in developing countries. This raised awareness for the plight 
of the poor and allowed Oxfam to reach decision-makers who shaped policy on 
relevant issues. 
Today Oxfam is said to be the best-known non-governmental 
organisations in the world. Oxfam UK is an independent British organisation, 
registered as a charity, and is part of Oxfam International. 
The Department for International Development (DFID) (formerly the ODA) 
is Oxfam's single largest donor, giving over £ 13 million in fiscal year 1996-7. 
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Oxfam also received funding from the National Lottery Charities Board, the UN, 
The European Union, and several others, including corporations and trusts. 
Oxfam describes itself as an organisation that works for the poor through various 
mechanisms: 
Oxfam GB is a development, relief, and campaigning organisation 
dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering 
around the world. We believe that every human being is entitled to 
a life of dignity and opportunity; and we work with poor 
communities, local partners, volunteers, and supporters to help this 
become a reality. 1° 
Their stated objectives and beliefs are stated as the following: 
1. The lives of all human beings are of equal value. 
2. In a world rich in resources, poverty is an injustice which must be overcome. 
3. Poverty makes people more vulnerable to conflict and natural calamity; much 
of this suffering can be prevented, and must be relieved. 
4. People's vulnerability to poverty and suffering is increased by unequal power 
relations based on, for example, gender, race, class, caste and disability; 
women who make up a majority of the world's poor, are especially 
disadvantaged. 
5. Working together we can build a just and safer world, in which people take 
control over their own lives and enjoy their basic rights. 
6. To overcome poverty and suffering involves changing unjust policies and 
practices, nationally and internationally, as well as working closely with 
people in poverty. " 
10 www. oxfam. orq. uk/atwork/0rql. htm 
11 www. oxfam. orci. uk/atwork/mission/htm 
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a. The Oxfam UK Programme in Lebanon: 
Oxfam's role in Lebanon began in 1982 as an emergency response to the victims 
of war, working with local NGOs. From 1985 the emphasis moved to 
development work including health, education, vocational training, early 
childhood education, disability and income generation. 
Oxfam also became involved with advocacy and lobbying, particularly in 
the field of disability. 
Oxfam defined their four focus areas at the end of the war to be: 
9 disability; 
9 rural development with marginalised rural communities; 
" Palestinian refugees; 
" the needs of the urban poor; 
" supporting local initiatives which address women and the law, violence and 
specific categories of vulnerable women (disabled, refugees, displaced 
women heads of households, rural women and migrant workers); 
" continuing our work with Palestinian refugees, particularly their education and 
health; 
" supporting community based initiatives addressing the management of 
natural resources which are jeopardised by the national reconstruction plan; 
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" helping to develop the capacity of local organisations, specifically those 
working on gender, natural resources and emergency preparedness. This will 
involve the eventual phasing out of funding to existing partner organisations 
and ensuring that they are able to continue their work independently. 12 
Unfortunately Oxfam UK's offices in Lebanon closed abruptly in 1999. 
7. The Pontifical Mission 
The Pontifical Mission is part of the CNEWA (Catholic Near East Welfare 
Association), which is a special agency of the Holy See established in 1926 to 
support the pastoral mission and institutions of the Catholic churches of the East 
and to provide humanitarian assistance to the needy and afflicted without regard 
to race, nationality or religion. They have also been `entrusted by the Holy Father 
with responsibility for promoting the union of the Catholic and Orthodox 
churches. ' (CNEWA 1997: 2) 
12 http: //home netscape com/escapes/search/ntsrchrnd-6. html 
180 
Their work in the Middle East includes: 
" Preparing church leadership 
" Facilitating priestly ministry 
" Building church institutions 
" Assisting the Holy See 
" Responding to urgent human needs 
" Rehabilitating dwellings and institutions 
" Sustaining a network of human services 
" Contributing to education 
" Promoting Christian unity 
" Fostering inter-religious dialogue 
" Raising consciousness about the East 
" Supporting educational programs 
" Encouraging intercultural communication 
" Advocating peace and justice 
Information on the history, organisational structure and finance for the Pontifical 
Mission are unavailable. 
a. The Pontifical Mission Programme in Lebanon 
The Pontifical Mission working with a grant from USAID and MISEREOR 
completed a three-year rehabilitation programme. They state that they have 
`restored 168 villages and rebuilt 1,427 houses, providing housing for 7,137 
villagers. ' They go on to say that because of their success they were encouraged 
to apply for an additional USAID grant. They did receive this grant and are 
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working along with the other four organisations in the USAID Reconstruction and 
Expanded Economic Opportunities project. 
The staff at the Pontifical Mission includes about 35 people and nearly all 
are Lebanese, including the head of the office in Lebanon. 
The next chapter covers a large part of the data obtained from local men 
and women concerning the level of development in their villages and/or regions. 
This chapter presents the intended beneficiaries' view of the INGO development 
programmes and projects with the intention that this information can be used to 
assist in understanding the current development environment in rural areas of 
Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MEETING NEEDS? INGOs, the STATE 
and RURAL COMMUNITIES 
Whoever does good work, does good to God. 
Mustapha 
Seen as efficient mechanisms by donors for promoting democratic development, 
INGOs have become thought of as necessary links between the state, market, 
local communities and sustainable development. However, their legitimacy rests 
almost solely on their capability to meet their own stated aims as well as at least 
part of the needs of the communities that they work with. Moreover the strengths 
and weaknesses of their capacity are complementary and comparable to the 
state and market, and should not be viewed separately. Whether these 
organisations acquire the institutional status to work as viable connections 
between the state and rural societies depends on their performance and 
implementation capacity as measured by all stakeholders in the development 
process, including the intended beneficiaries of their programmes and projects. 
This chapter explores the performance of seven INGO programmes in 
meeting the needs of rural communities in Lebanon. The voices of rural men and 
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women, who are living in villages where INGOs are working, ' are utilised in order 
to gain important insights of the rural political economy; as well as their 
assessment of the development programmes in their village or areal. 
As stated in Chapter Two, the development of Lebanon's regions varies 
dramatically due to a variety of political, historical and socio-economic factors. 
For this reason it is necessary to examine each region separately in order to 
grasp the macro-predicament of the particular area under study, before 
examining the individual programmes in specific villages. The chapter introduces 
each region and its basic political economy prior to the presentation of particular 
village data. It is hoped that this will enable the reader to gain a clearer 
perspective of the obstacles external to the project that development work faces 
in rural Lebanon. 
1I also visited four villages where INGOs were not working. 
2 Please see Appendix, p. 418 for a detailed table of the projects included in this work. 
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Administrative Divisions 
Lebanon has five governorates (muhäfagat, 
singular muliäfa? ah). 
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A. The Akkar 
The northernmost region of Lebanon, called the Akkar, is a pristine beautiful 
expanse of land, with rolling hills and a fertile plain. The main city of this 
region is Halba. The area is separated from Syria by Nahr el Kabeer el 
Janoubi (The Large Southern River). The coastal strip is known for its 
immense plantations of vegetables, sugar cane and olives. The interior 
mountainous regions are rugged and home to impoverished farmers who rely 
on growing mainly pulses and some deciduous fruit trees. Recent promotion 
of this area has come about from groups interested in the environment, as the 
Akkar is home to rare and beautiful flora and fauna. This region is considered 
by INGO, local NGO and UNDP representatives, among others, to be the 
most underdeveloped in the country. This is due in part to historical political 
neglect and the influence of landlords who refused large government 
development programmes in favour of maintaining their control of the 
farmer/peasants by providing for them through patron-client relationships. 
Michael Gilsenan (1996: 14) writing about his fieldwork in the Akkar in 1971- 
72 explained the relationship of the political elite with the farmers there. 
The beys' political control, the relative insulation from the economic 
and social transformations which had such an effect on central 
parts of the country from the 1820s onwards, and the absence in 
the Akkar of those links with France or England that have been so 
important for the evolution of modern Lebanese history, have 
combined to reinforce the quasi-isolation of the region. 
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The lords are happy to do everything they can to preserve this 
social and cultural backwardness to maintain local domination and 
their own autonomy from the centre. They have done little to 
encourage any form of modernization, prefering a population which 
depends as totally as possible upon their authority. Few dai'a 
(villages) have schools, clinics, post offices, sewage and drainage, 
piped water or electricity. The beys see to it by their influence in the 
National Assembly and the Ministries. 
Because this region is relatively isolated it was not directly affected by the civil 
war (1975-1991). There is a substantial Syrian presence here and comments like 
the following were heard in every village. 
The government has neglected the area so much. No MP's are interested. The 
MP's from here are our friends, but there is political prostitution in the system. 
The Akkar is hardly considered part of Lebanon. We are confused. Are we a part 
of Lebanon or a part of Syria? This does not mean that people are not happy. It's 
just that the Akkar is just too neglected. 4 
Local mukhtars and INGO representatives estimate the population of the Akkar 
to be around 300,000. The majority in this region are Sunni Muslim, but a 
sizeable Christian community also exists. Most of the Christians are from the 
Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects. Nearly all of the people living in the Akkar 
are involved in agriculture in some way. The status of agricultural 
development-as stated previously-in the area is very poor. Of all the regions 
looked at in this project, the Akkar has witnessed the least in development 
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assistance, whether from the government or NGOs (local and international). Two 
local NGOs, the Fares Foundation and the Rene Moawad Foundation, have 
ongoing programmes there. The Fares Foundation focuses on medical 
dispensaries and the Moawad Foundation (at the time of my fieldwork) was 
working to support local agricultural projects mostly in the Northwest of the 
region. At the time of my fieldwork, several projects in this region were being 
carried out by INGOs working with USAID, and most of the work that I looked at 
in this region was linked to the USAID initiatives. As will be discussed below, the 
village of Bkerzala was an exception, in that it had been used a hub for the 
distribution of relief aid to areas near Tripoli, which were affected by the war. 
4Faysal: single, adult man, painter, individual interview, 1998. 
'The Reconstruction and Expanded Economic Opportunity programme in Lebanon is the 
'flagship' of the USAID program. A critical component of this programme is the Rural Community 
Development Clusters. 
This activity consists of five cooperative agreements to five US NGOs to provide assistance to 30 
clusters, consisting presently of 226 rural villages with a total population estimated at over 
600,000. Assistance includes basic infrastructure; income producing activities; civic participation; 
and environmental activities. The NGOs work with local citizen groups, local government and 
community-based organization. Each NGO is responsible for development of its clusters for the 
life of the strategy. Community clusters are located in all areas of Lebanon identified by the 
Higher Relief Committee as poor, or very poor. Three of the clusters, comprising twenty villages, 
are located inside the Israeli self-declared "security zone". 
This programme is a $60 million five-year(1997-2002) project with an additional $ 1,000,000 for 
environmental programmes. Each INGO receives $one million per year for five years plus a one 
time instalment of $one million for the environmental aspect of their programs. The INGOs must 
spend the funds every year in order to be guaranteed funding for the next year. 
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I went to the villages of Bkerzala6, Bajaa'7, Ghaitla8, Tleil9, Hosnie10, 
Ghzailell, Kraybet el-Hayat12 (just north of Machta Hassan), Hise'13 and 
Hneider14 in Wadi Khaled. Mercy Corps is working in the north-western region of 
the Akkar in the villages of Bkerzala, Bajaa', Ghaitla and Tleil. The Pontifical 
Mission is building a school in Kraybet el-Hayat and the Cooperative Housing 
Foundation (CHF) is working in Wadi Khaled (specifically in the villages of Hise' 
and Hneider). I also went to two other villages Hosnie and Ghza*fle in the nearby 
area where INGOs/NGOs were not working. 
6 In this village I interviewed nine individuals and five men in a group. 
7I interviewed more than 20 men and women during the first visit and 15 in subsequent visits. 
81 interviewed nine people from this village. 
91 interviewed ten people individually from this village, and conducted a group meeting with more 
than six people. 
101 interviewed 15-20 people from this village in a group. 
11 1 interviewed nearly 30 people from this village in a group. 
121 made several visits to this village, and in total have spoken to at least 40 people. 
13 I interviewed three people individually and conducted a group interview about 10 people (nine 
men and one woman). 
141 made several visits to this village and interviewed at least 30 people. 
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1. The village of Bkerzala 
Bkerzala is a fairly large Maronite Christian village with a population of 3,000 
persons according to the local mukhtar15. The village is located just 15 minutes 
off the main road by car heading north towards Halba. Bkerzala is no stranger to 
foreign aid. During the civil war Bkerzala became a hub of sorts for aid 
distribution. The Pontifical Mission, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) and Caritas were the most frequently mentioned organisations, and 
several respondents informed me that the UNDP has recently promised to 
showcase Bkerzala as a 'model development village. ' Currently, the North 
American based INGO, Mercy Corps with funding from USAID is building a large 
sewage treatment system here. According to local people, sewage from the 
village used to collect at the bottom of the road at the entrance to the village. 
The majority of people in Bkerzala reported that they work in agriculture at 
least part of the time, though many hire day labourers to plant and harvest their 
crops. Most residents said that they have running water through pipes in their 
15 In Lebanon nearly every village has a mukhtar, or Mayor, who is responsible for maintaining all 
of the records, and he interfaces with the government in matters of birth, death, marriage and 
divorce and inheritance for the village. At this time, as was explained in Chapter Two, no official 
census has been carried out since 1932. Hence, mukhtars are the most reliable source for 
population data available in Lebanon. Throughout this chapter sources for population will be 
understood as having come from the village mukhtar, unless noted otherwise. 
190 
homes. There is a functioning, recently elected, municipality, a school run by the 
Maronite order, and the village receives some government electricity. The 
average per capita monthly income reported for the village is approximately 
1,000,000 LL ($667 or £417)16. The majority of people said that their living 
conditions and quality of life had improved in the past five years, though many 
remarked that `life is costing more and our expenses are high. ' Many people 
reported having relatives living abroad, and Australia seemed to be the adopted 
home for many of the immigrants». 
This village is a Christian village, which is situated between Sunni Muslim 
villages. Many respondents stated that they felt `surrounded' by 'backward' 
Muslim villages. It definitely seems that there is an uneasy co-existence in 
Bkerzala with their neighbours, and many people reported a feeling of superiority 
and more than a hint of frustration with the `underdevelopment' of the 
neighbouring villages. 
16 This figure was agreed upon by local people and the mukhtar. 
17 At this point it is significant to point out that references to remittances from either relatives 
living abroad or in major cities was infrequently mentioned. If it was, it was noted that this income 
was neither regular nor constant, and was considered by most respondents as a bonus and not 
regular income. For instance, in one village where the locals spoke of remittances from relatives 
living in Germany, it was mostly for school fees or house repairs and not necessarily a monthly 
stipend. 
191 
We are different than other villages in the Akkar. We are better. We are more 
advanced. We do have a bad social setting among neighbouring Muslim villages. 
They have a lower standard. There is just a different ambience. I say it to their 
faces. 18 
When it comes to reconciliation, no the NGO has not helped. There are clear 
social differences between them and us. It's difficult. 19 
The respondents said that government interest in their village was low and 
indicative of the region on the whole. 
Low very low. We have no telephones, no good roads, no hospital or infirmaries. 
As an area the government really neglects it. Look politicians belong to certain 
areas. The Akkar is forgotten... it is deprived. 20 
The government is not giving importance to the important things. People in the 
government draw everything towards themselves. Look at the roads that lead to 
certain villages, they should be repaired, your car can drown in these roads. If 
there are problems in this village, we solve them ourselves. Each family solves 
the problems for themselves. Like for instance a water problem we get the 
money and we do it ourselves. 21 
was taken to this village by Alia Shaban, the gender co-ordinator for 
Mercy Corps and UNIFEM, and she introduced me to Nadim Ibrahim, who 
historically has been the main connection with the aid agencies for the village. 
His position has changed somewhat as USAID requires that the INGOs set up a 
committee, and then following the municipal election the INGO must work with 
the municipality. The case of Nadim Ibrahim is important because he and others 
18Jean: married, middle-aged man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
19Mr. Obeid: married, elderly man, retired civil servant, individual interview, 1998. 
20Mr. Obeid: same as above. 
21Noura: married, adult woman, housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
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spoke about how his position in the village had changed since his contact with 
NGOs. He was living in a large house that had originally been the depot for all of 
the `development aid' and he was then able to turn it into his house and build on 
to it. He spoke of how he was able to get $5,000 from one aid agency that he 
was working with in order to repair the irrigation network for his orchards. He 
believes that his success in 'development' lies with his ability to write proposals 
and 'speak development language. ' This he says is why he `was able to bring so 
much development to the village'. 22 
When I told him that I would be interviewing some of the villagers 
concerning the work of Mercy Corps, he objected saying `Why speak to the 
villagers when you can speak to me? '23 
Overall, the villagers were pleased with the project: 
I have heard from other people and I know from Mercy Corp's current project. 
They are very concerned and active. No one could have dreamt this could 
happen here especially the older people who couldn't even water their orchards 
before Mercy Corps came! 24 
22Nadim Ibrahim: married, middle-aged man, NGO village liaison, individual interview, 1998. 
23Nadim Ibrahim: same as above 
24Suraya: single, adult woman, NGO worker and local committee member, individual interview, 
1998. 
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It doesn't matter who does the work as long as it is beneficial. When Mercy Corps 
came we had not heard of them-they took us individually as people and this is 
all that matters. What matters is that they came. 25 
One woman voiced her concerns about the surrounding villages' lack of sewage 
system and its effect on her village. 
Yes. It is very important not only to get rid of the sewage but I want everyone 
else's sewage away from me. There should be a solution because here we have 
olives and a lot of vegetable production, so there should be a global solution for 
the other's (villages) sewage as well. I wonder how they will make sure that the 
sewage goes to the treatment. How? There are no connections from our house 
to the project. 26 
Many of the people in Bkerzala complained that the village above them, Bajaa', 
was terminally 'backward' and 'undeveloped', and in desperate need of 
development agencies, so this was the next village that I visited in my fieldwork. 
2. The village of Bajaa' 
The small Sunni village of Bajaa' with a population of 350, according to the local 
mukhtar, is located about 20 minutes east of Bkerzala by car, up winding roads 
and is perched at the top of a steep hill. A long time development field worker, 
who had worked in Bajaa' several years before described the village as `... one of 
the poorest villages I have ever visited. '27 Today poverty is still evident and 
25George: married, adult man, farmer and local committee member, individual interview, 1998. 
26Noura: married, adult woman housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
27Haytham Annan: adult man, long-time development field officer, 1998. 
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widespread, though there is some construction going on and most of the people 
that I spoke to believed that their housing and living conditions have improved in 
the last five years. Like Bkerzala, there were many reports of relatives emigrating 
to foreign destinations (Australia), and migrating to larger cities; Beirut and 
Tripoli. Government involvement in this village appears totally absent, and the 
most common answer to questions regarding the government was: `The 
government... do they even know that we exist? '28 
The majority of women work in subsistence agriculture29 and the men either 
work as manual labourers in Bkerzala or as farmers. The average income for 
the village was reported by the local and the mukhtar to be 250,000 LL ($167 or 
£104) per month per family. When speaking about the reasons for the 
improvement of living conditions in the village, the locals listed several 
contributing factors, but many referred to emigration to a foreign destination and 
migration to Beirut and Tripoli, and the concomitant flow of remittances sent 
back to the village as the main source of 'development'. 
28AIi: married, adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
29 Subsistence agriculture in this context is meant to mean food that is grown and consumed by 
the family, and is not sold. 
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Mercy Corps is currently working here; they built a concrete road leading 
up to the village and a water pool reservoir. 30 Before the water reservoir was 
built, the village women had to walk one kilometre to a spring and carry water 
back to the village. Now, they all have access to this water source and most use 
it for household purposes and irrigation. However, because other villages in the 
mountainous region above them do not have sewage treatment31, Bajaä's water 
sources are polluted in the winter by sewage washing down from higher villages. 
It was reported that some people have continued to drink this unpotable water 
and illnesses due to contamination were commonly reported, many village 
women have continued to collect water from the spring for drinking during the 
winter months. 
30Save the Children also built a water holding tank there several years ago. 
31 Please note that when I state that there is no sewage treatment that means that sewage is 
disposed of locally in cesspits. 
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Mercy Corp's water reservoir in Bajaa' 
The other project that Mercy Corps was supposed to carry out in the 
village was the construction of an all weather school for about 70 children in the 
area, who for the most part do not have access to any formal education, due to a 
lack of facilities. 32 
We proposed the school project to the Mercy Corps because they had done a 
reservoir here previously. The locals offered the land 1000 square metres, but 
Mercy Corps denied us the request because they said that the land is not 
straight. They want flat land. As you can see this village is at the top of a hill. The 
flat land we have is all used for farming and we cannot spare it. Everyone knows 
that the land can be straightened with a bulldozer in two days, but they refuse. 33 
returned to the village in April 1999 and the original land offered by the 
villagers had been cleared and flattened by the owner of the land himself. They 
32Residents reported a minimum 75 % illiteracy rate in this village, 1998. 
33AIi and Mohammed: married, adult men, farmers, group interview, 1998. 
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were waiting for Mercy Corps to begin work on the school and had been told by 
the current field officer in charge that Mercy Corps was waiting for their new 
budget. The following week I visited Mercy Corps to inquire as to the status of the 
school and was told by Hiam Shedid, the acting head of Mercy Corps, that the 
villagers had not agreed on the land. I told her that I had just come from there 
and that the land had been offered and cleared, and that they were waiting for 
the budgeting process to be completed. She told me that the villagers were lying 
and that they had changed their minds concerning the project. I repeated that I 
had just came from Bajaa' and that they seemed more than co-operative. She 
said that she was going there in a week and angrily added, '... if things can't be 
worked out, this project will be deleted by Mercy Corps! khalas! (that's it! )'34 
34Hiam Shedid: adult woman, acting head of Mercy Corps International, individual interview, 
1999. 
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A typical day for Bajaa's children 
3. The villages of TleiI and Ghaitla 
The villages of Tleil and Ghaitla are about 30 minutes by car north of Bkerzala 
just off the main road after Halba, and are situated very close together. Mercy 
Corps built an all weatherised school in Tleil for use by both villages and 
constructed roads in Ghaitla. The previous school was a dilapidated one-room 
building that was in a sorry state, devoid of toilets or a heating system. 
The villages are mixed Alawite, Sunni Muslim and Greek Orthodox. The 
population of Tleil is estimated by local people and the mukhtar to be 3,000 
persons with 1,800 residents and Ghaitla has about 700 inhabitants. Most of the 
villagers work in agriculture and many families have at least one male relative in 
the army. Many villagers also reported that smuggling goods to Syria (as this 
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village is very near the northern Lebanese/Syrian border) was a very lucrative 
trade up until about two years ago (1996) when the Syrian and Lebanese 
governments began to crackdown on this type of illicit trade. The villagers 
pointed to elaborate red roofed villas built outside the village as those belonging 
to the `most successful smugglers. ' 
Unlike Bkerzala, the villagers spoke of very harmonious relations and 
peaceful co-existence between sects. They said that the 'war in Beirut' had not 
affected relations here and that this tolerance was reflected in the management 
and implementation of the project. 
The committee members were chosen by compromise between villagers, 
families, teachers and the municipality. 35 
We have no differences in this village. We all work with one hand together and it 
all goes back to the village. All of us men, women and children. 36 
I only met with the municipality members in TIeil, as Ghaitla has no 
municipality. Here I found that state involvement in this village was no different 
than anywhere else in the Akkar. 
Here we don't feel the presence of the government It is non-existent. 37 
35Fares: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
36Hind: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
37Il1yas: widowed, elderly man, retired farmer and civil servant, 1998. 
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We know about everyone else in the country but they don't know about us. Our 
whole village depends on agriculture production to survive. This year's production 
was really poor because of the rats. If the government really cared about us, they 
would help us, but they don't even want to know that we exist, what can they gain 
from us? 3ß 
No one cares about us. If we have problems here... even with the roads, we solve 
it ourselves within the family or within the village. We solve things for ourselves. 
39 
The men and women of both villages were very pleased with the work of 
Mercy Corps: 
Everyone here is happy with the project. Did you know that even the American 
Ambassador came to look at the project and to see our village? He made us feel 
that yes, we are on the map of Lebanon, and someone knows that we exist. We 
felt very good. Our own government never did anything for us. They don't even 
know that we exist until election time. Then they come here with smiles and 
promises and we never see them again or the fruits of their promises. 40 
This organisation has a very good reputation in this village. We hope that they 
don't leave. We are hoping for more projects here. 41 
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38Hind: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
39Fouad: adult male, 1998. 
40Hind: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
41Samia: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
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Future school in Tleil built by Mercy Corps 
Though the structural problems of the school had been solved by building a new 
one, many spoke of the low level of qualified teachers in the village, and those 
who could afford private school tuition fees were not going to send their children 
to the new school. 
I do have access to the school, but I will not be sending my children there. Why? 
My children go to a private school because up until now this school was barely 
functioning. I mean there were no toilets for the children or the teachers! Even 
now I won't send my children there because the teachers are not that qualified. 42 
There are 55 students from here in elementary school. The impact of the school 
is quite positive. Instead of sending my children to Halba they can go here. 43 
After Tleil they have to go to Halba if they continue. This school is only 
elementary. But with the school in Tleil the problem is that the level is really 
bad. 44 
Women in the village complained that they needed something for them. 
They wanted a factory to open a branch here, so that they could supplement their 
income and achieve some personal growth. Women admitted that they were 
involved with this project, mostly because the field officer from Mercy Corps had 
made a point of involving them. 
42Hind: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
43Hassan: middle-aged man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
44Moussa: middle-aged man, shop owner, group interview, 1998. 
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I think that men and women were equally involved in this programme so far. All of 
the women in our community are taking part in this because we know and 
understand what's going on. 45 
It must be noted that Mercy Corps' field officer, Jacqueline Moukeiber 
seems to have really made a difference. Men, women and even children from the 
villages where she was working, knew her personally. She spent a lot of time 
getting to know the locals and this seems to have given them a feeling of security 
and trust. Unfortunately, Jacqueline left the organisation just two months after I 
completed my fieldwork and she was openly criticised by her superiors at Mercy 
Corps for `spending too much time talking to communities and women and not 
enough time on infrastructure. '46 The drive to construct and move on to the next 
project is high with USAID funding, as the time limits are strict and short. If an 
organisation doesn't spend all of their yearly allotment, then they don't get the 
same amount of funding the following year. 47 
45Hind: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
46Hiam Shedid: adult woman, acting head of Mercy Corps International, individual interview, 
1999. 
47 According to a local consultant Alia Shabaan was also let go from Mercy Corps for the same 
reason: spending too much time with women and local people, 1999. 
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4. The villages of Hosnie and Ghzaile 
Hosnie is a very impoverished Sunni Muslim village that one must pass through 
to get to Bkerzala, and is about 10 minutes by car from Bkerzala. The men and 
women here are mostly day labourers on large agricultural estates. Most people 
reported their income on a daily basis and it was on average 4,000 LL ($2.67 or 
£1.67) per day for the summer months only (from the beginning of May until the 
end of September)48. There is no sewage system or running water in the village, 
and housing and living conditions were reported to be worsening49. According to 
local people no development organisations had ever approached Hosnie. 
The village had an election, however, groups belonging to different clans 
began fighting and the municipality was cancelled. When I asked a group of 
about six women why they thought INGOs did not approach their village, some of 
the women replied: 
Oh... we are too poor. Yes, they would never work here, because we don't even 
have the basics. Anyway, we can not get organised here, we need someone 
from the village to represent us, and there is no one. 50 
48 The average yearly income is 720,000 LL ($480 or £300). 
49 Most families have access to cess-pits for sewage. 
50Fatoum and Um Ali: married, adult women, farmers and housewives, group interview, 1998. 
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The other village I visited in this area that was not part of an INGO scheme was 
Ghzaile, which was a small Sunni village with about 300 inhabitants. 51 Each 
house had its own personal well, but there was no sewage system52. The 
villagers bought their own generator in order to electrify the village. However 
recently the government has supplied the village with electricity. 
Even as far as electricity goes, the villagers here bought their own generator and 
established an electricity network. And when the government had their 
emergency electricity plan, they came to this village, not because of a will to do 
so, but because they had to cover all of Lebanon and anyway because the 
Italians made them, the project I think was sponsored by the Italians. 53 
The economic situation preoccupied everyone we spoke with. The average 
income was about 300,000 LL ($200 or £125) per month per family, according to 
locals and the mukhtar. One man who worked as a painter professed that, `The 
political system is unstable. There is great uncertainty, and 200,000 LL ($133 or 
51 Unlike any other village I visited in my fieldwork, there was no welcome from the people. We sat 
in the saahah or the centre of the village with about 20 men and women. The reception was very 
frosty and no one spoke. Then when we explained the project and why we were there, relations 
changed instantly. Out came the tea and fruits and people started speaking animatedly. The 
reason for this initial standoffish reception was because the villagers explained that they had had 
several visits from Jehovah's Witnesses and they thought that we were there to convert them. 
52 Most families have access to cess-pits for sewage. 
53Faysal: single, adult man, painter, individual interview, 1998. 
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£83) a month is all that sustained me two years ago, now this year, it is not 
enough! '54 
The villagers were not aware of any NGOs or INGOs working in the area, 
though they mentioned names like Issam Fares for providing scholarships and 
medical care to people in the Akkar55. They, like the men and women in Hosnie, 
did not expect that any INGOs would approach their village, because they argued 
that they were too poor and did not have any wasta. 56 
5. The village of Kraybet eI-Hayat 
About one hour's drive to the north-east of Halba just after Machta Hassan and 
Machta Hammoud is the village of Kraybet eI-Hayat. This is a Sunni Muslim 
village with about 450 inhabitants, according to locals and the INGO 
representative. Many of the villagers in Kraybet el-Hayat are subsistence farmers 
and day labourers, earning just 4,000 LL daily for the summer only, 57 and most 
stated that they do not own their own land. Many spoke of working on land 
owned by a wealthy landlord from Machta Hammoud. According to my 
54Faysal: single, adult man, painter, individual interview, 1998. 
55 Issam Fares is a Lebanese multi-millionaire who is originally from the Akkar. Through his 
foundation, the Fares Foundation, he donates food, money and medicine to the people of the 
Akkar. His foundation also works to promote his political platform. 
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interviewees, the average monthly income for the villagers not working as day 
labourers is 300,000 LL ($200 or £125) per month for a family of approximately 
ten persons, including the elderly. The living and housing conditions have 
reportedly declined steadily in the last five years. 
In this village we don't have a school, sewage treatment, roads or potable water. 
This village lacks a lot, and basically we have nothing. 58 
We leave it up to God! Everything is deteriorating. There is no work. 59 
In Beirut, no matter what I do I make 10 papers (10,000 LL). Here we live like 
nothing! 60 
We need a sewage system, roads, and a hospital. When a person gets sick here 
he has to go to Syria. This is what is happening in all the border areas. The 
nearest hospital in Lebanon is in Halba, one hour away. There is a clinic in 
Qobayat. In Syria we pay for medical care, but it is symbolic compared to here: 
$100 in Lebanon $20 in Syria. If we go to the public hospitals in Syria it's free. 61 
56 Wasta is a term in Lebanese Arabic that means 'a power-broker'. 
57The average yearly income is 720,000 LL ($480 or £300) 
58Um Ahmed: married adult woman, farmer and housewife, group interview, 1998. 
59Abdel Karim: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
60Ahmed K.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
61 Mustapha: married, middle-aged man, store owner, individual interview, 1998. 
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The Pontifical Mission is trying to finish building a school here that the villagers 
started constructing themselves about seven or eight years ago. 
We gathered money from the villagers (40,000LL to 80,000LL) to build this 
school ourselves and then we started to build it. Well the darak (Gendarmerie 
from Machta Hassan) came and said that we didn't have permit to build this 
school, even though it was on our own land and then they came and tore down 
the work that we had started. We couldn't collect enough money for the permit, 
so we just stopped the school. You see if you look into this storage house you 
will see all of the wasted cement. It's all lost! Wasted! 62 
Two years ago one of the village notables who had been a candidate for 
MP heard that an organisation, Pontifical Mission, was doing development work 
in the area. He approached them to see if they would agree to build the school, 
and they agreed conditionally until approval from USAID was secured. They also 
agreed to construct an irrigation canal and pave a small road. In August 1998, 
seven months later the canal was completed, however USAID had still not 
granted permission for the school. Finally in the early spring of 1999 USAID gave 
approval and the Pontifical Mission went to work. They had completed the 
foundation and were just beginning the walls when the work was halted by the 
darrak (local police) claiming that they still needed the permit. 
62Ahmed: married, adult man, mini bus driver, individual interview, 1998. 
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Current one-room school in K 
Future school in Kraybet el-Hayat: Construction work frozen 
The last time I visited this village was in late April 1999, and all work on 
the school had ceased. The locals explained that the Pontifical Mission was 
trying to sort things out, but that this was basically an issue of local power 
politics. It seems that the head constable felt that the villagers should have 
officially asked permission from him before they began work on the school. They 
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also said that he expected some form of payment, both monetary and patronage. 
The villagers refused because they reasoned that this was their own land and 
they were building this primary school, because they believed that the 
government would never build one in their village. This village has no members 
in the military or the government. They have no patron and no wasta; therefore 
they are at the mercy of this local constable. He knows that they have no 
connections, which give him a significant amount of power over them, and they 
have no recourse to the government because in this area, he is the government. 
It is important to note that these constables are rotated, which means that he has 
a relatively short time to maximise his power structure and financial gain. Also, 
head constables are non-commissioned officers who have been serving for about 
25 to 30 years and are close to retirement, therefore the pressure for some to 
collect is substantial. 
Whilst in the village I met with a group of local men who were working with 
the Pontifical Mission. They laughed when I spoke about the committee and they 
said `our village is a committee'. Like the majority of villages that I went to in 
Lebanon, the locals generally handle problems or development issues 
themselves and decisions are taken together. There is no municipality though 
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many said that they would like to have one, and two men reported that they were 
interested in running for municipal elections. When I asked them if there were 
women on the committee, one elderly man responded. `Yes! There is one, and 
already that is too many! '63 All of the men laughed, but one man explained that in 
a way women are involved because `sometimes the husband will discuss these 
things with his wife. 'M This was not viewed by some women as fair, because a 
few did want to be directly involved and felt that they had been ignored. 
I was not engaged in any part of the project, because all of this happened 
between men and there was no part for the women. But, I would have liked to 
have been a part of it and I would have liked to have been able to have given at 
least my opinion concerning this project. 65 
Most of the men in the village responded with disbelief that women would even 
want to be involved. 
Women? No there are no women, only men are involved with this project, 
women? Do they want women? Women have no interest in these kinds of 
things. 66 
63Mustapha D.: married, adult man, truck driver, committee member, group interview, 1998. 
64Mohammed: adult man, farmer and construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
65Fatima speaks: married woman, housewife, group interview: group agrees, 1998. 
66Ahmed: married, adult man, mini bus driver, individual interview, 19% 
211 
The level of government development here is non-existent. The response 
that 'this village is self-made! ' was common. There was a complete lack of trust 
in the government, and many felt that the government was against them. 
There is no government involvement in this village. This area is dead forgotten! 67 
You never see a government official here in this village unless it is election 
time. 68 
There is a lack of trust in confidence in the government, that is why everyone 
works on his own. There is a lack of trust. 69 
In all of the government ministries and with all of the ministers, there is no trust. 70 
There's no municipality, we must resort to MP's and it's not easy to reach MP's. 
MP's when they want something, they are always around, but if there is work to 
be done, they will leave and you will not be able to see them. 71 
Elderly couple in Kraybet el-Hayat 
67Ahmed K.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
68Um Mohammed: married, adult housewife and farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
69Abdullah: adult man, construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
70Mustapha: married, middle-aged man, store owner, individual interview, 1998. 
71Fatima: married woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
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6. The area of Wadi Khaled 
Wadi Khaled lies to the north-east of Kraybet el-Hayat and one must pass 
through a Syrian checkpoint in order to reach the area. Wadi Khaled is a 
beautiful area. It has small forests, green rocky plains and ancient rock 
formations everywhere. The land gets progressively more rocky as one travels 
east. In Hneider there are large dark coloured boulders covering the land. Many 
locals have used these rocks to build houses and separation walls. 
According to local estimates and the INGO field officer working in the 
area, there are about 40,000 people living in Wadi Khaled and finally in 1993 
they were officially recognised as Lebanese citizens. Historically, they were 
nomadic tribes, but settled in this area about a century ago. There were a lot of 
stories going around the development community as to why they did not get 
citizenship before 1993. However, the story that the villagers tell is plausible and 
was confirmed by an AUB historian. In the past, the Ottomans would journey to 
the poorest areas and force young men into their armies. Upon receiving news 
that the Ottoman authorities were coming, the tribes of Wadi Khaled would leave 
the area and hide in the nearby forests. When the French authorities attempted 
to register the people of this area in the early 1920's, the people did not trust this 
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registration and understood it as an action to deny them their freedom and again 
they hid. Years passed and successive Lebanese governments avoided 
registering the inhabitants of Wadi Khaled, possibly due to the fact that they are 
Sunni Muslim and would have increased the percentage of that sect slightly. 
According to local people and CHF representatives this area is extremely 
impoverished72. Most of the population are farmers, however smuggling to and 
from Syria was a very lucrative business until about two years ago (1996). Many 
spoke of the loss of smuggling as a vital part of the economy, and a death knell 
for the area. Moreover, the Lebanese government has put strenuous conditions 
on their citizenship, and they are forbidden from collecting any wages for ten 
years. 
7. The villages of Hise' and Hneider 
Hise' and Hneider are both villages that I visited in Wadi Khaled. The area's 
economy is dependent on agriculture and the average family income was 
reported by locals and a few mukhtars to be 200,000 LL ($133 or £83) per 
month, but reports of 1,000,000 LL ($667 or £416) per year were common, 
72 The local interviewees and the CHF representatives made no mention of labour remittances 
contributing to the local economy. 
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especially in Hneider73. The average family size, according to a local mukhtar, 
was ten, including the elderly. Lack of agricultural attention and extension from 
the government was a source of great frustration. 
It was in Hise' that I met with the committee, which was working with the 
Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF). CHF was currently constructing an 
irrigation canal, had finished an agriculture road in Hneider and were helping to 
refurbish a government school in Hise'. During the committee focus group one of 
the members told me that, 'CHF is working for people and is making the citizen 
participate with labour or finance to make him value the work. '74 `CHF presents 
the material and the people will work with it and then when they see what they 
have worked so hard to accomplish, they will preserve it. '75 This is not the only 
place that I heard these declarations. This was what I was told by the mission 
head, Ayman Abdullah, all of his employees, the Lebanese media whenever they 
covered a CHF 'development success', and the CHF homepage on the Internet. 
It should also be stated here that CHF is the only INGO in this project that calls 
local people 'clients' and they do this purposely. 
73 These figures come from the local mukhtar, local interviewees and the INGO representatives. 
74Aziz: married, adult man, teacher and village committee member, group interview, 1998. 
75Amsha: single, adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1998. 
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Men at work on a CHF site in Wadi Khaled 
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It came out in the committee interview that the area was certainly very 
deprived and little in the way of development by the state had ever been 
attempted here. Again, it was clear that the villagers of Wadi Khaled, like other 
rural areas of Lebanon relied on each other and their families for nearly all of the 
village development. 76 
761 was not given permission to conduct any formal interviews in Hise' or Hneider on the first day. 
The CHF representative and the head of the committee, the sheik in the region preferred that we 
not interview the local people. I insisted saying that I had to interview at least some people, 
especially women since there were no women on the committee. So, the sheik's niece was asked 
to accompany us and I only conducted one interview in Hise with a woman who owned a small 
clothing shop just off the main road. However, I returned to the area three times and have 
interviewed many people. 
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Look we built and paved the main roads ourselves. The government didn't do it, 
we did. We don't even have a network for electricity, we manage it ourselves. 77 
If anything goes wrong here, we handle it ourselves. The government does not 
want to know about us. 78 
Many local people also complained about their lack of rights as citizens 
due to the restrictions that had been placed on their newly acquired citizenship. 
There is a law in place that prohibits them from earning wages from the 
government for ten years and this, they claimed, was a significant cause of their 
deprivation. 
We have no rightsl My cousin just finished law school, but he can't practice law. 
Ah.. but we have to do our military service! 79 
The CHF representative for the area shouted, `You waited for 60 years now wait 
10 more years! '80 Many villagers expressed displeasure with the work of CHF. 
Some people in Hise' said that the INGO was taking credit for building the school, 
when in fact the villagers had built the school themselves eight years ago. 'All 
they did was add a bathroom and put tiles of the roof, they didn't build the 
»Haj: married, elderly man, mukhtar and village committee member, individual interview, 1998. 
78Jamal: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
79Abdel: single, young adult man, student and part-time farmer, group interview, 1998. 
80Mohammed Al-Assad: CHF area representative, 1998. 
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school! '81 Most felt that they had not been asked or consulted about the projects. 
They did appreciate the help, but they felt that they had been cheated. Many 
mentioned that an American official had visited the area, and the villagers said 
that they felt powerless to speak to him, since Mohammed, the man who `owns 
the village', never left his side. 
Interestingly, most people in the villages had never heard of CHF, but 
when I mentioned the name of the CHF representative, Mohammed AI-Assad, 
everyone knew. It turns out that he is not only a native of this area, but he is also 
its largest landowner. 
Mohammed Al-Assad brings all of the projects here. 82 
We were never asked what we wanted or needed. We need a school more than 
a road. It comes from Mohammed Al-Assad, he brings all of the development 
projects here. 83 
Mohammed `Kheir' Al-Assad got the project himself from the organisation. They 
have the money. 84 
81Mohammed M.: married, adult man, construction worker, individual interview, 1998. 
82A1i: married, adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
83M. K. /Hneider: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
84Khaloud: single, young adult woman, student and part-time farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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He said that, .. the road was needed, but when it rains it will be gone, just like the 
roads that CRS85 did a few years ago. No one can use them now. They are 
useless. Mohammed worked for them too. He brings all of the projects here, we 
can't go out and get them. 86 
We spoke about the committee that was formed for the agriculture road, but it 
turned out that the committee had more to do with accounting than co-ordination. 
Yes there is a committee-well it was just for the road. CHF came and said that 
we had to have a committee so that no one would have a question about the 
accounting of the project. There were four people on the committee. 87 
Yes I did work on the committee, but it was only to make sure that the hours of 
labour were correct, and they were correct. 88 
We were never asked what we as people wanted for our area. No. Mohammed 
decided a road, then we get a road. Mohammed owns 70% of all of this area. 
He's the largest landowner here. 89 
When it comes to using the road, everyone has access. We all can use it, but it is 
rocky and when it rains, the road will be gone because there is no pavement. 90 
The plan was one thing, but the actual project was another -- it didn't turn out as 
good as I thought it would. 91 
We can't tell anyone! 92 
85 Mohammad also worked with CRS and Ayman Abdullah, the man who runs CHF used to run 
CRS. 
86Um Mohammed K. /Hneider: married, adult woman, housewife and farmer, individual interview, 
1998. 
87Yahyah: married, adult man, farmer and construction worker, individual interview, 1998. 
88Haj: married, elderly man, mukhtar and village committee member, individual interview, 1998. 
89A. M.: married, adult man, driver, individual interview, 1998. 
90Abdel Aziz: married, adult man, farmer and driver, individual interview, 1998. 
91 Um Amr: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, group interview, 1998. 
92Amr: married, adult man, construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
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CHF's agricultural road in Hneider 
There is no school in the village of Hneider, which is about 10 to 15 
minutes drive east of Hise'. The tuition rate at the nearest school is 200,000LL 
per child, which is near, or more than most earn per month. Most of the families 
have five children, so this cost is prohibitive93. They typically send one child to 
school, and usually it is the eldest. They said that they could send their children 
for free in Syria, but they can't afford the monthly transportation bill to get them 
there94. This was a source of immense frustration for the villagers. Apart from 
their severe economic dilemmas, not being able to send their children to school 
was a cause of great distress and shame. They said that they had approached 
93 Statistics for family size comes from the local mukhtar and interviewees. 
94Generally throughout the Akkar, transportation via privately owned mini buses to school is 
25,000 LL per child per month, however in other places, it was said to be as high as 100,0001-1 
per child per month. 
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CHF through their local representative, Mohammed (Kheir) Al-Assad to ascertain 
if CHF would help them construct a school. 
We wanted to do the school project instead of the road, because we need the 
school more and we are willing to contribute. Someone approached the CHF 
(Mohammed Assad) but he rejected it. 95 
Do you know why? 
Well, I don't know they say that it is the government's duty. 96 
We told him that other organisations are building schools and why doesn't he ask 
CHF again. 97 
I am sure that they will tell us that it is the government's duty. Why should 
Mohammed Assad build us a school? 98 
Whatever this organisation does, they can't compete with the govemment. 99 
Anyway like other things, you need a lot of wasta to get things done with the 
organisation or anyone else. (everyone agrees)10° 
Many spoke about the one way trade from Syria to Lebanon now that both 
of the governments have stopped smuggling. Smuggling was an integral part of 
life and an important source of income for the entire area of Wadi Khaled and all 
border towns. 
95Amr: married, adult man, construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
96Amr: married, adult man, construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
97Kassem: ault man, farmer and construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
98Amr: married, adult man, construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
99Aisha: married, adult woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
100Amr: married, adult man, construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
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Before the war, we used to bring products from Lebanon and sell them in Syria. 
In a way our village was open. Both men and women worked together! Then we 
didn't have the Lebanese nationality. But now, since the end of the events (war) 
finished, things have gone worse for us, especially for those who have no 
education. 101 
The villagers rely heavily on Syria for survival. In many cases, it was reported 
that if there was no access to Syria's inexpensive food and hospitals many of the 
people in these rural border areas would starve. 
Look if we weren't close to Syria it would have been a disaster! 
Here 5 kg of salt is 5,000 LL while in Syria 10 kg of salt is 100 Syrian Lira (2,000 
LL, $ 1.33 or £. 83). 102 
Syria helps us 100% in living. 103 
We even check our health in Syria for 350 Syrian Lira (around 7,000LL, $5 or £ 
3)104 
They don't ask us where we are coming from, because Syria knows our poor 
condition. 105 
In Syria on 5,000 Syrian Lira (100,000 LL, $ 67 or £42) the best family can live. 
The government there sets the prices and makes sure that all have something. 
Not like here. 106 
Even here we live 99% from Syria and 1% from Lebanon. Not because we want 
to, but because we are forced. If it weren't for Syria we wouldn't live. We buy 
almost everything there and we even go to the doctor there. 107 
101Kabeer: married, adult woman, shop owner, individual interview, 1998. 
102Kabeer: single, young adult woman, group interview, 1998. 
103Amsha: single, young adult woman, group interview, 1998. 
104Um Amr: married, adult woman, farmer and housewife, group interview, 1998. 
105Khoulout: single, young adult woman, student, group interview, 1998. 
106Aisha: married, adult woman, group interview, 1998. 
107Um Ali: married, adult woman, housewife and farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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We show our Lebanese ID's and they treat us like Syrians. They treat us as 
equals. 108 
Our government doesn't care about us at all. We simply don't exist to them. Do 
you think Berri and Hariri worry that Haj and I can't buy a bag of sugar for our 
families? Ha! 109 
Women in the area expressed frustration because they felt that they were 
not included in the development projects. Women in all of the rural areas pleaded 
for help from INGOs, the government or anyone who would listen. They 
desperately want to learn new skills, so that they can contribute financially to the 
household income, and gain some security for themselves. 
There should be something done for women here. They are in bad shape. It used 
to be that a girl would only go to school until the 5th grade elementary, now they 
stay longer, and can try to guarantee some kind of future. The ones who don't 
stay are in trouble. They should so something, even a sewing factory, so that she 
can secure her future. For example, if she becomes a widow or her husband 
leaves her. Now, even the man can't secure the family alone. 110 
The young men in these organisations, even ones coming from Beirut, they don't 
convey their messages very well. We don't know what's going on. We don't know 
what is available to us. " ' 
Until now, no we women have not been spoken to or asked about anything. 
Maybe they are not interested in involving women in these projects. ' 12 
No. No. Women are not a part of these projects. These are male projects. ' 13 
When I asked Mohammed Al-Assad about the inclusion of women in CHF 
projects, he said that: 
108Haj: married, adult man, construction worker, individual interview, 1998. 
109Yahyah: married, adult man, shop owner, individual interview, 1998. 
110Kabeer: married, adult woman, shop owner, individual interview, 1998. 
11'Aisha: married, adult woman, group interview, 1998. 
112Um Mohammad: married, adult woman, housewife and farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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CHF really cares about the needs of women and women are our major target. 
Sometimes we even go around and ask women what they need and on an 
individual level the women are able to say what they want. However, this 
organisation CHF is involved in collective projects and this is where the woman's 
ideas are not that mature. 
In all cases more than 55% of women benefit from the ongoing projects, 
because women either have their husbands in agriculture or even if they are not 
married, they still might work in agriculture. But if we want to do tailoring courses 
or embroidery, the market is very competitive, and we are incompetent, because 
the Syrian market is a great competitor. Even if they want to buy wool, ready to 
wear shirts are much cheaper in Syria than buying the raw materials to make 
them. So that's why great factories have closed in Lebanon. 114 
Women are invariably linked with tailoring, canning and carpet making 
everywhere. Many women expressed that they would like to learn new farming or 
household management techniques. It seems that INGOs are hesitant to initiate 
programs for women that are not linked directly to the market. In the end many 
INGOs reason that if the women cannot produce something that they can sell, 
then there is little or no benefit in sponsoring projects. 
113Um Ali: married, adult woman, housewife and farmer, group interview, 1998. 
114Mohammad Al-Assad; CHF area field representative, 1998. 
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Mother and her daughters in Hneider 
B. Summary of Findings 
My fieldwork in the Akkar region confirmed that due to its relative isolation and 
distance from Beirut, the area suffers from a tremendous lack of government 
attention and services. Moreover, this lack of government presence reinforces 
the power of local landlords and strongmen to the detriment of local men and 
women. From both my own observations and those of INGO and UNDP 
representatives this area is considered to be the poorest in Lebanon. Locals in 
only two villages, Bkerzala and Bajaa', reported that their situation had improved 
in the last five years. They claimed that their improvement in living standards was 
due to the migration and emigration of family members to larger cities and 
Australia. 
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The close proximity of Syria and the easy availability of inexpensive Syrian 
goods and services provide a safety net for the majority of Lebanese citizens 
living in the Akkar. Without this alternative source, it is possible that many 
Akkari's would not be able to survive in these areas and probably would not 
remain. 
All of the factors above have affected the interests, capacities, 
opportunities and perceptions of INGOs working in this area. Mercy Corps made 
a courageous attempt, due to the effort of their field officer, to build wider 
community relationships with the work of the INGO and also attempted to include 
women in the projects, at the very least by keeping them informed. The Pontifical 
Mission has encountered significant problems in trying to build a local school due 
to the persistent objection of a powerful police official on the area. The Pontifical 
Mission dealt with the local male leaders of Kraybet el-Hayat and made no 
attempt to include women in their projects. CHF, working in the remote area of 
Wadi Khaled, made no attempt to build wider community relationships and 
instead worked with the local landlord, who other INGOs had worked with 
previously. This created a negative image of the INGO in the area and very little 
in the form of 'development' was accomplished. CHF made no attempt to work 
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with local women, though all of the women that I spoke to would of have liked to 
have been at least given the opportunity to be involved. 
It is also important to point out that due to the absence of government 
interest or a strong patron in the region, INGOs field officers and other personnel 
are able to have a freer hand in decision making concerning various aspects of 
the development project. This can be both positive and negative. It can work 
positively if the field officer is conscientious and knowledgeable. The case of Tleil 
and Ghaitla are good examples of how this could be so. The case of Bajaa' is an 
example of how an INGO can renege on a promise to complete a project, 
knowing that no one from the village has the power or the connections to force 
Mercy Corps to follow through with the planned school. 
C. The Beka'a and Hermel 
This region lies just east of the Mount Lebanon mountain range. It is home to the 
fertile Beka'a valley and the ancient cities of Baalbek and Anjar. The Beka'a plain 
is a checkerboard of fields planted with grains, vegetables and vineyards. The 
economy of this region revolves around agriculture. This area is predominantly 
Shi'ite, except for Arsal which is Sunni Muslim and Anjar which has a large 
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Armenian population. Several Christian villages are also scattered throughout the 
area. The approximate population of the region is 650,000 persons according to 
the CHF and UNDP representatives working in the area. 
This region, like the Akkar and the South, has several landlords, who 
continue to wield influence. Additionally the two main political parties, Hizbullah 
and Amal endeavour to maintain a tight grip on their areas and followers. These 
parties run schools, clinics and are an important source of security and wasta for 
some. Syria's presence is absolute. 
According to a UNDP consultant115, the Hermel was once the leading 
producer of hashish in the world. The Lebanese war provided the lack of internal 
control, and the Cold War provided Syria, the main authority in the area, the 
incentive to allow the illicit crop transit throughout the country without hindrance. 
Following the signing of the Ta'ef Accord and at the request of the United States 
government, Syria and Lebanon began to crack down on hash cultivation in the 
Beka'a and Hermel. Lebanon was promised aid in 1993 as compensation for the 
farmers in the area, whose livelihoods heavily depended on growing hash. This 
115 'Raymond', 1999. 
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aid has never materialised and the farmers have steadily become desperate and 
angry. 
1. UNDCP and UNDP's Empty Promises 
The UNDP received severe criticism from the inhabitants of the Beka'a/Hermel 
region. Nearly every farmer I spoke to felt the need to express his/her anger and 
disappointment concerning the work of the UNDP. In return for discontinuing the 
cultivation of hashish, the area was promised at least $200 million in 1993 for 
rehabilitation and development. This programme was called the United Nations 
Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and was co-sponsored by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). However, people in the area and government 
representatives allege that nothing has ever materialised. On February 28 1997, 
Ross Mountain, the UN Resident Co-ordinator at the time and UNDP 
Representative for Lebanon, delivered a speech at the "Signing Ceremony of the 
Programme Support for the Regional Development of Baalbek-Hermel", where 
he celebrated the success of the UNDCP programme and announced a new 
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UNDP programme with a target budget of $110 million. 116 In development circles 
it is known that no substantial development programmes were ever implemented. 
The UNDP has come under attack from the Hizbullah MP Ibrahim Amin Sayyed, 
who complained that, `Since it started the program five years ago, the UNDP has 
spent $16 million, but no results have been achieved other than a small park 
near Baalbek that bears the UNDP sign. ' He went on to say `Are the farmers who 
all dropped the cultivation of illicit crops expected to get substitute crops from this 
park? This is a total insult to the farmers and to all of us! '117 
The UNDP came here, but they didn't do anything. In fact they sent us 
backward. 118 
The UNDP brought from the whole world funds of $4 million and $3 million were 
spent on studies and research, and $1 million were given as loans. Each loan 
was $600. From the $600 we needed $100 to get to Baalbek to get the loan and 
another $100 for all of the stamps, all that was left was $400! Another step was 
something like $320 million for development, we never saw anything! ' 19 
The UNDP enter as a competing party with the local organisations and it also 
caused the local organisations to compete with each other rather than to work 
together and co-operate for the benefit of the village. 120 
116Signing Ceremony of the Regional Development of Baalbek-Hermel, UNDP, UNDP Internet 
Homepage, 28 February 1997. 
117The Daily Star, Monday, July 19,1999. 
118Mohammed: adult man, farmer and driver, individual interview, 1998. 
119Mohammed Hassan: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
120Kassem: married, adult man, local head of NGO, group interview, 1998. 
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The UNDP has many programmes. The UNDP's rural development programme 
of Hermel and Baalbek is facing many problems for many reasons, but mainly 
due to the people executing these projects. 121 
I agree and I think that also the people in Beirut are not executing these plans the 
way that they should be, but it being done under the political umbrella. 122 
The project is supposed to be for development, but when it reaches the ground 
the project will be transformed and rather than helping people it will burden them. 
You know most of these projects are free of content. Here is an example: When 
the UNDCP and the Ministry of Agriculture sold the farmers in the area cows to 
replace their lost income in growing hashish, it turned out that it cost the farmers 
more to feed the cow than they were able to pay. So they asked the ministry to 
take their cows back. And this was hard on the farmers here. 
That is in other words, the project will pass through many channels and it 
will be filtered before reaching the ground. 123 
One farmer claimed that the bulk of the money went to Syria since it controls the 
area. 
America wants to ban drugs in Lebanon so it gave around $200 million, however, 
Syria assumes the responsibility for controlling this area of the Hermel and that's 
why Syria actually got the money. I know this because I live here. You may have 
not heard this before, but it's the truth. 124 
2. The Cow Fiasco 
In 1993 the American government through USAID and the Lebanese Ministry of 
Agriculture embarked on a disastrous scheme to sell American dairy cows to the 
destitute farmers of the Baalbek/Hermel in order to substitute their lost incomes 
121Fouad: married, adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
122Haj: single, adult man, local NGO field worker, group interview, 1998. 
123Kassem: married, adult man, local head of NGO, group interview, 1998. 
124Ahmed: single, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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from the cessation of growing hashish. The cows were supposed to be sold for 
$700 each to needy farmers and access to low interest credit was to be made 
readily available. This is far from what happened. Many of the cows were given 
to key people in the area, who in turn sold them at much higher prices. Some of 
the cows were ill and required expensive medical attention and majority of the 
farmers could not afford to feed the cows. 
Cows were given to the people who are also certain key figures. 125 
We used to plant grains and the green plant (hashish), but the government 
rejected it and the government gave cows in return for stopping the green plant, 
but I myself didn't see anything from these 400 cows. I didn't see anything from 
the beginning or at the end-126 
After we stopped the hash plantations, they gave us applications to give us cows 
and they rated each cow at $2300 and out of this $2300, we had to pay $700 and 
so in all this area, which includes about 5,000 people, we received 15 cows! 
Some died. Some didn't give milk and some were diseased. Still there are 
villagers trying to return their loans-127 
These cows were supposed to be attached to land, and there was supposed to 
be a study for this issue of cows. The information from them was that one cow 
can sustain 4 people, plus they were supposed to include a milk and dairy 
processing plant, but this was not completed. These products from the cows 
were supposed to have been sold and marketed but this never happened, and 
instead of helping people it burdened them. 128 
125Hassan: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
126Mustapha: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
127A1i Hassan: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
128 Kassem: married, adult man, local head of NGO, group interview, 1998. 
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There was this project with the Ministry of Agriculture. We were given the chance 
to buy a pregnant dairy cow for $2,300. We were told that this cow would give 
birth and that they were going to set up a dairy factory here. They told us that the 
cow would give us 40 kilos of product. In fact it was only 7 kilos. The loan was for 
3 years, but we had to have a teacher or a soldier as a guarantee for the loan. 
We were forced to buy insurance for $113 for the vet, and we had to pay 
the vet when he came to check the cow. We complained, but they said this is 
how the system works, so we said okay. We were told that we had to buy the 
insurance and that the vet care would be free. But the vet takes 25,000LL. My 
cow was ill so I had to call the vet many times to check the cow so that I could 
send it back, because if we could prove that the cow was sick they had to take it 
back. Finally the vet wrote the report saying that my cow was unhealthy. 
Another problem with the cows was that okay, now we have this cow, but 
how are we going to feed it! We couldn't afford to feed the cows. The government 
promised to set up a dairy factory, but they never did this. 129 
Besides all of the lies with the cows, there is an even bigger problem; all of the 
tons of milk that comes here from Syria. We can't compete. There is a lot of 
smuggled milk coming here. 130 
Some influential people got cows through wasta and starting selling them for 
$1,5001 The problem comes from the US government who co-ordinated with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, who co-ordinated in political ways. So, to me the problem 
is also with the Ministry and the mediators who gave the cows to the people that 
they had chosen. And of course the US has also some responsibility in this! 131 
Obviously the false promises of the UNDP, USAID and other government 
programmes have done nothing to obviate their plight and many farmers wanted 
to discuss the UNDP, because of the hard feelings that they were holding 
129Mohammad N.: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
130Mohammad N.: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
131 Hussein: married, adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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inside. 132 The farmers feel helpless to express their anger at the UNDP, USAID, 
or their representatives. 133 
3. The Political Parties: Amal and Hizbullah 
Another important factor in this area is the impact and influence of Amal and 
Hizbullah. These parties exercise a critical amount of control over the region. 
They are extremely powerful, at times violent, and backed by the Syrian 
government. They run hospitals, clinics, schools, back political hopefuls in 
elections and provide income for the armies of unemployed young men. Not 
belonging to one of these parties leaves one exposed and without potentially 
powerful wasta. However, as many report, being a party faithful does not always 
pay the expected dividends either. 
132Many in the development community believe that the USAID Cluster Program is in fact guilt 
money because of the failure of the UNDCP Programme and other programmes where USAID 
was involved. 
1331 was related a story (1999) by a person from a local environmental NGO, who was co- 
ordinating a project with the UNDP in the Hermel. When the NGO person approached a local 
farmer to ask him about his situation, the UNDP area representative began screaming at her to 
get away from the farmer. He would not relent and forced her to come back to the jeep. When 
she arrived she was furious and asked him why he had behaved like that. He replied just as 
angrily, "Are you crazy to be talking to these people? " "These people are like animals! You can 
not speak to them! Who knows what they might do to you! " She was so dismayed that when she 
returned to Beirut, she convinced the NGO members to cancel the contract with the UNDP. 
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We don't have anything because we don't belong to a certain political party and 
because of this we are poor-write this down -I don't care if the USA or France 
knows about this. 134 
It is such a pity that these people hide behind faith, because the Hizbullah they 
say that their welfare is good, but they are for themselves. 135 
I like to follow these things up because I don't work. I don't have a job and I really 
don't care about myself. I like to debate and argue with all of the young men 
especially those that join Hizbullah and Amal. I always tell them that despite the 
fact that I was with Amal myself. I got nothing out of them. I got absolutely 
nothing out of them.. . the political parties. First there was Nabih Berri who said 
Jnoub! Jnoubl (The South! ) And then again it was Berri who said that the Beka'a 
was the "reservoir of fighters". This reservoir is going to end because there is 
nothing to feed it. They take them to fight for the resistance and they give them 
nothing in return. This was such a disappointment. 136 
These parties are natural by Syria. They originated from Syria. If a political party 
is strengthened it is strengthened by Syria and if a party is weakened, it is 
weakened by Syria. We can't really be surprised if we want a president he has to 
go and take the consent of Syria. Our government doesn't have any pride. Either 
they should admit that there is total chaos and let it be or they should be a 
government that respects itself and works as a real government. 137 
People join the political parties because they are poor and they are dying to join 
Hizbullah just to get 100,000 LL a month. 138 
And these political parties! Huh! They are supposed to help. But they don't. They 
are only interested in making money. Hizbullah and Amal have private schools 
and they are the most expensive in the area! I wish Israel would come and bomb 
them! They are beautiful to look at but no one can go! 139 
I have been with Amal for 15 years and I have given them all of my support, but 
they won't even deduct 100,000LL from the tuition bill of my child. 140 
134M. H.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
135A. G.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
136A. K.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
137A. H.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
138M. A.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
139G. M.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
140Mohammad: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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The political parties don't represent anyone here. They are here to serve 
themselves. 141 
Write this down! I don't care if they come after me. I hope that Israel comes and 
bombs both of the parties. They are worthless! 142 
Recently the government built a hospital for the area, however according 
to local people and the INGO representative, the political parties, Hizbullah and 
Amal, fought over where the hospital would be located, and eventually the 
hospital ended up being built 30 kilometres away in the jurd' (farm land) so that 
no one has easy access to it. 
I visited eight villages in this area: Charbine'43, Fissan1", Quaigh145, 
Naasra Khirbet el-Boutenl46 and Maasri147 in the area recognised as the Hermel. 
CHF is working directly in Charbine and Fissan. 
The Hermel region is populated by five main tribes, which according to 
INGO and local mukhtars has a population of 50,000, all of which are Shi'ite. This 
area is considered extremely neglected and there has historically been very little 
state development. Many villages have no running water and the locals are 
141A. N.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
142H. N.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
143 In this village I interviewed ten people in a group meeting and five individuals. 
144 In this village I interviewed nine members of the village committee (all men) and eleven locals. 
1451 interviewed fourteen people from this village in a group interview. 
146 I interviewed two people from this village. 
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forced to buy cistern water from dealers in the main city of Hermel. This area has 
suffered for many reasons as detailed above. Their tribal social structure has 
stigmatised them, and their `uncivilised nature' is a source of derision outside the 
area. Moreover, many men and women from the area reported that their leaders, 
in order to maintain their powerful positions, purposely kept the area isolated, 
dependent and neglected. 
Many of the farmers of the Hermel have completely lost their livelihoods, 
as they were the main cultivators of hashish. Their land is dry and not suitable for 
a wide variety of crops. The Assi River runs through the area and is plentiful 
enough to provide the entire area with water resources for irrigation and 
household use. However, Syria denies the Lebanese government or the farmers 
in the area access to water from this source because it is reserved for Syrian 
utilisation. 
4. The villages of Charbine, Fisan, Maasra Khirbet el-Bouten, Maasri and 
uai h 
These villages are all quite close together and CHF is directly working in the 
villages of Charbine and Fisan. Charbine is the main village for the Nasreddine 
1471 interviewed two people from this village. 
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tribe, who are fairly influential. Massri and Khirbet el-Bouten are very close, are 
part of the Nasreddine tribe, and have access to the newly constructed CHF 
agriculture road. Fisan is the centre for the Jafaar tribe, who are the largest 
landowners in the area. CHF built an agriculture road just outside the village 
of Charbine in order to connect it to other villages and to help farmers get to their 
fields, and helped the Jafaars get access to drinking water. 
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The village of Charbine 
At the initial committee focus group, Charbine members were angry with the CHF 
field person, Hussein Hajdib, because they discovered that CHF was doing a 
water network for the Jaafar tribe and not for them. To most of these people 
water was a much higher priority. The problem seemed to be located in the fact 
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that the Nasreddine's from this area could not pool together the 'required' amount 
of money. 148 Moreover, like in every area where these INGO agriculture roads 
had been done, the people complained that the roads had not been covered with 
asphalt. This frustrated most of the farmers because they said that the roads 
would be destroyed after the first heavy rain. 
These complaints aside the residents of the village were very grateful for 
the attention that they received from CHF. One farmer said of the new road 'all 
the world uses it. '149 
If the government had done that road, the government would have done it with 
$100,000, whereas the CHF did it only with $ 10,000 and with better work. 150 
We as a committee believe that we can voice our concerns, so far there has 
been no complaints and we are thankful for what they have done. If there is 
anything wrong we can always get in touch with them. 151 
The first time they did the road, the committee rejected it, then they did it a 
second time. We rejected it again, then they hired a contractor and the road is 
now fine. 152 
They work until they ask the people if we like their work and after we say yes, 
then we give them the money. 153 
148CHF seems to press for the 30% to be paid in cash. In almost every area where I visited a 
CHF site the people had paid in cash, this was not always the case for the other INGOs working 
within the USAID Cluster Program. 
149Mustapha: married, adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
150Hussein: adult man. arouD interview, 1998. 
151AIi: adult man, committee member, group interview, 1998. 
152Mustapha: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
1-rI3Ali Hassan: adult man, group interview, 1998. 
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The people here trust the organisation. No organisation has worked in this village 
before CHF. 154 
A '_ all! 
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CHF's agricultural road between several villages in the Hermel 
Fisan is home to the Jaafar tribe, who are very influential in the area. The 
people here were also very pleased with the work of CHF. However, many 
complained about having to pay 30 per cent of the project in cash. 
A lot of organisations came and promised many things, but it wasn't until three or 
four months ago that CHF came and we thank this organisation very much for 
giving us the chance to have drinking water. 155 
This is the first time any organisation comes and does research and executes the 
plan. For a lot of organisations came and promised, and in the end never did 
anything. 156 
CHF came to this village and said that they are here to help the villagers. CHF 
asked the villagers to come up with a lively plan and the people said that there is 
one major problem.. . that 
is drinking water. So CHF brought engineers and did 
research and so they will promote our own villagers to work in this project. 157 
154Mustapha: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
155Faysal: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
156Ali: adult man, committee member, group interview, 1998. 
157HusseinG.: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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This is the first organisation to invest a plan in our village! 158 
CHF has done a project of drinking water here. CHF changed the pipes. Villagers 
paid 30% of the entire cost. 159 
It took the project three months to be finished. There is about three kilometres of 
piping and now everyone in the village gets drinking water. 160 
The co-ordination was good, but we didn't like paying the 30%, we are poor. 161 
The whole project cost around $16,000. The villagers paid $4,000 and the 
organisation paid $12,000. We tried our best to get money from the villagers. 
Some people paid and some people paid for others and some people had to let 
their children work on the project. 162 
A committee meeting in Fisan with men from the Jaafar tribe 
The village of Quaigh is located in the Hermel just between Charbine and Fisan, 
where CHF is working. Most of the people in this village are farmers and herders. 
158AIi G.: adult man, group interview, 1998. 
159AIi H.: adult man, group interview, 1998. 
160Ghazi: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
161 Hussein: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
'62Fatima: married, adult woman, group interview, 1998. 
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Some have tried to grow tobacco, but most say that `it is impossible to get a 
license. ' They do not have a municipality, and they have not been given a date 
for elections. This tribe, the al Hiq, is the least influential tribe in the Hermel, and 
they have never grown hashish. According to local interviewees, the average 
income here is 200,000LL ($133 or £83) per month if they are working, as there 
is a lot of unemployment here. They believe that their living and housing 
conditions have steadily worsened in the past five years, and most of the children 
do not go to school. 163 
Four years ago, the villagers pressed the government to dig a well in their 
village, as they were collecting rainwater and buying water as their grandfathers 
had done. The government did eventually dig the well. They also laid the piping 
to the village, however to everyone's shock and dismay, the government workers 
came back a few days later, closed the well and put a lock on it. They have tried 
in vain to find out why. No one has been able to give them an answer, not even 
the men who did it. They have no wasta and are the least powerful tribe in the 
area. 
1 There is a public school in the village, but there are no teachers. 
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We try to press for our rights. We talk to ministers and different leaders, but 
nothing changes. 164 
The villagers said that they had approached the INGO (CHF) which was 
working in the area to see if they would work in their village, but the answer from 
the INGO was no. 
The NGO wouldn't want to work here because we are the weakest in financial 
and political terms. 165 
We were wondering why our village wasn't chosen by the NGO since we are right 
in between the villages that they are working in, and everyone will tell you that 
this is the poorest village in the area. 166 
Yes we are wondering why this happened. 167 
This happened because maybe the others have people to demand. We don't. 168 
164 Ahmad: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
165Nahida: adult woman, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
166Hussein: elderly man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
167Fatoum: adult woman, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
1 Souad: adult woman, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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Of all the villages around here, we are the most deprived of all the villages. The 
main reason for this is that we have no wasta! Yes... wasta is everything and we 
are weak without connections. Wasta is everything. You have to understand and 
remember this-169 
According to various sources, including locals, INGO and UNDP representatives, 
average incomes for the whole area have plummeted from the average of 
5,000,000 LL ($3,333 or £2,083) per year or 400,000 LL per month per family to 
many reports of 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 ($667 to $1,333 or £417 to £833) per 
year or 83,000 LL to 166,000 LL ($55 or £37 to $111 or £74) per month per 
family. 
The majority of the people from the Hermel did not want to discuss the 
work of the INGOs; they wanted to talk about government neglect, the forced 
termination of hash cultivation, and their resulting extreme poverty. They all 
referred to the cessation of hash cultivation as `a disaster'. Many people here 
spoke of hunger and the unemployment rate was reported to be as high as 90 
per cent! 
At the time of planting hash, people here lived like in the Emirates. One person 
would work and benefit five persons. And when the USA asked for the stopping 
of hashish and promised to give alternatives, we did, but up till now nothing has 
happened on their part. 170 
169Hussein: elderly man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
»oAli H.: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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We are not with the planting of hashish, because we ourselves don't like it. But 
there is a demand. The farmer doesn't make a lot of money, but the people who 
trade these goods do. The traders are mostly in Zahleh and Jounieh. Even 
though we planted it, no one here dealt with it. 171 
When the hash planting existed, it created labour everywhere! Because these 
farmers did not only work in the fields, but there was a lot of building and other 
things going on. 172 
You know in this area, we planted drugs. We don't want to hurt anyone. No one 
wants to hurt anyone, but our lives are at stake. We think that drugs are wrong, 
but at least they should have stopped it in a different way. Even now if I can I will 
do it again, because there is a demand for it and nobody cares about us. 173 
Many of the farmers I spoke to threatened to go back to planting hash, and some 
have already started. 174 
The government has also historically neglected this area and many 
acknowledged that their own leaders purposely kept them ignorant and poor. 
Many spoke of the 50-year government reign of Sabri Hamadeh (1926-1975) the 
Shi'ite landlord from the Beka'a who: 
In order to keep his (Sabri Hamadeh) position and remain in power, he used to 
tell everyone in the government that he (as an MP) has people who eat rocks 
and kill for crimes of honour and this has been going on for the past years. 175 
One villager in Maasri recounted a story about how Sabri Hamadeh so easily 
manipulated the villagers: 
171M. Jafaar: adult man, individual interview, 1998. 
172Mustapha: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
173Ahmed: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
14There are occasional news reports of army battalions being sent to the Hermel to burn hashish 
crops. 
175 Ahmad M.: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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The government wanted to put a railway station in the Hermel and run a train 
through the area. So Sabri went to the farmers and gathered them and said, "The 
government wants to put a railway station in your area, what do you think? " And 
all of the farmers raised their hands in the air and said Yes! Yes! And then the 
farmers said, "But, what do you think? " And he said, "What? You want foreigners 
to look at your women when they are passing through! " And then all of the 
farmers raised their fists and said No! No! So there was no station and no train. 
This was a real frustration for the government! 16 
Migration to Beirut, Zahleh or Tripoli was commonplace, but migration was the 
last resort and many did not want to leave their areas. 
I would say that 80% of the villagers have someone either in Zahleh or Beirut. 177 
If someone has a son in Beirut, maybe he will be able to send the family 
money. 178 
There is no produce from our land and so people have to have relatives outside 
the village in order to survive. 179 
As far as we are concerned, if we had jobs here, we would not think of leaving 
our village. And leaving this village and going to Beirut, we have to think about 
the expenses of living in Beirut and so in both cases we are not happy. 180 
People who migrate to Beirut will not progress. That is because whatever he gets 
will be paid on rent, electricity, water etc... For example, this guy here sitting to 
the left, he went to Beirut for two years and came back with nothing. 181 
Again, Syria was seen as being both their persecutor and protector. It was 
said that Syria kept them from ignorance and starvation. The people of the 
16Ahmed: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
177Hussein J.: adult man, group interview, 1998. 
18Mohammad: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
179Mustapha: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
180AIi J.: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
181 Ahmed H.: adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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Hermel reported that they did not even receive Lebanese television or radio 
signals, and that there were no telephone lines in the area. The people, however, 
did receive Syrian television signals and to them this was their link to civilisation. 
We don't know what is going on in our country, so if hell breaks in our country we 
will never be able to know because nothing reaches our village. Thanks to Syria 
we get to know something! 182 
All citizens near the borders find that it's better to go to Syria than Lebanon to 
buy things. 183 
It's easier to go to Homs (Syria) than Zahleh. There is a bus everyday that goes 
to Homs. The people who are working in this village prefer to go to Homs and 
pay 10% of the cost of things. The whole Bekaa' goes to Homs everyday! 
There were no schools in the area and I was told that many children did not 
receive any education. 
I have five children and I can't afford to send them to school. I put them in the 
house all day and my heart aches over them. 184 
We have to send our children to the Hermel for school. All of our work and effort 
goes into sending our children to school. Without the bus it costs us 500,000LL. 
There is no supervision in the public schools. Look every teacher belongs to one 
of the political parties so no one can say anything to them. 185 
Some even spoke of people moving to Syria in order to send their children to 
elementary school. 
182AIi: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
183AIi H.: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
l84Hassan: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
185M. A.: married adult woman, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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Poor farmers in the Hermel: elderly husband and wife 
5. The villages of El Ain186 and Nabi Ousman187 
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These two villages are located within a few kilometres of each other in the north- 
eastern region of the Beka'a, and as in the Hermel, the termination of hashish 
cultivation and smuggling has caused a massive loss of income; though this area 
has not suffered as greatly as the Hermel. The YMCA has been working in this 
area for about 25 years and has an excellent reputation in both villages. They 
initiated a new programme as part of the USAID Cluster Program in September 
1997. The YMCA started a canning and pickling program for some 42 women 
from the area. The women are trained in canning procedures and marketing. The 
idea is that the women will market their products with the Y's help initially. Once 
1861 interviewed around three people in a group and seven individuals from this village. 
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the programme is self-sufficient, the INGO will withdrawal. Many women in the 
area were excited about this programme. Even if they were not able to attend the 
classes, which lasts seven weeks, many women in the area reported that their 
neighbours were teaching them the new techniques. The women stressed that 
this programme may not only help them make some money in the future, but it 
helps them in their households as preserves are consumed by their families all 
year long. 
This course is very important. It is true that we learned many things about fruits, 
but we also acquired the knowledge of a healthy way of canning. 188 
We acquired the group work rather than individual work. It gives me a place to 
exercise personality building. It is very important for women. 189 
We will start with organisations and then we will probably start a co-operative. 
We can't start our own. 190 
We can now train others to do the same thing. They also have no problem 
learning something new. 191 
Before this project, we had nothing to do, but probably stay in the house all day 
long. 192 
We thank the YMCA for working in this very neglected area and through this 
project we got the chance to meet others and work together. 193 
1871 interviewed around six people from this village. 
188 Fatima H.: married adult woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
189 Alia: married adult woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
190 Mona: married adult woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
191 Fatima N.: married adult woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
192 Aisha: single adult woman, group interview, 1998. 
193 Mira: married adult woman, group interview, 1998. 
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YMCA's canning workshop for women in EI Ain 
One of the trainers told me that when they started this programme it was 
discovered that many women did not have transportation and could not attend 
the classes if they lived far from the centre of town. The YMCA rented a bus that 
collected the women in the morning and took them home on the training days 
which were three days per week. 
The YMCA co-ordinator in the area, Dr. Nasreddine, who inherited the 
post from his father, explained how the YMCA encountered problems with local 
and foreign players in the area when they initially began the most recent phase of 
their development programme. Another man who was present spoke of how the 
YMCA was warned that they were going to fail here because of the complex 
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nature of the area, and that the UNDP and CHF bet against the possibility of the 
YMCA being able to complete its work. 
There was a bet that the Y is not going to work well, but aft er the work that has 
been done and due to the interaction and the feedback that they got.. a lot of 
organisations also wanted to prove that they were successful and started saying 
that they were working in these areas. Also I believe that if the Y was not able to 
compete then its work would have lacked something, instead these organisations 
are competing, they should co-ordinate and finish the work that has already been 
started. A lot of organisations come and do studies but nothing is observed, 
especially from the UNDP, which is a morally low organisation. Did you know that 
the UNDP bet me that the Y will not be able to work well, but the UNDP lost the 
bet. CHF also bet that the Y would fail here. 194 
It was also stated that, `This area is subjected to extreme familial and political 
influence, so when the YMCA came here they had to bargain their position. '195 
The good thing also about the YMCA is that they don't come from above and 
they ask for their 30% to be paid by the cost of labour, no cash. If a project that 
costs $1,000 then the YMCA will pay $700 and the beneficiaries will work for the 
cost of the 30%. 196 
In Nabi Ousman, the farmers appreciated the help of the YMCA in building 
irrigation canals. However it seems that there were many other problems 
affecting this village. 
The Y has done a good job for us seven or eight years ago. But if you are dying 
of thirst and someone came and gave you a drop of water, then you will like it no 
matter what. 197 
They have been affected by all of the problems that plagued the region in 
general. However, this village also suffers because they belong to the political 
party Qawmiyah. 198 
194Habib: adult man, engineer, individual interview, 1998. 
195Hassan: married adult man, sheik, individual interview, 1998. 
196Habib: married adult man, engineer, individual interview, 1998. 
197Sobhi: married elderly man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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Most of the area around this village is Hizbullah this village belongs to the 
political party Qawmiyah. This is the reason for our deprivation. 199 
I disagree! We are deprived because of tribal reasons. Deprivation exists, not 
because of different parties. 200 
Mainly people here are broken, there is no insurance, medication, we are 
deprived and isolated and if something happens to you... you have to take care of 
yourself. But it's politics that is playing here, not the economy. 201 
The locals of Nabi Ousman were also highly concerned about the fact that 
people in the area could no longer send their children to school. Many could not 
even afford to send their children to the public school. 
Here some children don't go to the public school... actually 80 % of the children 
here don't go to school because they can't afford it. 202 
Before 90 % used to go to school and outside the village, but now more than 20 
% can not go out because there is no productivity. 203 
The level of illiteracy is increasing 99%, because people cannot afford to go 
school here. 204 
198Antoun Saadah, a Greek Orthodox political ideologue, started this party in 1936. He believed 
that the Fertile Crescent should be considered one country, with no borders and no segregation 
according to religion. One people, Christians and Muslims, living in one land historically called 
"Greater Syria" with a common enemy; the Jews. 
1 Rowia: married woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
200Mohammad: married man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
201Nabi: married man, farmer, construction worker, group interview, 1998. 
202Mohammad N.: married man, farmer, driver, group interview, 1998. 
203Rowia: married woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
204Ali- single adult man, driver, group interview, 1998. 
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6. The town of Arsal 
The town of Arsa1205 is located in the far north-eastern area of the Bekaa and is 
surrounded by the Eastern Lebanese Mountains. According to the local mukhtar 
and local NGO representatives, the population of Arsal is approximately 25,000, 
and most of its inhabitants are engaged in agriculture to some extent. The town 
is extremely remote, has a dry, desert-like climate and limited resources. Fruit 
production (mainly cherries and apricots) and cereal production (mainly wheat 
and barley), keeping livestock (goats and sheep) and quarrying are the main 
sources of income for the town. Smuggling from Lebanon to Syria used to be a 
lucrative job for many inhabitants of Arsal; however this illicit trade has all but 
stopped due to Syria's insistence. 
2051 interviewed at least 20 people from this village. 
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The town of Arsal 
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Oxfam UK had been working in this village for several years. At times they 
worked with other INGOs, like the YMCA or MCC, but they consistently worked 
with the local NGO, the Arsal Rural Development Association (ARDA). The local 
men and women in this village were very pleased with the work of Oxfam UK. It 
seems that the organisation spent a lot of time building relationships and creating 
working partnerships with the local people, the local NGO and other INGOs on a 
consistent basis. Unfortunately, Oxfam UK abruptly closed their office in Lebanon 
and their projects ended. Many men and women in Arsal felt that they had been 
abandoned. Through the USAID project, CHF was constructing an agriculture 
road in Arsal, and the locals felt that this was not really what they needed in their 
village. They also complained extensively that CHF did not work like Oxfam UK. 
;.., 
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They felt that CHF bypassed the local NGO and the local people, working only 
with close associates of the INGO who were local strongmen in the village. 
I respect Oxfam. You know why? Because they respect the needs of the 
villagers. When they worked here it was not an imposed project or a need of the 
organisation. It was for the needs of the villagers. 206 
I wish that we could deal more with Oxfam and not CHF. Why? I just like the 
work of Oxfam better. It fits. 207 
In Arsal, there are basic ideas about CHF's work. For instance, this road.. . the 
way it was done.. . the quality of work.. . the way they approached this village and 
the money. It was not acceptable. Ayman (the mission head of CHF) and his 
colleagues work in these villages as if he owns the organisation. 208 
Three generations of women in Arsal 
206 Qassem: married, adult man, local head of NGO, group interview, 1998. 
207 Haj: single adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
208 Sayyed: married adult man, NGO worker, group interview, 1998. 
255 
D. Summary of Findings 
Again in the Beka'a and the Hermel region, there is a significant deficiency of 
government attention. Though it is not as lacking as in the Akkar region, it is still 
a pervasive problem according to the local men and women. Like the Akkar, the 
positions of landlords and local strongmen are enhanced due to the lack of direct 
state involvement. However, this region has added factors that greatly complicate 
matters for INGOs working here. Firstly, the tenacious presence of the political 
parties and the pressure that they exert on local people and development 
organisations greatly influences development projects on the ground and the 
viability of even attempting such a project or programme. 
Secondly, the fact that this region has suffered a severe blow to its local 
economy from the cessation of hashish cultivation has created a situation of 
desperation for the local men and women, who have seen their income dwindle 
to almost nothing in a matter of two years. The deficient attempts by the UNDCP, 
UNDP and the US government along with the Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture to 
find some sort of replacement economy, including new crops, have produced a 
sense of hostility towards organisations coming from the outside to work in this 
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area, and many of the INGOs were looked at, at least initially, with a great deal of 
suspicion. 
Lastly, the ubiquitous presence of Syrian troops in this region reinforces 
the fact that the people from the Hermel and Bekaa are living under foreign 
occupation. This heavy Syrian military presence has created a complication for 
INGOs working here and they must constantly bargain their way through the 
rough terrain of political sensitivities and regional diplomacy. 
The work of the INGOs was again quite mixed. CHF's work in the Hermel 
met with the satisfaction of most of the locals, however they were not as 
successful in Arsal and the men and women of Ras Baalbek refused to let them 
work in their village. Oxfam UK was well respected in Arsal and the work of the 
YMCA was also approved of in El Ain. The YMCA and Oxfam were the only two 
organisations that included women in their programmes. 
E. Hasbaya 
This area is situated in the south-eastern part of Lebanon next to Mount 
Hermon, which separates it from Syria. The area is characterised by its cold 
weather, mountainous terrain and two main rivers: el Hasbani and el Wazzani. 
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Most of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood; mainly growing 
olives and deciduous fruits. Administratively part of South Lebanon, Hasbaya 
was at the time of my fieldwork almost completely cut-off from the state. The 
former Israeli security zone dissected the area just north of the main town of 
Hasbaya. Moreover, the Council of the South did not include this area on their 
agenda for development projects. According to the YMCA field officer and a local 
mukhtar the population of the region is approximately 70,000 persons. All of the 
men and women that I interviewed complained that the Israeli partition destroyed 
their region economically because they had no access to the main markets in the 
principal city of Hasbaya. 
1. The viliaae of Kfeir 
Kfeir209 is a beautiful Christian and Druze village. Once known for its grains and 
olives, the Israeli occupation has meant the slow death of the village and their 
agricultural livelihoods. 210 According to the INGO representative, the local 
mukhtar and interviewees, the average income in the village was about 300,000 
LL ($ 200 or £ 133) per month per family, and the entire socio-economic 
209 1 interviewed approximately 12 people from this village. Five persons were part of a group 
interview. 
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circumstances of the village have been interrupted. Firstly, the locals are cut off 
from their main market in the city of Hasbaya, and many farmers have ceased 
harvesting their crops, because there is nowhere for them to market their 
produce. Secondly, the occupation has obstructed Kfeir's access to their fresh 
water springs, which are guarded by the Israelis. Now they have no water for 
irrigation nor do they have access to potable water or water for household use. 
Additionally, though they have a public school in their village, many residents 
used to send their children to Hasbaya for education because the level was 
considered to be better. Now if they want to send their children to schools other 
than the local one, they must send them to Dayr Al Ahmar, which is one hour 
away by car using very dangerous roads. Because of these factors many of the 
villagers have migrated to Beirut. 
210 This is no longer true, as the Israelis have withdrawn from these positions. 
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A traditional house (bayt) in Kfeir Zeytoun 
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Often referred to as Kfeir Zeytoun (an olive jar) this village feels like a 
ghost town. In fact, some of the people we met were just there visiting and others 
told us that this was their last year `unless something major changes'. Many of 
the older residents still tend century's old olive trees in hope that this year will be 
different. They claimed that: 
When we had olives, each family used to get $ 1,000 per month, but now we 
don't sell much because there was some publicity against olive oil. So people 
stopped buying it and bought Mazola instead. Now we get a lot of competition 
from outside; Greece, Italy, Spain and Syria. If you remove the competition that 
came two years ago, then it would have been a different situation here. 211 
211 George: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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The living conditions here have deteriorated. We had olives and an olive oil 
season, but now we have nothing. The season for the olives is October and 
November, we will harvest this year, but maybe in the future we will not be able 
to harvest. This is my livelihood, I own it, it is very hard to leave it. 212 
Most people here either have to work in the army or teach. In Kfeir there used to 
be 60% farming of grains. . . now there is 5% farming of grains. Most of the 
people have olives, but there is a problem, no marketing for products and it is for 
this reason that we have financial problems. Secondly, the internal market is 
dead and through the Beka'a and Beirut there are a lot of foreign products 
coming in. 213 
The YMCA is working in this village, and they had completed an 
agricultural road that passed through the olive fields when I arrived there in 
August 1998. 
As far as the agricultural road, it serves a lot people around 70 % of farmers. 214 
. ý. ý., ý 
YMCA's agricultural road in Kfeir Zeytoun 
212Majid: married adult man, construction worker, individual interview, 1998. 
213Mohammad H.: married adult man, store owner, individual interview, 1998. 
214Wadih Abu Risk: married adult man, INGO area representative, 1998. 
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The YMCA was also negotiating with UNIFIL, who were in turn negotiating 
with the Israeli army to allow them to build a water pumping system to the village 
from the springs that lie just on the outskirts of their village, near the border of the 
occupation zone. 
The villagers were generally pleased with the work of the YMCA, though 
some thought that water was their first priority and that the agricultural road didn't 
benefit everyone. 
The road is good, but we DO have a water problem ! 21 s 
Our priority is sewage.. . this is more important than water! 
216 
No! Water must come first! 217 
I think that the men of the Christian Association put people here to service their 
own interests. I think that the road that is being dug is not as important as 
sewage and water. Mostly the road leads to land of specific people. These men 
which the YMCA works for are a result of the war and belong to political parties. 
They (the men) are crooked and have no conscience. 218 
One villager, who happened to be a Druze sheik said that, 
The YMCA dug an agricultural road and built a bridge on the Hasbani River. If 
they dig a road in Akkar or Zhgorta everyone will benefit, we are all from the 
same country. 219 
215 Marie: married adult woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
216 Walid: adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
217 Marie: married adult woman, housewife, group interview, 1998. 
218Majid G.: adult man, farmer, mini bus driver, group interview, 1998. 
219Mohammed: married adult man, Druze sheik, teacher, group interview, 1998. 
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Besides these obvious infrastructure needs it was also very clear from all 
of the people that they needed agricultural development. They needed help in the 
form of new farming techniques, equipment and inputs. Many complained that 
their land needed to be repaired as they were terrace farmers and that there 
were no small loan programmes that could really help them. 
The YMCA was also planning some courses here for men and women, 
much the same as the project in EI-Ain. However, though they appreciate the Y's 
efforts, many were sceptical as to how these courses were going to help them to 
make a living. They reasoned that in the first place they were farmers and they 
wanted to stay farmers. They would not mind learning a trade, like plumbing or 
sewing, but their question was where were they going to work after they learned 
these trades? `How many plumbers do you need in one village? ' was a constant 
question. 
Wadih Abu Risk was the YMCA co-ordinator for this region. He was 
originally from this village and had worked with the YMCA in the past. He, along 
with every one I spoke to believe that the future of the village was dependent on 
an Israeli withdrawal. 
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Kfeir had just elected a new municipality, so they were all waiting to see 
the results and were hoping that through them, they would get some long 
overdue government attention. Like other rural areas, government development 
was absent, however the situation was blamed more on the war and the Israeli 
occupation rather than on the government directly. 
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Druze farmer returning from his field in Kfeir Zeytoun 
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F. Summary of Findings 
Obviously, the Israeli occupation has made working towards comprehensive 
development extremely difficult, if not impossible. As long as the locals do not 
have access to their water for the irrigation of their crops or a main market to sell 
their produce, the desire to migrate will continue. 
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YMCA's efforts were appreciated, though many of the local men and 
women were sceptical about the various training programmes that the INGO was 
planning to introduce. Many said that they would prefer to learn new techniques 
and skills in agriculture. 
G. South Lebanon 
South Lebanon is the region extending from the Awwali River in the north to the 
village of Ras al Nagoura just next to the Israeli border in the south. It borders the 
Mediterranean Sea to the west and the Syro-Lebanese border to the east. The 
population of this region is estimated at just over one million persons. Most of the 
men and women resident in this area are dependent on agriculture for a living. 
The main crops are vegetables, tobacco and olives in the interior whilst bananas 
and citrus fruits are grown in the coastal area. The Litani River provides most of 
the water for irrigation. The two main city ports of the region are Sidon (Saida) 
and Tyre (Sour). South Lebanon has witnessed major political and military events 
all through its history from the times of the Assyrian kings to the latest Israeli 
intervention. 
The situation of the South cannot be explained without speaking about the 
traditional landlords. The South, mostly populated by Shi'ites with some scattered 
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Christian villages, has been dominated by four main families: the Osseirans, 
Assads, Zeins, and Khalils. 
There is a well-known story concerning Ahmed Bek Assad, a notable Shi'ite 
landlord from South Lebanon, who when asked by his peasant-clients to build a 
school for their children, he responded by saying, `Why bother? My son, Kamel is 
attending school. ' 220 
These families basically ruled the South (excluding Sidon) up until the mid-1980s 
when their power was largely subverted by the Amal militia leader Nabih 
Berri-current Speaker of the House. Berri represents a newly emerging class of 
Lebanese leaders; warlords who gained power by maintaining a group of 
followers that only believed in sectarian solidarity, by participating in the violent 
war machine, and by having the support of an outside sponsor. 
Relations with the government in the South are much better than in any 
other rural area in the country. The Council for the South, with patronage from 
Nabih Berri insures that the area receives a fair share-if not more-of 
development funds. The Council for the South was originally set-up in the 1970s 
in order to concentrate government money for the development of neglected 
areas, which were under Israeli bombardment with the intention that this 
investment would discourage migration to Beirut. However, the situation has 
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changed into one in which Nabih Berri indirectly appoints key members in the 
organisation and behaves like the ultimate landlord. He has been able to utilise 
government funds allocated to the Council for the South for his own personal 
political ambitions. For instance, interviewees understood his power to be such 
that if a house belonging to a member of his political party was damaged by 
shelling, he would be generously reimbursed, whilst if a house belonging to a 
supporter of one of Berri's political adversaries should happen to be shelled, then 
that person would most likely receive very little compensation-if any-from the 
Council. Many people that I interviewed in the South blessed Nabih Berri saying, 
`Allah Ykhali al-Ustaz', literally, `May God keep the teacher. ' Nabih Berri, a lawyer 
by trade, is commonly referred to as 'al-Ustaz. ' 
In interviews with INGO personnel it was reported to me that the majority 
of farmers in the South have running water in their houses, electricity and fully 
equipped schools221. Most admit that this high level of development really began 
in 1996 and was done to keep them from flooding the cities during constant 
Israeli bombardment. Although poverty and destruction are obvious in the 
villages that I visited, the monthly income per month per family is higher on 
220 Jamil: adult man, physician, 1998. 
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average than in other rural areas. The typical reported income was about 
700,000 LL ($467 or £292)222 per month, and the majority of this income is 
gained through the production of government subsidised tobacco. 
1. The village of Zaoutar 223 
The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) is working the village of Zaoutar, which 
is south of Nabatiye and precariously situated on the Israeli occupation border. 
All border villages are dangerous places to live, the constant Israeli shelling, as 
well as the infighting, sometimes violent, between the two main political militias, 
Amal and Hizbullah keep the villagers in a chronic state of fear and panic. The 
MCC representative, Bassam Chamoun, explained the programme of the MCC 
as being low-key. They do not advertise and they do not necessarily want 
anyone to know who is doing the work. 
221 Please note that this did not include the zone occupied by Israel. 
222 According to local people, mukhtars and INGO representatives. 
223 1 interviewed at least 30 people from this village. 
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We don't actually do the work ourselves, we contact the head people in each 
village. Our aim is not to give things to the farmers in the relief sense, but we are 
working in capacity building. Most help from the NGOs in this area has lessened 
a great deal, but we have stayed. We work quietly. For instance, we did a drip 
irrigation system in this village to help the farmers save water. In many cases the 
farmers do not know which organisation is doing the work because we do not 
advertise. We helped to do a road and many people said that we should put a 
sign saying that we did this road, but this is not our goal to advertise what we are 
doing. We are interested in working with the grassroots, with the local farmers. 
We are more interested in community development. 224 
The MCC field representative also told me in a previous interview about the 
difficult situation of the women in the South because it is their job to string the 
tobacco. Stringing tobacco is an arduous, time consuming chore. The women 
use long metal needles with string tied at the end of the needle. They pierce a 
small bunch of leaves at the bottom and then drag the bunch onto the string. 
When the bundle is full and packed tightly, they hang the tobacco from the ceiling 
of their house to dry. Women do this job all year long and their hands are stained 
reddish brown. Many young girls spoke about not being able to go to school 
because of this year-long chore. Observing this, the MCC field representative 
searched for an alternative, and found a leaf-stringing machine that is used in 
Greece. He purchased the machine and then discovered later that the Lebanese 
leaves were smaller than the Greek leaves and the machine would not hold 
2246assam Chamoun: INGO representative, 1998. 
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them. He said that they are trying to make adjustments and hoped that some day 
the machine would work. 
Women stringing tobacco in Zaoutar Gharbieh; men help to prepare the leaves 
Bassam Chamoun met me in the South and spoke to me about the 
projects that the MCC was doing; vegetable tent distribution, irrigation, and aid 
(fertiliser, seeds etc... ) for farmers following Israeli shelling. I was not able to 
conduct any interviews on that day without his presence and he claimed that it 
was because he needed to learn too. When we reached Zaoutar, he took me to 
the house of Habib Yaghy. He said, `Habib is the man I deal with here. He is the 
Secretary of the Tobacco Syndicate for the South and he knows our programmes 
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very well. '225 Habib also showed me the tobacco-stringing machine, which was 
located in his storage room. 
The village of Zaoutar is divided into two separate villages: Zaoutar 
Sharieh (east) and Zaoutar Garbieh (west). MCC was working in Zaoutar 
Garbieh. This was an active farming community and every household was busy 
with tobacco and/or tending vegetables in tents. Vegetable tents were a recent 
addition to the farming routine here, but in this area people who could afford 
them were doing quite well, and their production capacity had reportedly 
increased. Unfortunately, these long nylon tents are also easy targets for Israeli 
shelling and many families spoke of great hardship and loss following their 
destruction. After one particularly ruinous raid, the MCC decided to replace the 
destroyed tents. Unfortunately for the farmers, there was no distribution. Instead, 
Habib, MCC's local contact, was given the tents and he split them between 
himself and his brother. The farmers in this area were furious and this type of 
"grassroots development" has caused bitterness and resentment. 
In this village we know everyone and all of us know what's going on. We villagers 
usually get together to discuss the situation of the village. And as far as the tents 
go... well Habib Yaghy along with the other guy A'kl seem to own tents. Habib 
owns around 10 tents and A'kl around 3 tents. 226 
225Bassam Chamoun: INGO representative, 1998. 
226Mohammad: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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Habib works for Hariri and he has 10 tents for vegetables and when we ask him, 
he says that he bought them with his own money. Habib has around 10 tents and 
A'kl has around 3 tents. But we know they are from the MCC. No one from the 
NGO has ever spoken to us. 227 
If they give the responsibility to a person in charge for distribution, he will take 
them himself. We didn't get anything. There has been no co-ordination. We 
bought tents with our own money. Ours were shelled by the Israelis and 
destroyed. They came around and took names of the people whose tents have 
been shelled, but instead, Yaghy's brother got all of the tents and we didn't get 
any. 228 
Yes we have heard of the MCC. How? Well about 3 years ago they brought 
samples of fertilisers and seeds, not to all farmers, but to some farmers. The aid 
came in the form of tents. Though first they got chemicals, then they got the 
nylon. My tents were shelled, but I wasn't among the people who got help. Habib 
in this village is the one who decides and he works through Mohammed Ali 
Ahmed ... 
he's an engineer and they both work with the Baath party. 229 
If there had really been aid given in the form of tents, seeds, water, seedlings, 
etc... then we would have benefited. We need these things desperately. But as 
farmers here we do not have direct contact with the people from the MCC, they 
have a contract with certain people in the village. There should have been a 
representative from their organisation (the MCC) to contact the farmers. 230 
You know certain people receive these aids, but how do I know that these people 
are not selling this aid? And they do sell it. We do not have direct contact with the 
people from the MCC. They have a contract with certain people in the village. 231 
The best thing is that the MCC should have a representative who will visit the 
different villages and villagers so that when MCC does something, it will show. It 
will really be helping for everyone-not just some. That way if the rep comes to 
the village, he will talk to the villagers and the villagers will tell them what they 
need and so this way it will also show what MCC is doing. In that way if 
someone's tent was damaged, for example, then there would be direct help and 
direct communication. Maybe the two people who are benefiting in this village 
don't even pay for plant medicine and seeds. 232 
227Ahmed: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
228H. Ali: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
229Y. M.: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
230M. H.: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
231 Mohammad: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
232Y. D.: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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Basically, they (the MCC) are in one valley and we the farmers are in another 
valley. 233 
There were a lot of criticisms that were made when the nylon tents were 
distributed. I mean how could they come and give to my neighbour and pass me. 
They passed without giving to me. 234 
We know of the MCC but we have no direct contact with it. Maybe people on the 
level of individuals have benefited from it. One or two or maybe three people 
from each village have benefited from the work they do. 235 
Yaghy Aki was an agricultural engineer in Syria, but he wasn't doing well. His 
sister has a good contact with Bahyia Hariri. She may have helped him. His 
tents-he probably pays nothing-he gets them from MCC. He gets his seeds, 
the nylon etc... for nothing-again aid from MCC. And he's wealthy by the way. In 
the end he doesn't really care if he loses or profits because he is not working 
hard for it. 236 
INGOs should have representatives in order to prevent stealing and people like 
Habib. If they do that then they can organise the farmers. It's not the bucket of 
chemicals that makes the difference, but it's they way it's done. It's good to feel 
that an organisation cares like a father who takes care of a son. 237 
This organisation! MCC works with the very person who works for himself! 238 
233Hassan A.: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
234Habib: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
235L. M.: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
236y A.: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
237AIi: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
238Hannah: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
273 
2. The villages of Siddiquine and Recheknanav 
The village of Siddiquine239 and Recheknanay24O are located just outside of the 
city of Qana, the site of the massacre of 107 persons by Israeli bombing in April 
1996. According to representatives from Save the Children, over 50 per cent of 
the people killed in Qana were from the village of Siddiquine, and many of the 
people I spoke to had lost family members or friends. One woman I met had lost 
nine members of her family, including both of her parents. The village itself was 
in shambles, almost every house had a wide gaping hole somewhere, and the 
streets were empty. Constant Israeli shelling, as well as political infighting 
between the two militias kept these farmers, like most farmers residing in border 
areas, in a constant state of fear. Tobacco is the main crop here and almost 
everyone was growing it. They spoke of working in their fields at night, because 
of the fear of shelling during the day. They said that they had to work hard and 
fast in order to tend to and harvest their crops. And they routinely said, `We sell 
our tobacco to Berri. ' According tothe local mukhtar and reports from local 
people, the average income is about 7,000,000 LL ($4,667 or £ 2,916) per year 
2391 interviewed approximately 15 people in individual and group interviews in this village 
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per family. The principal of the local school spoke of the high numbers of people, 
who have emigrated, especially to Germany. This he said was a life-line for the 
families. He said that almost every family had someone in Germany, and `with 
the money that the relatives send life is manageable. '241 Most feel that their living 
conditions will never improve until Lebanon and Israel sign a peace agreement. 
There is no doubt that their housing and living conditions have deteriorated in the 
last five years, and in this village more than any other, the effects of ongoing 
conflict could be distinctly felt. The people were kind and hospitable, but they 
also exhibited signs of aggressiveness, agitation and nervousness. 
Save the Children have been working for years in this village. They work 
primarily with women and children and they initiated a special programme in 
1994 for children, which is taught and run by the local youth. 242 This programme 
is quite successful and seems to have given the young people and children a 
reprieve from the death and destruction that surrounds them. 
The Save programme is nice because they teach us songs, drawing etc... I also 
went to reading schools and here it is nice because they don't study like any 
other school. 243 
240 1 interviewed around 15 people from this village. At least nine people were present in a group 
interview. 
241 Hassan Y.: married adult man, school principal, individual interview, 1998. 
242Seven children from this program also perished in the Qana massecre. 
243AIi: seven year old boy, individual interview, 1998. 
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I volunteered and my love towards children has made me apply to work with 
Save the Children. Before 1994 Save the Children had a programme including 
100 children. In 1994, they asked for people my age to volunteer. But now it is a 
summer camp, even in winter, we have like one or two days that we meet on I 
believe that the children have changed a lot especially that they are village 
children. These children have learned confidence, especially when they are 
talking to others. It has also encouraged shy, embarrassed children to have 
confidence to speak up. 244 
This programme is directed towards children. The programme is established in 
such a way to group people together in a way to teach them co-ordination and 
sharing. It is also to discover the children's talent and confidence. It costs 500LL 
($. 33 or 21 pence) for each student per month. During the continuous club the 
summer camp is 250LL and when we have trips it costs 1000LL. Some children 
can't pay the monthly 500LL, but the trainers don't turn them away. The trainers 
pay or someone else, we don't let them go. 245 
Before April's war (Qana) there was a girl who was in the Save programme. 
During the massacre she lost her parents and five of her brothers. The teachers 
in the Save programme kept working with her to get her to speak again, and 
during two days of camp, they discovered that she was improving, and she has 
started to speak. 246 
We have learned that a lot of children have beautiful voices! They also dance the 
dabke (Lebanese traditional folk dance). A lot of people do acting and sketches 
to make everyone laugh, and others like to draw. It's good for the children. 247 
We have found out through this programme that some children have talents and 
with at this program would have been impossible2`8 
The programme includes everything and it is very well organised and the children 
don't get bored. First we started the programme by discussing a certain 
topic-like teeth after that they play, draw and sing etc. . . about the 
lesson. 249 
244Miriam: single young adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1998. 
245Zeinab: single young adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1998. 
246Miriam: single young adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1998. 
247Fatima: single young adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1998. 
248Amal: single young adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1 998. 
249Zeinab: single young adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1998. 
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Through this programme, we the trainers got the idea that we wanted to clean up 
our village. We thought of a hygiene campaign. We not only wanted to clean the 
village but also to put permanent barrels in the village for people to throw their 
garbage. We told Munza, our Save representative and she raised it with Save 
and they agreed! We went to all of the houses and got 5,000LL from each house 
and hired a truck to carry away all of the garbage! 250 
After every class, the children are asked to evaluate the session. Then the 
trainers evaluate themselves and the class. When the Save the Children 
representative visits every month, they evaluate together and make changes. 
The trainers said that they are now co-ordinating programmes with the 
local people and the local elementary school. Some are concerned about the 
financing of the programme. They felt that there should be more money for crafts 
and they did not feel that the programme would be sustainable without someone 
visiting and co-ordinating from Save the Children. 
You know what it is like to be run locally? Impossible! It is better to bring 
someone from outside, especially when children establish this with teachers. I 
believe that it is not sustainable without Save the Children. 251 
Unlike Zaoutar, the villagers here expressed dissatisfaction with the government. 
They felt that the government's interest here was `non-existent'. They explained it 
was due to political reasons, as they were supporters of Hizbullah. 252 
250Kafaa: single young adult woman, teacher, individual interview, 1998. 
251Hassan: married adult man, school principal, individual interview 
252Nabi Berri is the head of Amal, a competing militia in the area. 
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H. Summary of Findings 
The Israeli occupation of the South and the chronic bombardment of Southern 
villages is the most difficult hurdle for INGOs working there to overcome. 
Constant shelling and destruction mark the daily lives of the inhabitants of this 
war-torn region, and in many villages it is simply too dangerous for INGOs to 
work. They have, in some cases, had to abandon projects and programmes due 
to this hazardous working environment. 
In this region, unlike others, the relationship with the government is quite 
strong. This strong relationship built via the Council of the South has contributed 
to the withering away of the power of the local landlords. The majority of men and 
women see this as a positive outcome, though many complained that Nabih Berri 
was in fact, through his position in the government, becoming the sole patron and 
most powerful landlord. 
The work of the INGOS in this region varied greatly between the abundant 
praise for Save the Children and the vociferous criticism for the MCC. The two 
programmes were completely different and it was observed that Save the 
Children made a great effort to work with empowering the youth of societies torn 
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apart by war, whilst the field officer of MCC worked for basically for the 
empowerment of himself and his close allies in Zaoutar. 
I. The Shut 
The Shuf Mountains are in the southern half of the Mount Lebanon range. The 
area is spectacularly beautiful, with lush green valleys, fountains and springs, 
narrow gorges, rivers and waterfalls, and the omnipresent terraced 
mountainsides. Unlike the northern half of Mount Lebanon, the Shuf is sparsely 
populated as many of its residents fled following the Israeli invasion of 1982 and 
the fighting between the Christians and Druze that broke out in the wake of the 
Israelis' departure. 
This area is historically home to the Druze sect and is jealously guarded 
by its leader, Walid Jumblatt. Walid Jumblatt publicly claims to work hard to 
protect this area's natural resources and beauty. It is clean and a frequent 
destination for tourists and picnickers. Christian villages are scattered throughout 
the area, though most were levelled following the "War of the Mountain" in 1987. 
The population of the area is estimated by a local mukhtar and an INGO field 
officer to be approximately 300,000 persons. Many residents in the area rely on 
agriculture at least for part of their income. The main crops grown in this region 
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are vegetables, apples, olives and apricots. Since the end of the war, several 
INGOs have started to work in this area. The focus of the work has been to assist 
displaced persons who wish to return to their villages of origin. Programmes vary 
and include the rebuilding of houses and infrastructure to conflict resolution 
programmes that work with local people to help them deal with overcoming the 
hostilities that took place between groups during the war. 
1. The villages of Maidel Meouch253 and Kfarniss254 
These two villages are located on the peak of a steep mountain, and to reach 
them one must traverse up a harrowing one-lane road. The Pontifical Mission is 
currently working in both villages, though the YMCA, Mercy Corps and the UNDP 
have all also initiated programmes here. I met with a man named Najib Adwan 
upon my arrival, as he was the local Pontifical Mission contact and wanted to 
explain the Mission's development projects and programmes there. He said that 
the Pontifical Mission had begun working in this area six years prior and that their 
first project was repairing the drinking water system. They also renovated the 
school, built a clinic and provided 70 per cent of the medical equipment for it. 
253 1 interviewed at least 20 people from this village, including two group interviews with 
approximately six people present. 
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Then three years ago they shifted to agriculture and began fixing the irrigation 
systems, canals and roads. They are also going to deal with the sewage problem 
and they are currently building a factory for animal feed. He added that the 
Mission was also giving small loans to farmers. Moreover, this was another 
UNDP "model development village". 
After interviewing several of the locals, I discovered that Nagib 
Adwan-the Pontifical Mission's main contact in the village-was the nephew of 
a very powerful Maronite Monsignor, who was also from this village. The locals 
were angry and bitter and felt that the 'development' that had been done in their 
village was tainted with patronage and wasta, as it appeared that all of the 
254 1 interviewed around six people from this village. Four men were interviewed in a group. 
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Pontifical Mission's feed factory in Majdel Meouch 
development projects that took place in this village had to first pass through 
Nagib Adwan. 
Yes I have heard of the Pontifical Mission. They have done a feed factory ... you 
can apply for agricultural equipment and stuff, but you need wasta! Nothing 
works without wasta here. 255 
The PM doesn't work with a co-operative or the municipality in this village, but it 
works with a certain person from the village. Nagib Adwan. He's the nephew of 
the Monsignor. 256 
If you want to buy a tractor, you have to go to Nagib to apply. 257 
I am saying the truth and even if I am to be slaughtered in order to find the 
truth-this is the truth of the village. To be sure, all projects that are going on 
here, Nagib is the only one who is monitoring all of these projects-and he is the 
only one that the PM is dealing with. 25 
Work is being done here, but it is restricted to one person. 259 
Nagib doesn't get paid, but if he can contract a person for $2000 and get a 
contractor for $1,500 then of course he is not going to refuse and this way he will 
get money. 260 
People like one person to be popular and so this is probably why his uncle wants 
him to be popular regardless of his education or condition. 261 
It is not like the people to complain here, but we went down to the offices to hand 
our loan application to the Pontifical Mission and the Pontifical Mission told us 
that we had to deal with one person: Nagib Adwan. 262 
255Assad: married adult man, farmer, engineer, individual interview, 1998. 
256Tony: married adult man, factory worker, individual interview, 1998. 
257George: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
2Amine: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
259Rania: married adult woman, housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
260George: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
261Georgette: married adult woman, housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
262Assad: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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Most of the workers were from this village through wasta and there was a 
Monsignor who got his nephew to monitor and do all of the work. There is no 
committee established in this village. 263 
This does not mean that the villagers believed that no development had taken 
place here. Quite the contrary, most were very pleased with the projects that had 
been done, and many said that 99 per cent of all people in the village have 
benefited from the work of the Pontifical Mission. It was not what had been done, 
but distinctly how the development programme had taken place that disappointed 
the people in the village. 
Pontifical Mission's irrigation canal in Majdel Meouch 
. ý. ýý- . ý. -ý_`. 
The farmers here also complained about the government's lack of 
dedication to seeing them return to their homes. Walid Jumblatt as the head of 
263Mary: married adult woman, housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
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the Ministry of the Displaced was in charge of distributing money for house 
reparations. However, the funds had been frozen and he was unable to give the 
locals the full amount of their checks. The government first paid the Druze 
squatters to leave the houses and then they paid or were supposed to pay the 
Christian families to rebuild or repair their houses. Farmers spoke of corruption 
on all sides and many believed that because they did not have wasta, they were 
not able to collect the money that was rightfully theirs. 
Most importantly, like in every other rural village, the farmers spoke of the 
government's negligence of agricultural development. Most of the farmers in this 
town were elderly. It seems that the majority of people left the area due the war 
and only return for summer holidays. People spoke of the lush vegetables and 
fruits that they used to produce here, and continue to painstakingly maintain 
terraces that have been a part of this village for centuries. 
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Terrace farmer in Majdel Meouch 
For example before the war I used to make from agriculture: 
5,000 USD from olives 
4,000 USD from tomatoes 
3,000 USD from apples 
On average I used to make about $12,000 per year. 
Before the war I once made 70,000 LL ($23,333)! 264 and my son was so tempted 
by this that he wanted to start his own farm. Now if I beg him to come and help 
me, he won't. It's just not feasible. 265 
Why am I not planting this year? No market. Well it hurts me morally because I 
am not planting this year. Land is the soul and if you can't feed it, then it will die. 
It's the same if you don't feed and take care of a child, he will die. 266 
This year I didn't plant because there is no market here and then I will have to 
take the produce to Beirut and there they will waste it. 267 
264The exchange rate before the war was 3LL to $1.00 
265Illyas: married elderly man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
266George: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
267Assad: married adult man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
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Once an Armenian farmer was on his donkey and he came to see me. So the 
man saw me on my land working and he simply told me that his donkey's 
situation is better than his. 268 
The situation for farmers is very bad because there is no protection and no 
guarantees. You plant and then there is no marketing and your produce stays 
here and rots. 269 
The situation in Kfarniss was slightly different when it came to the Pontifical 
Mission. According to the people that I met, the Pontifical Mission was meeting 
the expectations of the locals. It was the YMCA that some complained about. It 
seems that the YMCA made some loans to the farmers in order to help them 
restore their agricultural livelihoods. Most, instead of investing the loan in 
agriculture, used the money to rebuild their houses, thinking that when they got 
their allotted money from the government they would use it to pay back the 
YMCA. Unfortunately, the government did not pay most of these people their 
reconstruction payment until a year later, and the YMCA foreclosed on the loans 
and was suing some of the farmers. 
The Pontifical Mission is the only one looking out for us for the past two years. 
Though Caritas has given us money for renovations. 270 
The Pontifical Mission interest is in agricultural development projects, which is 
encouraging people to stay. 271 
268Illyas: married elderly man, farmer, individual interview, 1998. 
269Gerogette: married adult woman, housewife, individual interview, 1998. 
270Amine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
271Shahine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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The Pontifical Mission is also doing an irrigation program. In winter they brought 
us 6000 fruit plants. 272 
Caritas and YMCA have also helped this village. 273 
The YMCA gives loans... for example, it gives a person $5000 with a symbolic 
interest of 9% for those who want to do small jobs. Around 25 people from this 
village got loans. This year it is hard to get loans, because the people who got 
loans from the YMCA were expecting to return it by getting the promised money 
from the government (Money for house reconstruction) and so this is why it is 
hard to get loans. They couldn't pay it back. 274 
The YMCA started suing people for the return of the loans! Damn the YMCA! 275 
The PM gave us pipes 6 inches wide costing $23,000 and gave us $3000 for 
labour. The mission brings the equipment and we provide the labour and we 
complete the project. 276 
Now the PM is going to give us an agricultural tractor costing $18,000. But there 
is a problem-who is going to receive this tractor-the municipality or the co- 
operative? 277 
The mission is also studying a project of sewerage treatment, which will cost 
$100,000.278 
(group of farmers) 
The PM came directly after the displaced people returned to their area. The PM 
came and asked us about our needs. They came to this place, Kfarniss because 
it was an absolute disaster. 279 
Caritas gave each household $1000 and some others an extra $2000. The 
YMCA also helped, they gave loans. 280 
272Maroun: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
273Joseph: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
274Shahine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
275Amine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
276Joseph: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
277Maroun: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
278Amine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
279Shahine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
280Joseph: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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The YMCA didn't help, don't say that! They are suing us! 281 
(2 people disagree) No they helped. 282 
There was a co-operative that was behind it, they were capitalists who worked so 
hard and collected a lot of money to help the village-283 
And who was behind them? Behind the co-operative is the YMCA! 284 
The UNDP gave $80,000 to Majdel Meouch to do some agricultural 
developments, the wasta is big there. 285 
No. The PM is the only one looking out for us. 286 
YMCA did irrigation canals in Majdel Meouch and the UNDP spent $80,000 
there. They called it a model village and invited the American Ambassador there. 
This is not right. It's all about influence. 287 
J. Summary of Findings 
This region, the Shuf, was the site of brutal Christian-Druze massacres in 1983, 
which have left the region marked with numerous demolished and depopulated, 
mostly Christian, villages. The organisations working here must, in many cases, 
start from scratch rebuilding the foundations of destroyed homes and roads. 
Before attempting to work here, all organisations must pay a visit to the patron of 
the mountain, Walid Jumblatt. He represents the historical tie of the locals to this 
281 Amine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
282Joseph and Farid: married adult men, farmers, group interview, 1998. 
283Kamal: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
284Joseph: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
285Michel: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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land and his patronage is unquestionably needed for the success of any project 
in the Shuf. 
Though the Pontifical Mission expended a huge amount of money, time 
and resources over the years rebuilding the village of Majdel Meouch, the way 
that it was done angered and disappointed the local men and women. The 
extensive and flagrant use of patronage via the INGO, the local Monsignor and 
his nephew has left local people feeling very dissatisfied with the work of the 
Pontifical Mission. Local participation in this project was nearly non-existent. 
In Kfarniss, the locals believed that the Pontifical Mission was the only 
organisation that cared about them and they complained about the YMCA, and 
the fact that this organisations was suing them because they had failed to pay 
back loans. 
This chapter elucidated my fieldwork utilising the voices of local men and 
women concerning their views and understandings of the development work 
taking place in their particular villages and regions. As was shown by my 
fieldwork, many things coalesce around the objectives of INGOs, however, one 
of the most important components on the ground is the INGOs choice of field 
286Amine: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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officer. This person is the link between the local villagers and the organisation. 
He/she represents the organisation and its agenda to the 'beneficiaries' on all 
fronts. Who the INGOs choose to represent them and the way this person 
implements development programmes/projects on the ground is of crucial 
significance to the overall opinion of the work. Many local men and women did 
not know the exact name of the INGO working in their area, but they almost 
always knew the INGO field officer's name. 
The following chapter also includes local men and women's voices, but it 
will be mostly devoted to looking more closely at the relationships between the 
other main actors in the development scene; the State, donors and INGOs. This 
is done in an attempt to present a fuller picture of the development apparatus so 
that a more accurate analysis of the system can be achieved. 
287Farid: married adult man, farmer, group interview, 1998. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS of INGO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES in 
RURAL AREAS of LEBANON: obstacles, constraints and 
realities 
Whose Development is it anyway? 
Kingston Kajese 1 
This chapter will explore the main actors involved in rural development in 
Lebanon (the state, non-state political actors, INGO's, donors, and beneficiaries). 
It will dig deeper into the development process in order to discover some of the 
obstacles and constraints that may keep INGOs from meeting the needs of local 
men and women. It will also investigate whether these obstacles and constraints 
also keep them from meeting their own stated goals. Initially, it will look at the 
relationship between INGOs, and the State specifically examining INGO-state co- 
ordination, regional political constraints, and domestic constraints focusing on 
local politics, and confessional ism. Within this section, the context in which 
INGOs form patron-client relationships with powerful Lebanese figures will also 
be inspected. The second section of this chapter will examine the salient themes 
in the connection between donor agendas, INGOs, and the actual projects. It will 
1 Kingston Kajese b., cited in Haskell Ward (1989: 97). 
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pay particular attention to the work of USAID, as this donor funded four of the 
seven INGOS included in my project and maintained an office in Lebanon. Then I 
will move on to the INGOs' work on the ground, covering issues like 
transparency, accountability, and sustainability. 
Finally, I will look at the beneficiaries' level of participation, especially 
women. I will also include a section that dwells on beneficiaries' access to 
INGO's projects and programmes according to need. It is important to note that 
my fieldwork data is used as a basic framework for most of the arguments and 
analyses included in this chapter. It is important to note that these conclusions 
are drawn very specifically from my fieldwork and are not necessarily applicable 
to INGO universally. 
A. Domestic Obstacles: INGOs, non-state political actors, the state 
and Development 
We thank the government. What can we give it more? The government is made 
of the people. We are the government. The gangs are there true, but if we don't 
do anything about it... well. I mean if we didn't do the same, then we could have a 
good government. 2 
2 Mr. Halabi: married, adult man, shop owner, individual interview, 1998. 
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There are historical, political and socio-economic contexts that influence the 
INGO-state relationships. INGOs are `organisations of human agents which 
themselves have identities, objectives, and above all, social histories. ' 
(Farrington and Bebbington (1993: 42). These histories and objectives may or 
may not coincide with a committed partnership with the government. Some 
organisations are more pragmatic and economic whilst others are essentially 
political. The raison d'etre of the organisation, in many cases, influences the type 
of people who work for the organisation and the stance that it takes concerning 
the government, as well as its approach to working with the poor. Esman and 
Uphoff (1984: 267) state that `whether and under what circumstances a particular 
organization should relate to government or avoid government is a major 
strategic decision'. 
Historically, voluntary organisations have operated quite freely in 
Lebanon. This freedom was greatly extended during the war (1975-1990) due to 
the near complete collapse of the state and the great surge of funds that INGOs 
(both local and international, but especially international) received from abroad. 
There was little call for accountability and transparency as it was an emergency 
situation. It is true that during the war INGOs helped distribute large amounts of 
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aid and have been credited with helping to hold the society together. Likewise, it 
is also clear that corrupt3 practices were rampant in certain organisations and 
many of them established `mini-kingdoms' in areas where they were working. 
Although, it has been nearly ten years since the end of the war, many INGO staff 
are still not accustomed to answering questions concerning their work and/or 
finances, or establishing partnerships with the government, or each other for that 
matter. One field staff worker put it this way, `During the war, a lot of NGOs 
behaved like militias. There was no one to tell them no. Today they have to 
change, but it will take time. '4 Nowadays the funds that flowed so generously 
during the war have mostly dried up, and the state is attempting to reclaim lost 
territory. Many INGOs are feeling the crunch as they attempt reorganise 
themselves for the future and it is obvious that INGOs in Lebanon are currently 
undergoing some difficulty in redefining their institutional identity. It is also 
important to recognise the issue of power in the context of these relationships. 
The government's policy and politics have a considerable impact on the 
3 Definitions of corruption are many and varied. They range from simple notions that corruption is 
the exercise of public power for private gain to more complex econometric analyses that try to 
measure the impact of corruption. Robert Klitgaard (1998) has suggested that corruption stems 
from arrangements in which there is a monopoly of power, discretion in how that power is used, 
and a lack of accountability about its use. 
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distribution of power and resources in society. The Hariri government's plan for 
reconstruction and development focused almost exclusively on infrastructure in 
the urban city centre of Beirut, neglecting the rural areas, as well as social 
aspects that probably should have been seen as imperative following the civil 
war. 
The inadequacy of past state development programmes in rural areas has 
been reinforced by current reductions in agricultural funding, lack of co-ordination 
between the Ministry of Agriculture, the FAO, INGOs and other international 
organisations working in rural development. This lack of planning and focus 
serves to exacerbate the hardship experienced by local men and women, who 
live far from the centre, Beirut. Moreover, there is a considerable waste of 
resources due to duplication of work, lack of co-ordination, and corruption. All of 
the respondents complained about lack of water resources5, sewage treatment, 
electricity, medical facilities, public education for their children, agricultural inputs 
and training, and help in marketing their produce. In many cases, the INGOs 
provided the only source of assistance or prospect for assistance in the near or 
4 R. N.: female INGO field officer (she has worked for at least three different INGOs in Lebanon), 
1999. 
5 Please note that unlike other countries in the region, Lebanon's water is plentiful, however, this 
extremely valuable resource is horribly mismanaged. 
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distant future. One INGO handled the problem of government negligence this 
way: 
People are so used to complaining about the government not doing this or that 
for them. The YMCA tells them that it's not a question of sending lists of 
demands for someone else to fulfil. Instead, we tell them 'you are the 
government'. 6 
Telling an impoverished farmer that he/she is the government implies that 
they have some control over most aspects of their lives, which, in most cases, 
they do not. In fact, they have almost no control over the most simple aspects of 
their lives, like whether they are going to be able to afford shoes for their 
children, locate a market for their products, or obtain a license to plant tobacco. 
Furthermore, throughout my fieldwork and without exception, the men and 
women reported that they do provide for themselves, and that people in rural 
areas of Lebanon have been providing for themselves for centuries. What urban 
dwellers consider and expect as entitlements; water, electricity, roads, sewage 
treatment, rubbish collection etc... rural people handle for themselves, in nearly 
all cases working together as a community. 
Many domestic impediments to development like the unfair distribution of 
tobacco licences in the Beka'a, the flagrant corruption regarding the 
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reconstruction of destroyed homes in the Shuf, the lack of the enforcement of fair 
marketing practices for agricultural produce, the failure to provide alternative 
crops following the eradication of hashish cultivation, and the provision of inputs 
for the agriculture sector are all decisions that require political will from the 
administration in order to be corrected. 
NGOs The State? 
1. NGO-State Co-ordination 
Stepping in when government won't8 
Co-ordination between the INGOs and the government is very haphazard and 
fraught with ambiguity from both sides of the relationship. 
6 Leyla Mbayed, YMCA quoted in the Daily Star, Wednesday, April 14,1999. 
7 All cartoons in this chapter were reprinted with the permission of Hurriyat, where they first 
appeared in No. 9, Fall 1997, by cartoonist Mr. Antoine Ghanem. Michelle Obeid, my field 
assistant, and myself did the translations for cartoon captions. 
8 Daily Star, Wednesday, April 14,1999: Commentary on the work of YMCA. 
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The problem with the government is that government ministers from the area or 
other interested parties want their names on the projects. They are interested in 
being elected or re-elected. We want participation. We don't want all of the credit 
for the project, but we don't want them taking credit for the project. For us, our 
goal is to do good work and attract more funds for the future. 9 
It is reportedly very difficult for the INGOs to work with the government ministries. 
All INGO staff complained that the administration is uncooperative, lacking in 
professionalism and, in many instances, corrupt. 
Public construction site: We (the government) work for you 
We don't avoid the government. But if we had to ask permission or present all of 
the papers, we would never get any work done. We try to consult, but we don't 
always get answers. We do the work. Nobody stops us. If they say no, or wait, or 
whatever, we don't stop. We do the work and they don't stop us. 10 
The problem is that everyone in the government, every man who has an office 
acts like a Minister. In Lebanon this is a problem. Everyone sees himself as 
important. 11 
9 Jacqueline M.: former INGO field officer, 1999. 
10 Rabih: INGO country representative, individual interview, 1998. 
11 Samir: INGO field officer, 1998. 
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We went to Hobeika12 with a list of projects. He said yes, yes, yes. Except this 
certain project, no, because they had done a study and allocated the money for it 
and they were going to do it. We had to present the same list to some other man 
in another department, in the same ministry, who said no to all of the projects! He 
said that their offices were going to do the work. Another man in another 
department said we could only do the work if we gave him a new proposal that 
would include specifics on every one metre of ground we dig. He would have had 
a stack of papers that he would have just put into the drawer and he would have 
never looked at them. It would take us months to do that kind of work and it 
would tie up the staff doing ridiculous paperwork. It would take us one year to do 
a project that could be done in two weeks. 13 
None of the INGO mission directors or staff had anything positive to say about 
working with the government. One INGO director went as far as to say, `The 
government is a mafia, so sometimes we have to behave like a mafia too. ' This 
should be understood in the context of the current socio-political economy. 
Almost all of the people working for the INGOs are Lebanese and part of 
Lebanese society. It is well known that most of the Lebanese public view the 
government with disdain. 14 Therefore, their reluctance in dealing with the state 
apparatus is a rational choice. In the eyes of many Lebanese citizens the 
government, for the most part, lacks credibility and legitimacy. 
12 Elie Hobeika was the former minister for Public Works, Electricity and Water. Incidentally, he is 
also an ex-warlord and the former leader of the Lebanese Forces militia. He was the prime 
suspect for directing the massacres at the Sabra and Chatila refugee camp. 
13 R. M.: INGO country representative, 1998. 
14 Stories of corruption are openly and constantly discussed. Moreover, the country's current 
economic recession has exacerbated the characteristic level of Lebanese cynicism towards the 
government. 
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In agriculture, we have no relationship with the government at all. We are a small 
organisation that works directly with the people. The government is not 
interested. In our education programmes, however, yes for the summer courses 
we need permission. Getting permission depends on wasta. It took one day for 
Kfar Roumane to get the permit. They have a Parliament member from there. 
One week for Qfarseer, they have someone from the Ministry of Education from 
there. Zaoutar, it's been one month and a half and still nothing. They have no 
one. But they started the programme anyway before they got the approval. 15 
2. Between the State and INGO: Personalities and Patronage 
The INGOs are better than the government. Why? 
Because we haven't tried the government! (everyone laughs) 16 
Some leaders feel that they are guests and if they are not living in the house, 
then they won't fix it. 17 
John Clark (1997: 47) wrote that `A healthy NGO-State relationship is only 
conceivable where both parties share common objectives. ' In Lebanon this is 
definitely lacking. However, though INGOs are fairly autonomous from the state 
apparatus, the absence of a clear-cut working relationship does not imply that 
there is no relationship with the government executive. Almost all of the INGO 
executive directors must work under the patronage of someone powerful in the 
administration. This is especially important if they are working in sensitive, 
relatively wealthy or influential areas. It is a mutually beneficial arrangement 
15 Bassam Chamoun/ MCC field officer, 1998. 
16 Kfeir Zeitoun: group interview with municipality members, 1998. 
17 Mohammad: single, adult male, painter/electrician, individual interview, 1998. 
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where an INGO working under the patronage of an MP, Minister, or one of the 
'troika' gains the possibility of access to the government apparatus and more 
power, including the possibility of future government funding, whilst the patron 
gains the political advantages of `bringing' development to a particular region or 
village(s). 
If a person doesn't have wasta then he will die. 18 
My son is in the Ministry. I express my feelings to him and he conveys this to the 
Minister or to his contacts, friends, officers, doctors ... like that. Every Saturday 
and Sunday people come here to talk to my son from the village and 
everywhere. 19 
Other than obtaining patronage and protection from an important government 
official, they must court the regional and local leaders as well as the remaining 
powerful landlords. For small-scale education projects or programmes like Save 
the Children's, where there is very little to gain politically from the project, 
extensive wasta is not needed in most cases. However, in big infrastructure 
development projects like the ones supported by USAID, an INGO working in the 
South must have a favourable `relationship' with Nabih Berri. Likewise, INGOS 
working in the Shuf must pay their respects and establish a good relationship 
18 Mohammad N.: married, adult man, farmer from the Hermel, 1998. 
19 Mr. Halabi: married, adult man, farmer from Kfeir, 1998. 
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with the Druze za'im, Walid Jumblatt. In this way, state-INGO relationships are 
personal and are handled between the elite of both establishments, especially 
initially. Bratton (1989: 572-6) concludes from his study in Africa that: `the amount 
of space allowed NGOs in any given country is determined first and foremost by 
political considerations, rather than by any calculations of the contributions of 
NGOs to economic and social development. ' Moreover, INGO mission directors 
have great potential for forging patron-client relationships with powerful people 
considering the amount of money that they have at their disposal via these 
projects. In fact, the USAID representative boasted that many of the people who 
had participated in their projects were elected to the municipalities: 
... many of the committee members were later elected to their respective 
municipal councils because they proved that they could get things done. 20 
By doing projects for influential people in and out of government, especially if this 
working relationship has been established over a period of time facilitates the 
work of the INGO and gives them the wasta needed in order to bypass 
regulations or other hindrances that may get in the way of completing a project. 
20 James "Spike" Stevenson, The Daily Star, Monday, 26 April, 1999, p. 3. 
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In Jezzine we were planning to dig a well for 25 villages. We had a lawyer and a 
geologist. It was said that the area where we wanted to dig the well was too close 
to the previous well. The government in the form of the darrak came and said 
that we shouldn't dig this well. We said okay, so the lawyer investigated and 
found that in Jezzine a well had to be at least 10 metres from an existing 
one... the one we were going to dig was only seven metres. . . and we dug the well 
anyway. How? The head of our INGO has a lot of wasta in the government. He 
has a lot of connections. And in the end he works for his own benefit. 21 
State-INGO relationships are not the whole story. They are complicated by 
issues of personality and patronage, both with and without the involvement of the 
state. Whilst this may be conceived of as corruption in as much as formal 
channels and procedures may be bypassed, they may equally be viewed as an 
alternative framework for relationships and one that is socially and culturally 
more authentic. 
It is nearly impossible to discuss the vital factors influencing INGO projects 
for rural development without also speaking about other regional and domestic 
constraints that influence this process. The regional constraints include the 
policies and practices of Lebanon's powerful neighbours; Syria and Israel. 
Domestic constraints are many (some of which are discussed above), but the 
political parties, patronage and confessionalism stood out in my fieldwork as 
21 G. F.: former INGO field officer, 1999. 
303 
playing a critical role in the overall scheme of rural development, and as a barrier 
to INGOs meeting the needs of local men and women. 
3. Regional Pressures 
The regional political situation is a significant and persistent obstacle to post-war 
development in Lebanon. As was shown by my fieldwork, the already difficult 
lives of people living in the South, the Baalbek-Hermel and Hasbaya are made all 
the more precarious due to extensive disruption caused by the ongoing conflict 
with Israel. 22 Moreover, most of the rural areas that I visited suffer from various 
economic and political pressures brought on by the policies of the two dominant 
regional actors: Israel and Syria. 
Israel's role is fairly straightforward. There is almost no benefit to people 
living in rural areas from the occupation of Lebanese land, the bombardment of 
Lebanese territory or the control of Lebanese water sources. The havoc that 
Israeli actions cause is not somehow compensated for by, for example, 
22 Please note that my fieldwork was conducted during the latter period of Israeli occupation 
1998-1999). 
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inexpensive medical care or cheap food23. Many farmers in the South and the 
Baalbek-Hermel region did admit that if it were not for sustained Israeli military 
action, the tobacco subsidies would probably not be as high. However, according 
to the people that I spoke to, the over-valued tobacco prices were not seen as an 
equalising measure in compensating them for the continual destruction of 
property and lives as well as the tension and fear that have become a way of life 
for them. 
Israel's occupation of 10 per cent of rural areas in Lebanon until May 2000 
hindered rural development whether by INGOs or the State. Firstly, there was a 
constant threat of danger presented by the ongoing violence, and there was the 
unfortunate by-product that many of the infrastructure projects were eventually 
destroyed. 
Syria's role on the other hand seems to be much more ambiguous. On the 
one hand, enormous imports of cheaper Syrian agricultural products and other 
goods have proven catastrophic for Lebanese producers. The uncontrolled influx 
of Syrian labourers willing to work for a fraction of the wages demanded by the 
23 This statement concerns only those people living outside of the Israeli self-declared security 
zone. It is possible that people living within the security zone received benefits from the 
occupation, but at the time of this fieldwork that information was not available. 
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Lebanese has also increased unemployment among rural people, especially 
men, who aspire to work on Beirut construction projects or in rural areas as day 
labourers. The recent cessation of smuggling from Lebanon to Syria and the 
concomitant increase of smuggled Syrian goods to Lebanon have caused 
immense economic hardship for the Lebanese living in border areas. Syria's 
control of water in the Hermel and the ubiquitous presence of the Syrian army 
and mokhabarat in the Beka'a and to a lesser extent in the Akkar demonstrate 
the powerful intentions of Syria and illustrate well the weakness of the Lebanese 
state. 
Nevertheless, though people do respond bitterly concerning Syrian 
influence in the country and the hardship that Syrian political and economic 
policies have caused them, the majority of people living in the border areas 
expressed a reluctant gratitude for the access that they have to Syrian schools, 
markets, media24, and especially Syrian medical care. I heard it many times 
24 During my fieldwork I noticed that nearly all of the people in the Akkar (including Wadi Khaled), 
Baalbek-Hermel and Arsal watch Syrian television. When I asked them why?, they replied that 
Syrian shows were more relevant to their lives. They said that they learned things from Syrian 
television, for instance agricultural and food preservation techniques, and that they didn't learn 
anything from "Beirut" television. Moreover, it was stated many times that they found the 
behaviour and way of dress on "Beirut" television vulgar and indecent. 
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throughout my fieldwork that if it were not for Syria they would be in much worse 
shape, many expressing that starvation would be a definite possibility. 
Syria provides them with an escape hatch from their ignored poverty and 
lack of Lebanese government interest. I am certain that if it were not for this 
option, there would be a tremendous amount of instability in these areas, with the 
best case scenario being violent demonstrations. 25 
4. The Political Parties 
Some people who are politically committed will try to convince you that a camel is 
a sheep. 26 
The power of local political party-militias (Hizbullah and Amal) are an additional 
obstacle for INGOs working in the Beka'a and the South where these groups are 
active. It is well known that the military arm of the party-militias could not exist 
2S In fact, there were demonstrations in 1997 led by Sobhi Tufaili, an ex-leader of Hizbullah. He 
had intended to lead a hunger march from Baalbek to Beirut in order to draw attention to the 
conditions of the poor. These sorts of demonstrations are illegal in Lebanon and were closely 
monitored by the Syrian and Lebanese armies, and in the end the march did not take place. 
However, thousands of people turned out in support of Sheik Tufaili, many of them farmers. 
'As far as I am concerned, I disregard the political intentions and goals of Toufeili, but for me this 
was the best revolution that ever took place in this area. Usually, it was always Muslim against 
Muslim or Muslim against Christian or Druze, but this time it was the poor against the 
government. All they demanded from the government was basic security, at least food and 
shelter' (Ahmed). 
26 Mohammad: married, adult man, farmer from the Beka'a, 1998. 
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without the explicit approval and backing of Syria. The INGOs must get approval 
from the parties to work as well as from the Syrian mokhabarat policing the area. 
The overwhelming majority of local people that I spoke to resented both of 
the political parties; Hizbullah and Amal. Not one farmer had anything positive to 
say about these parties. In fact many stated that these parties were a hindrance 
to development and their daily lives. Many felt manipulated by these actors, and 
they looked forward to the day when they would no longer exercise so much 
power in their areas. According to the people that I spoke to the removal of these 
parties and their influence lies in the hands of Syria. 
There were several instances where the INGOs had to court the political 
parties in order to establish their projects, and in some cases they avoided 
working in areas because a particular party forbid them to. This situation was 
compounded for INGOs normally viewed as `Christian', like for instance the 
YMCA. The YMCA's work in the northern Beka'a was a sensitive subject for 
some members of the parties, due to the perception that the YMCA is a Christian 
organisation. 
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5. Confessionalism and `Balanced' Development 
The Lebanese political system is based on a confessional balancing act where 
the constant manoeuvring of a class of political notables that may hold positions 
based on any combination of land, status, wealth or the direction of violence seek 
to secure increased levels of power for their sect and themselves. This system 
relies on the extensive use of patronage, cronyism and nepotism for its survival. 
It is a fragile system fraught with infighting, back-stabbing and shifting alliances 
with its ultimate outcome being a weakened Lebanese state. There is little room 
for the concept of a public good in this system, as it is a zero-sum game where 
leaders try to accrue as much of the spoils of office to their own areas/region and 
people for their own political gain. INGOs must work in this system, and they are 
an important part of the system. Due to the fact that they are distributing or have 
access to funds that could potentially help a politician or an individual within his 
community, their business is highly sought after. Likewise, an INGO that perhaps 
decides to absent itself from the system will find it difficult to work if not 
impossible. 
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I should also shed some light on the confessional make-up of Lebanon and how 
this is translated into the work of the NGOs. This confessional structure 
influences everything for the work of a local NGO. The entire administration is 
influenced by this confessional structure in Lebanon. Any organisation in 
Lebanon that tries to be independent will encounter lots of problems. An 
organisation that tries to defend its independence will have problems in funding 
to say the least. For an organisation to function it must be under the umbrella of a 
certain political figure in other words confessional power. If the organisation is 
not, there will also be problems in official funding. 27 
One might think that because these NGOs are foreign and have headquarters 
abroad they may be able to avoid this modus operandi, but this is not the case. 
The INGOs have foreign headquarters, but they are working in Lebanon and are 
staffed primarily by Lebanese. Moreover, within this climate, an organisation that 
hopes to get any kind of work done quickly, particularly infrastructure, has to 
become a part of this tangled web of alliances or else face constant delays and 
interruptions. 
Confessionalism... well this is Lebanon, but you know this doesn't bother me as 
long as the INGO is working for the poor. Like the Pontifical Mission, it's stated 
who they work for; Christians. Everyone knows, right. But where they work and 
the people they work for are poor. Those people are in a very terrible situation. 
So to me there is no real problem. But when an INGO that typically works for the 
Christians let's say, but then to win favours with Berri does work in Shi'ite villages 
in the South, some of them, not even poor villages for sure, they are cities! 
Nabatiye? How can this be considered rural? The YMCA is doing a $50,000 
water reservoir there, and there already is one! 28 
27 Qassim: married, adult man, local NGO worker from Irsal, 1998. 
28 H. Anwar.: INGO field officer, 1998. 
310 
In Lebanon, there is a concept of `balanced' development among government 
officials, as well as all interested parties. This concept is illustrated by the 
following scenario: For instance in the Shuf, a mixed Christian/Druze area, the 
PM's primary focus was geared towards working in destroyed Christian villages. 
However, they also had to work in Druze villages, even though they were not 
considered to be in need. This was done in order to maintain this concept of 
`balanced' development, which is really just a replica of traditional government 
policy in rural areas aimed at keeping everyone `pleased'. This policy forces 
INGOs to waste resources that could better be utilised according to level of need. 
Other than governmental, regional and domestic obstacles, donors also 
contribute to the overall success or failure of rural development projects and 
programmes. The following section will attempt to analyse the impact of donor 
agendas on INGO's work in rural areas of Lebanon. 
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B. International Constraints: Donors and Development 
'He who pays the piper calls the tune. ' 
Many of the INGOs in my study have been working in Lebanon for a lengthy 
period of time29, they all received a great bulk or all of their funding from foreign 
sources, and their head offices are all located in North America or Europe. As 
stated in Chapter One of this work, donors usually choose to work with 
INGOs/NGOs because these organisations are positively distinguished from the 
state, due to their assumed closer ties with local people, and hence their 
supposed ability to manage projects which include enhanced local participation, 
and because of their perceived cost-efficiency, flexibility, innovation as well as 
their reputed effectiveness in completing projects in a timely manner. 
Speed in implementing the projects is of the essence. Funding 
needs to be dispersed quickly; otherwise the money goes back to 
USAID. That's why the decision-making process at the YMCA has 
to be quick and efficient. 30 
29 The only exceptions were Creative Associates and CHF, which came on the back of USAID 
funding. Creative Associates was not a subject of my study, because they were late in getting 
started in Lebanon, however they were a part of the USAID programme and were constantly 
referred to by INGO personnel and local men and women during my field study. 
30 Leyla Mbayed, Integrated Rural development Program Director for the YMCA, quoted in the 
Daily Star, Wednesday, April 14,1999. 
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1. Donor Agendas: USAID 
The questions that this section will address are: Do the objectives of donors, 
INGOs and local people match? Do donor objectives and agendas facilitate or 
impede the work of INGOs in meeting the needs of local men and women who 
are the intended `beneficiaries' of their aid money? 
In March 1994, USAID's Strategy for Sustainable Development 
established objectives for aid such as protecting the environment, stabilising 
world population growth, and encouraging broad based economic growth. A 
fourth category, entitled `building democracy', called for `the provision of 
assistance to countries that have recently emerged or are in the process of 
emerging as democratic societies; have recently emerged or are emerging from 
civil strife; or where democratic progress or institutions are threatened (p. 2). ' 
Lebanon was chosen for US foreign aid based on pledges made at the Friends of 
Lebanon Conference, which grew out of US concerns raised by the Israeli 
Grapes of Wrath attacks on the country in April, 1996. Prior to these attacks, US 
assistance was being phased out. 
The hostilities served as a reminder that Lebanon plays an 
important role in the achievement of regional peace, and that its 
continued recovery from civil war and regional conflict is fragile 
(USAID 1998: 4). 
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This section focuses primarily, though not absolutely, on USAID because it was 
the only donor agency that maintained an office in Lebanon. Moreover, it was 
seen as being highly involved with the oversight of projects done in their name 
via the North American INGOs, which were a part of this project. 
The USAID representative in Lebanon was very clear about why USAID 
was here. He said that they were working in the country because of Lebanon's 
strategic importance for the security and stability of the region. To him that did 
not imply that development work could not be performed, on the contrary, it 
could, but it clearly was not the first priority of USAID. 
The reason USAID wants to increase the program is because of Lebanon's 
crucial importance to regional stability. "Lebanon can be an economic entrepöt 
for the region. It could play the same role in the region that Amsterdam or 
Brussels or Zurich play in Europe. But that all depends on peace and stability 
and open borders and that's why we're here. "31 
Importantly, USAID remains subservient to the Department of State and 
the Congress therefore; 
... the fact remains that USAID (1) is a tool of US foreign policy and 
exists to promote US interests more than to promote development 
in poor nations; (2) has failed in its professed goal of helping 
promote self-sustaining economic development in various 
developing countries; and (3) is essentially a Cold War agency now 
(or perhaps still) in search of continued legitimacy' (Sullivan 1996: 
6). 
31 James Stevenson, quoted in the Daily Star, Friday, September 17,1999. 
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One well experienced project field officer argued that even though donors 
have agendas, this does not particularly mean that the INGO cannot do good 
work on the ground. 
Let's say that USAID has stated their goals and agenda okay. The community 
has their needs. In order for the local community to have their needs met... the 
missing element is money. USAID has the money. If the INGO working in the 
area is good, they can do it. They can satisfy both parties. I mean they can't do 
everything that the village may need, but they can do a lot. And they can also 
satisfy USAID in their goals. 32 
We will first look at the initial participation practices and processes in USAID's 
rural development programme that included choosing which INGOs would 
receive this quite large sum ($7 million each) of money for development work. 
Specifically, what were the criteria, and how were the INGOs that participated 
and received funds totalling $7 million each chosen? 
The work contracted by USAID is done through a process of `competitive 
tenders'. How competitive the tendering was however, is not certain. 
32 Haytham Annan: adult man, INGO field officer, 1998. 
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And this selection process of USAID for the clusters... well beside the point of 
why the INGOs chose the clusters that they chose, why were the INGOs they 
chose chosen in the first place? Maybe USAID didn't want the best because then 
the best will ask questions that they aren't prepared to answer. Moreover, they 
didn't give any money to local NGOs. I heard that they were saying that local 
NGOs don't have the capacity that they weren't professional, that they were 
corrupt. This is simply not true! In many cases, there is no difference between 
these organisations, and the local ones are even better, because they have been 
doing this for a long time. They have been working with the locals and they are 
closer to the grassroots organisations too. But USAID prefers to support Creative 
Associates! What is this? 33 
From the beginning the criteria appear dubious. Except for references that 
the INGO should be North American based and associated with a local 
representative in Lebanon; capacity, experience and staff qualifications all 
seemed to be quite varied. The only INGO that had the staff, experience and 
capacity for the work was the YMCA, which has been working in development for 
over 100 years in Lebanon. Mercy Corps was highly understaffed and the head 
of the office was living in the Caucasus during most of the period under 
consideration. CHF is an organisation that was `imported' from the U. S. along 
with Creative Associates, an organisation that is not even an INGO, but a for- 
profit corporation. Creative Associates and CHF are both based in the 
Washington D. C. area and are heavily dependent on federal funds for their 
operations. Creative Associates and CHF were also involved in the USAID pilot 
33 H. Anwar: adult man, INGO field officer, 1999. 
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cluster programme in El Salvador. These two organisations in particular have 
received much criticism in the Lebanese development community and I suspect 
that the head of the USAID programme in Lebanon had little choice in granting 
them funds to work here. 34 It is also important to note that there is something 
called the `audited overhead rate'35 for the North American INGOs getting money 
from USAID in which a percentage, `15-36 percent', of each tranche of the funds 
is transferred to the home office in the U. S. as overhead running costs. So out of 
$1 million dollars the lowest being 15 percent comes to $150,000 being sent to 
the U. S. every year during the funding period. The total funding is $7 million so 
that would equal $1,050,000 in total over five years. If in fact it is true that one of 
the organisations must return 36 percent that comes to $2,520,000 over a five- 
year period. This represents nearly one third of the original funding, and not an 
insignificant amount of money, especially considering that it is just one out of 
hundreds of ongoing USAID projects. 
The last part of this chapter's field analysis will look at the outcome of 
actual projects and programmes through the eyes of beneficiaries. It will focus on 
34 USAID struggles to get their budgets passed through a conservative Republican Congress 
every year. Notably, in order to get their funding they typically report to Congress that 80 percent 
of AID money gets returned to the United States. 
35 1 was told by a USA ID official that this rate is periodically reviewed, 1999. 
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issues like transparency, accountability, sustainability and levels of participation. 
This is done in order to illuminate critical INGO practices on the ground that may 
or may not contribute to these organisations meeting the needs of local men and 
women. 
C. INGOs and `Beneficiaries': the realities of development 
Most organisations. . . they get trees, they plant them and that's it. They leave. But 
I believe that this should be a part of a bigger project, which includes: 
assessment, investment, follow-up and marketing. 36 
Look, if there was any true and actual rural development going on, it could be 
observed by now. So I would say that what is going on is not true development, 
but something much more haphazard. 37 
1. Accountability of INGOs and Sustainability of Projects 
Believe me, in Lebanon, with NGOs, there is no accountability. 38 
A lot of organisations have already prepared projects. I mean look at it this 
way-if you have a shirt that could fit anyone, it's not made for you, you would 
have to break your arm or your shoulder to make it fit. This is what it's like for the 
local people trying to manage these programmes that simply were not designed 
with the locals in mind. 39 
36 Kassem: married, adult man, local NGO worker, 1998. 
37 Abed: single, adult man, INGO field officer, 1998. 
38 L. M. adult female, long-time INGO field officer, 1998 
39 Kassem: adult man, local NGO field worker, 1998. 
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The `problem of accountability' has been an ongoing debate within the realm of 
development practitioners working with NGOs (Moore and Stewart 1998). Who 
are these organisations accountable to? How do multiple accountabilities 
encumber autonomy (Biggs and Neame 1996)? The World Bank states that 
ultimately it is the civic constituency these organisations are accountable to 
(World Bank 1997). However, most INGOs do not have a civic constituency and 
are more likely to be accountable to their donors. Fox and Brown (1998) argue 
that in order for NGOs to be considered credible and legitimate, they must 
include "downward accountability" 
Accountability cannot be disentangled from the socio-political and 
economic relations of power between the most salient actors; the INGOs, donors, 
the government as well as the local men and women, who are the weakest link in 
the chain. In an interview for the Daily Star, USAID mission director, James 
"Spike" Stevenson told reporters that if the local people do not co-operate then 
the INGOs have the right to just pull out. 
If we don't get cooperation, the NGOs know they can pull out and we can put 
resources somewhere else. We are willing to work with them but they have to 
willing to work with us. 40 
40 Daily Star, Monday, 26 April 1999. 
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What does `willing to work with us' entail? Either make the conditions easy and 
do what we want, or forget it. Do local communities have the same power? Do 
local people have the right to choose which INGO they want to work in their 
village? In my fieldwork I found that they did not. For example, the people from 
the village of Ras Baalbek in the Beka'a did not want to work with CHF? They 
preferred to work with the YMCA. USAID told them that if they wanted to be a 
part of the programme then they had to work with CHF or forget it. The men and 
women working for the local NGO in Arsal also did not want to work with CHF, 
they felt that CHF was not the best INGO for Arsal. They claimed that the 
organisation was working with the influential people in the village, who were 
friends of the field officer, and not working with the local NGOs. They specifically 
did not want an agricultural road. They argued that it was not one of the village's 
priorities and moreover no one had been consulted. However, it was discovered 
that some of the locals did pay 30 percent of the total cost, which was 
approximately $10,000. The local Arsal NGO complained that the same people, 
who were working for CHF had worked for another INGO some years previously 
and they constructed another agricultural road in Arsal that was now impassable. 
The locals had also paid for that road. The men and women had no recourse as 
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the INGO had pulled out and there was no accountability. USAID refused to hear 
their complaints and in the end, CHF built the agriculture road. 
The main leverage a country has over an INGO is a refusal of access to 
its territory. The same could apply to a village where the "resources" are people, 
powerful people. If a village is home to powerful people or a powerful person then 
the village has leverage and the INGO and/or USAID will try to work out whatever 
difficulties that may arise. However, if the village has no wasta or very little, then 
there is little motivation for the INGO or the donor to persevere through the 
process of consultation and partnership building. For example, Fakiha was seen 
as an important village because it has a high proportion of `professionals' and is 
a comparatively wealthy village in the Baalbek-Hermel area, `because they have 
opened to Syria and the countries wanting hashish during the war. '41 They have 
a doctor, engineer and an officer in every house. '42 1 was told during my fieldwork 
that there was a lot of competition for this village and although the YMCA had 
been designated to work there, CHF was also starting projects in same the 
village, which was against USAID regulations. 
41 Nazih: married, adult man, farmer from the Beka'a, 1998. 
42 Ahmed: married, adult man, farmer from the Beka'a, 1998. 
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When I asked the local people who they would turn to if there should be a 
problem with the work of the INGO, most were confused and did not know what 
they would do. Many reported being intimidated about going to Beirut let alone 
walking into INGO or USAID offices to complain about an employee or the work 
of the organisation. This is doubly true for people who live in a village setting. No 
one wants to be seen as being responsible for losing any sort of help for the 
village. 
At this juncture, I would like to review several village case- studies in order 
to examine closely the question of accountability to the local people. The first 
village I would like to look at is Bkerzala. The men and women of Bkerzala 
contributed 30 percent of the total cost ($100,000-$150,000) for the sewage 
treatment facility project done by Mercy Corps International. 
Importantly, many local people were confused as to who was to be 
responsible for the project if something went wrong now or in the future when the 
INGO pulled out. It was clear from my interviews with a representative from the 
Ministry of Public Works that the government would not take responsibility if 
something should go wrong and that they would not work in villages where the 
INGOs were working. This makes for sort of a conundrum, because let's suppose 
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that in village A, an INGO is installing a sewage treatment facility and the 
villagers are paying 30% cash for the project, but in village B the government is 
doing the same project and the villagers are not paying because by all rights this 
is supposed to be something that a government does for its citizens; an 
entitlement. In the future, if the INGO sewage treatment facility should need 
maintenance, the government claims not to be responsible. Geoff Wood 
(1997: 81) asks an essential question: 
To what extent do citizens lose basic political rights if the delivery of 
universal services and entitlements is entrusted to non-state 
bodies, which would at best only be accountable to the state (or 
donors) rather than directly to those with service entitlements? 
To this he answers that the `principle of sub-contracting disperses both 
responsibility and the process of accountability' (ibid. : 83). 
In the case of the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) working in 
Zaoutar, the villagers, without exception, were furious at the way the organisation 
had handled its work. However, none of them had approached the INGO. There 
were different reasons for this reluctance. Some seemed to think that because it 
was a foreign organisation, although the field officer was Lebanese, that it was 
impossible for them to complain. Many villagers thought that it was the duty of 
the INGO to come to the village and talk to the local people so that they would be 
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better informed about what was going on. Many felt powerless to complain to the 
organisation, which was in actual fact giving away charity. They also felt 
intimidated by the factors of power that inevitably arise in any situation where 
people of a lower socio-economic status have to approach those they perceive 
as having a higher status. These factors are compounded in situations where 
people feel the urge to complain about powerful people that could affect their 
daily lives, especially when there are nuances of mismanagement involved. 
In the case of Oxfam, the head office in Oxford decided on short notice to 
close the Lebanon office without ensuring the continuation of their programmes 
and without conducting a final overall evaluation of their years of work in the 
country. The local staff requested that they should conduct an evaluation and the 
ongoing programmes should be supported, but to no avail. Importantly, the head 
office in the UK ordered that all documents, including all past evaluations be 
shredded. In essence, years of work and information were destroyed. Who is 
Oxfam accountable to? What happens to dedicated local staff, who had been 
working with an organisation for years but when the politics of the head office 
suddenly changed they found themselves out of a job? If Oxfam does not show 
accountability towards its staff members, then one could draw the conclusion that 
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this lack of accountability will be transferred to the men and women in rural 
areas, which it was. 
in the Shuf, the Pontifical Mission's patronage of a powerful Monsignor 
has left a very negative impression of the organisation with the local people. 
Although, they are pleased with the amount of work that has been done in their 
village by this organisation (and others), the way it was executed has caused 
bitterness and hostility towards the nephew of the Monsignor as well as the 
INGO. I asked one farmer if he had thought about complaining, and as it turned 
out he had gone to the Pontifical Mission's office, but once there failed to 
complain about the politics of the development in the village, because he wanted 
to apply for a small agricultural loan. They told him to go see Najib Adwan, the 
nephew of the Monsignor, and in the end his loan application was refused. He 
said that he regretted not saying anything, but that `talking about it' would have 
been worse for him, due to the power politics of the village and the need for 
wasta if something should happen to him or a member of his family. 
Current and former employees from World Vision heard that I was doing 
this work and several of them asked to speak with me. They were particularly 
distressed about the work of this organisation. Many said that there was very little 
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being done and one man said that he spent all of his time writing fake letters to 
child sponsors in Europe and North America. 
I am a liar, positively a liar. I used to write letters and cards saying that, `because 
of you this child will be able to eat figs, because of you he is going to school, 
probably the kid was in the street. I feel terrible for what I have done. And they all 
are doing it there. Keep this in mind, all of this is in the name of God. 43 
We used to call ourselves postmen. Big job right! Just getting letters from the 
kids and sending them. Wow! Development! `W 
We asked him why are you forcing us to do this? It takes too much time and it 
doesn't deliver enough money. The yearly budget for World Vision in Lebanon is 
no less than $1 million. It's the sponsor-a-child-programme. Each sponsor pays 
$250 per year that is supposed to go to the child, but this is not what happens. 
First the money goes to the International office, then to the Geneva office and 
then it gets to Lebanon, which ends up being less than $50 per child. Tuition fees 
in this country are 1,000,000 LL ($ 670 or £447). 45 
Another problem at this office seems to be the insistence on staff becoming 
"reborn" or "rebaptised". 
The staff has changed so much. Since 1984 at least 12 persons have gone and 
most of them forced by the executive director. Why? Because you get so long to 
convert and if you don't get rebaptised, then eventually you will find yourself out 
of a job. 46 
He had a problem with me. He told me it is difficult for you to work here because 
you are Catholic, and we are helping a lot of Catholics in Lebanon. He didn't like 
me, maybe because I am not baptised as a new born. 47 
43 G. M., adult man, former INGO field officer, 1999. 
44 J. N.: adult female, former INGO field officer, 1999. 
4-5 George: adult man, NGO field officer, 1998. 
46 Irene: adult female, INGO field officer, 1999. 
47 George: adult man, INGO field officer, 1998. 
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Obviously, this programme brings up serious questions of accountability. 48CHF 
and Creative Associates49 are organisations that have come to work in Lebanon 
as long as there is USAID money and then they will leave without looking back. 
Many of the villagers have contributed cash towards projects done by these two 
INGOs, and many of the farmers they are working with are from the poorest 
regions in the country. What kind of long-term accountability can these two 
organisations provide local people, who in many cases scraped together what 
little funds they had and in some cases borrowed money or had their children 
work to pay for the projects. If something should go wrong, who will worry about 
them? They call the local men and women, clients, in other words: customers. 
Customers should have some kind of guarantee or rights. But that is not the way 
they work. They turn the whole process around, by claiming that the people `own 
the project' because they paid for part of it with cash or labour. This relinquishes 
them of any responsibility once the project is completed. 
Moreover, if the villagers have a problem with the local field officer, which 
was the case in many villages, who do they speak to? How can they complain? 
48 The executive director has been replaced by World Vision, and hopefully this situation has 
been corrected. 
49 Creative Associates is not an NGO, but a for-profit company. 
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When an INGO hires the man who `owns the village' to oversee their projects, as 
in Wadi Khaled, there can be no higher reference for complaints. The project field 
officer is their only link to the organisation, for many the only one they are aware 
of, so all complaints-if someone has the courage to file one-will end up with 
the field officer, who is the limiting factor for all comments and feedback. 
The YMCA's canning programme on the surface seems like an 
achievement for women, however these types of programmes are notorious for 
failure since they must compete with dozens of international brands, many at 
cheaper prices. I myself saw rooms of boxes filled with jars of home-made jam 
waiting to be marketed by local women, who had very high hopes. Some women 
took their products to a city exhibit in Beirut and were not able to sell one single 
jar of their jam. The YMCA's programme objectives were short-term, did not 
include quality control, or a well-studied pre-manufacturing marketing plan. Who 
will be accountable to these women who will most likely not be able depend on a 
losing business? 
Save the Children's programme in the villages of Siddiquine and 
Recheknanay were considered to be very successful by the local men and 
women. However, they pointed out that eventually the INGO was going to pull 
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out and that this programme was supposed to be sustainable on its own. The 
majority of residents and participants felt that this programme would not be 
sustainable without Save's oversight, and they feared that the absence of the 
INGO would inevitably mean the end of the programme. 
Other than a few power brokers, INGOs were clearly not accountable to 
the local people. This could work as a safety net for local villages with powerful 
wasta. If something should go wrong, at least there is a hope that the INGO 
could be held accountable through the existing patron-client relationship. If a 
village has no one particularly powerful, then there is almost no accountability. 
The village in Bajaa' is a good example. The link to the INGO in this village is a 
school principal. He has a nice villa, separate from the village. However, his 
power is limited, as he has no strong contacts with the government or religious 
clerics. Therefore, Mercy Corps can try to force the locals to utilise agriculture 
land for the school, and they can also walk away from the village without doing 
the project with little or no concern that anyone powerful will object. This would 
be unthinkable in a village with a powerful patron. 
In summary, INGOs working in Lebanon are not accountable to local 
people, and in some cases seem to be accountable only to the donors. 
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Moreover, the entire mechanism is set up that way when a donor organisation 
repeatedly promotes the speed of implementation: 
Randolph and Stevenson believe that the key to USAID's success 
is the speed with which projects are implemented. "We can 
generally develop a project and complete it in a matter of three 
months". 50 
It should be little wonder why the INGOs do not feel accountable to the locals in 
this case. They simply do not have the time. Cost-effectiveness, rapid 
disbursement of funds and fast work on the ground upsets few and provides 
ample opportunities for public relations. INGOs must spend each tranche within 
the year, or they will not get funding the next year. Pressure to spend quickly 
forces these organisations to spread their human resources very thin, purchase 
capital equipment, typically from the donor's country of origin, and put as much 
funding as possible into infrastructure. 
Hulme and Edwards argue that accepting money from donors like USAID or 
others entail much more than simple accounting. It must be recognised that the 
influence of utilising such funds goes well beyond simple finance. The 
acceptance of increased volumes of financial aid involves entering into 
50 James Stevenson, quoted in the Daily Star, Friday, September 17,1999. 
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agreements about what is done, and how it is to be reported and accounted for 
(1997: 8). 
2. INGOs and Transparency 
> ýýý ýý ý I 
Reporter: Where does your funding come from? 
Head of NGO: God is the ultimate 'Donor' 
Related to accountability is transparency. The credibility of an organisation is 
greatly enhanced if its operational procedures are made visible and available. 
Due to the complex environment that INGOs function in, transparency is greatly 
missing and is needed in order for them to remain an integral part of the 
development process (Biggs and Neame 1996, Fowler 1996). 
In my work an interesting finding was that the organisations which were 
getting the bulk of their funding from USAID sources were in most cases more 
willing to speak to me and seemed to be much more transparent at least about 
the types of projects and their locations. They had no objections to my speaking 
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to local people, except for the initial objections of the YMCA. 51 Whereas 
organisations that were not funded by USAID were generally much less helpful. 
For instance, World Vision forbid my entering `their villages' unless I would agree 
to being accompanied at all times by a World Vision representative. Moreover, 
the director, Jean Bou Chebel refused to even disclose the areas where they 
were working. One World Vision ex-staff member said that: 
All of the people coming from World Vision abroad to evaluate or see the 
programme were even kept away from the office staff! We weren't allowed to 
speak to anyone coming to the office from abroad. He would keep them busy 
going to different projects. He was determined to keep us away. He had to do 
this so they wouldn't ask us any questions. 52 
The MCC field officer was steadfastly present during my preliminary 
interviews with the people that he took me to meet in the South, in spite of my 
repeatedly asking him to allow me to speak to people alone. 53 The director of 
Oxfam was not very forthcoming about their projects and did not even tell me that 
they were working in rural areas. I found out by chance in the field, and as it 
turned out Oxfam's programme was one of the most positive experiences in 
51 Initially the YMCA did not want me to enter "their villages" because of a fear that my presence, 
as an American, would somehow disrupt their projects. 
52 H. N.: adult man, INGO field officer, 1998. 
53 I returned to the villages where MCC was working that same week to conduct interviews with 
local people. 
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'development' for the local NGO and the men and women from Arsal. The 
exception for non-USAID sponsored INGOs was Save the Children, which was 
very transparent, helpful, and professional. The office at Save the Children was 
also distinct from the others. The field and office staff at Save the Children told 
me that the mission director, Rajan Gill had `created an atmosphere of respect 
and co-operation. ' Admittedly, the Save the Children staff seemed to transmit this 
way of working to their programmes in the field. As one respected and long time 
field officer said: 
The NGO person on the ground must have experience and solid skills in 
development. Honesty is important too, but you must remember that in the end of 
the day it all comes from the top. The head of the NGO will decide the overall 
policy on the ground. 54 
Though I was not particularly interested in the INGO's financial 
statements, of course the subject of funding did come up. Most executive 
directors saw this part of their work as a `no go' area, though some were quite 
forthcoming about how much money they received and how they had decided to 
spend their funds, especially those working with USAID. One regional director for 
a large British funding agency told me that she could not get the local Lebanese 
NGOs she was working with to disclose their full financial statements, even 
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though she threatened to 'cut off their funds'. There continues to be an 
atmosphere of sacredness regarding the financial management of INGOs in 
Lebanon. 
In a time of limited availability to international and national funds, many 
INGOs/NGOs are barely surviving. The competition for USAID funding in 
Lebanon was so intense that one INGO mission director who did not get the 
contract was severely criticised and nearly lost his job, and another director was 
dispatched to the United States for `retraining. ' 
Many of these organisations revolve around a charismatic and powerful 
person, usually male. Being asked to disclose potentially sensitive information 
and maintain transparent standards of implementation and evaluation are not 
welcomed by many INGO mission directors. Most of the INGOs working in 
Lebanon are without some sort of true philosophic mission. Moreover, many of 
these organisations are responses to market forces, political opportunism, and 
sub-contracting as detailed in Chapter One. 
54 Haytham Annan: adult man, INGO field officer, 1998. 
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I don't know what it is-whether it's just here in Lebanon-but people in these 
organisations here feel that it's their right to skim off of these projects. To take 
their share. Maybe it's something that we got from the Ottomans... tribute... but 
here everything is personal. It's all based on personal interests. Hardly anyone 
cares about doing any real good. I have worked for a lot of organisations here 
and it happens in all of them. This should be exposed. And the heads of the 
organisations know what is happening. 55 
Many people here are hired knowing that they are corrupt. Here. . . you 
just say 
someone's name and it's known. They take [money]. But they are hired again 
and again! They move from one organisation to the next. And USAID knows too! 
I mean these people are known for corruption and USAID supports them. 56 
3. Evaluations 
Evaluating INGO development work continues to be a `difficult problem' (Moore 
and Stewart 1998). Whether evaluations constitute a `possible deterrent to 
sustainability', however, is debatable (Uphoff 1996: 31). One of the difficulties in 
evaluating the work of INGOs lies specifically within the way they work. Much of 
their work is trial and error and many of the benefits intangible and immeasurable 
quantitatively (Moore and Stewart 1998). Moreover, evaluations of INGO projects 
are almost solely conducted by the INGOS themselves, which can be interpreted 
as being non-participatory (Shah and Shah 1996). 57 
55 L. M. adult female, long-time INGO field officer, 1999. 
56 H. A.: INGO field officer, 1999. 
57 See the web site: www. mande. co. uk/news. htm for up-to-date news and information concerning 
monitoring and evaluation in development, 
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The evaluations that I was able to review covering USAID sponsored 
projects were quantitative and speculative. If one looks at an actual evaluation 
sheet from an INGO working with USAID (see appendix), one will notice that the 
evaluations are based on a cost-benefit analysis and are geared towards a 
quantitative record of projects and programmes. Moreover, the numbers listed in 
the activity progress report are based on potential beneficiaries instead of the 
actual number of local men, women and children who will benefit from a certain 
project. For example, a school built in the village of Tleil (Tlayl) claims that the 
number of benefiting students are 260, however this is not factual because many 
of the local families will not be sending their children to this school due to the fact 
that they do not have a good standard of teachers. It also claims that the 
community participation for this project amounts to 40,000 persons. This number 
is actually an extrapolation of the entire region. The population of the village of 
Tleil (Tlayl) where the school was built is approximately 2,000 residents only. 
The evaluations that are not performed by INGOs themselves are rare. In 
an interview with an independent evaluation consultant, who regularly does ad 
hoc evaluations for the UNDP, World Bank and USAID, I was told that he 
verbally tells them the truth, however his written evaluations are based on 
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quantitative cost-benefit analysis and reflect these organisations' expectations. 
When I asked him why he does this, he replied that he has a family to support 
and if he writes the truth he will not be hired for this type of work by any 
organisation. He also said that on many occasions the organisations have 
changed his numbers so that they are more appealing to the head offices in New 
York and Washington D. C. 58 
In instances where the USAID mission director visits project sites in an 
attempt to `evaluate', he must go under heavy military protection and basically 
walks through villages like a tourist, mostly getting information from the project 
field officer and the INGO mission director. Many local people told me that the 
American convoy created a sense of fear and made them feel like terrorists 
instead of people. 
} 
.y 
58 1 was asked to close my notebook and to put my pen aside during this interview. 
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Hooray, aid is here!!! Order.. . order! 
4. Local People and Participation 
Since participation is deemed to be the NGOs way of being accountable to its 
clients, the sham of participation translates into the sham of accountability. 59 
John Cohen and Norman Uphoff (1977: 6; 106) suggest that participation requires 
more than local people agreeing to do what the organisation wants them to do: 
People's involvement in decision-making processes about what would be done 
and how; their involvement in implementing programs and decisions by 
contributing various resources for cooperating in specific organizations or 
activities; their sharing in the benefits of development programs; and/or their 
involvement in efforts to evaluate such programs. 
As stated above an important component of the new development agenda' is the 
concept of `good governance', and participation is an essential element of `good 
governance'. Greater emphasis on the importance of participation by local people 
in projects springs from the claim that broader citizen involvement in managing 
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their own affairs and taking responsibility for their own lives and for `their projects' 
is essential for democracy. 
The important thing is that no matter how much money we put into a project, at 
the end of the day, because the villagers contributed their own money, their own 
sweat and blood, it's their own. 60 
During my fieldwork, I frequently heard personnel from USAID and USAID 
funded INGOs express this kind of belief. However, I saw no evidence during the 
fieldwork that beneficiaries of projects were more or less committed to those 
projects depending on their own contributions to them. Hard work was clearly a 
feature of most people's daily lives and there was a high level of recognition that 
maintenance of projects required a necessary input from the intended 
beneficiaries. 61 
59 Najam (1996: 346) 
60 Robert Randolph; quoted in the Daily Star, Friday, September 17,1999. 
61 There is a danger inherent in the new development agenda in that it may be interpreted to 
assume that local people are somehow irresponsible or lazy, and that they have to be "taught" to 
hold the same norms of hard work as are supposedly held in the developed world. 
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The following is the aid program: 
From 8 to 10 a. m. we have a lecture on the definition of aid... 
from 10 to 10: 20 a. m. we have distribution of aid... 
from 10: 20 to 4 P. M. we have siesta... 
from 4 to 4: 20 we have distribution of aid... again ... 
then we have a thank-you speech from the 
representative of the poor locals. 
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God, they are acting as if they have not seen food for a while! 
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One of the democratic `good governance' requirements for USAID funded 
INGOs was that they had to establish a committee until there was a functioning 
municipality. Most of the INGOs, with the exception of Creative Associates, 
started working prior to the municipal elections, which were held in 1998/1999. 
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Following the elections, the committee was to be dissolved and then the INGO 
would work with the elected municipal officials. In a few cases, the INGOs 
maintained relationships with both the committee and the municipality. In some 
villages, because of size and/or politics no municipal elections were held. 
Typically, the committees were formed by the key people in the village. The 
INGO representative would go to the key person, tell him to form a committee 
and to include two women because USAID requires it. The whole process was 
quite perfunctory. In the case of MCC, the field representative went to the key 
person in the village and worked with him exclusively. Oxfam co-operated with 
the local grassroots organisation, which seemed to have worked quite well in that 
particular area. Save the Children worked with local male and mostly female 
volunteers. 62 
USAID required that there must be a minimum of two women per 
committee, however, following municipal elections the INGOs were to work with 
the municipality instead of the committee, consequently in most of the villages I 
visited no females were elected and there were no females involved thereafter. 63 
62 Incidentally, the local school principal in Siddiquine was a little put off about Save the 
Children's programme, because his involvement was not substantial. He said "It's a good 
programme, but they prefer to work with women. " 
Note that in most cases women's involvement in the committees was not significant. 
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Some men and women felt that the committees were more fair and a little more 
representative, as elections in Lebanon are governed by patronage and 
increasingly by appointment. Most people do not even have the opportunity to 
run for election, especially women. 
Elections in Lebanon. Ha! Even if someone here wins 200,000 votes 
he won't get his seat. People are appointed in Lebanon not elected. 64 
An interesting point made by the local people was that the idea of working 
in committees or groups was not new to them. They routinely work together as a 
community. In the end, this idea of `democratising' local people by establishing 
committees has more to do with the INGO and donor organisations changing 
their methods of working and not educating local people on the need for 
community based work with shared responsibility. This is what they do anyway. 
The only novelty may be the insistence on women taking part in the committee, 
which was really a chimera. 
64 Interview in Laboueh 
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5. Women's Level of Participation in Development Programmes 
If gender is the most important element in these development programmes then 
where are the women? Serving tea, the Mukhtar replied- August 1998. 
All of the INGOs with the exception of the Pontifical Mission stated that one of 
their highest priorities was to include women in almost every aspect of their 
project or programme. The only INGO that followed through with this claim was 
Save the Children. Other than the latter, Oxfam and the YMCA, both made 
serious attempts to involve women in their programmes. However, the other four 
INGOs were sadly lacking in this respect. 
Ah... women. They are involved. They provide encouragement. Women make the 
coffee and take it to the men working on the school, and in that way, they feel 
that they are involved. 65 
Women do women's things, like sewing. Men do men's things, like a road or 
building something. This is the way it is. 66 
Following an interview with an INGO director, a female employee started 
slightly complaining about the way in which women were chosen to get loans in 
the INGO's micro-finance programme, which was funded by USAID. As the 
formal interview was over and the tape recorder was not running, it was assumed 
65 Muktar; he was the INGO link person. 
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that 'we could really talk'. She said, `Tell her how the women were chosen, tell 
her! ' He started laughing and said, 'Oh come on, you make a big deal out of 
everything. ' She laughed nervously and told me that, `They decided who got 
loans based on their looks! ' The women were made to stand in front of the INGO 
(all male) employees and present their ideas for 'income generation' projects. 
The women then received loans according to `their beauty and their bodies. '67 
The mission director was not phased at all. He laughed and joked and said that `it 
was a good way to choose'. 68 
Out of seven committee meetings that I attended, four of them had no 
women, and in two of them the women committee members were serving soft 
drinks and tea and rarely injected a single word. Typically the women were wives 
of the 'real' committee members. Comments like the ones stated below are too 
numerous to detail: 
Until now, no we women have not been spoken to or asked about anything. 
Maybe they are not interested in involving women in these projects. 69 
No. No. Women are not a part of these projects, these are male projects. 7° 
66 Ali: married, adult man, farmer, Akkar, 1998. 
67 This woman later left the INGO. 
68 A. K. M.: married, adult man, mission director for an INGO, 1999. 
69 Mohammad: adult man, farmer from Wadi Khaled, 1998. 
70 Samira: married, adult woman, farmer/housewife, from the Akkar, 1998. 
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There is a prevalent idea that women somehow should be sewing clothes, carpet 
weaving or canning food to sell in shops in order to be considered `part of the 
projects'. One INGO mission director told me that he was `going to set-up a 
secretarial training centre' in the Ba'albek-Hermel area, because `you know you 
just can't find good secretaries in Beirut! ' The majority of the women I spoke to 
were farmers. They maintained subsistence plots and worked in cash crop 
production as well. Women's labour is crucial in the growing, harvesting and 
drying of tobacco. They do most of the time-consuming and physically 
demanding labour involved in tobacco production. They need a mechanism, 
which will save them time in stringing tobacco. The MCC field officer brought 
such a machine from Greece, but found that it did not work because the leaves in 
Lebanon are smaller than the tobacco leaves in Greece. However, with a little bit 
of ingenuity and money, a similar machine could be constructed here and utilised 
by thousands of families working in tobacco. The sad truth is that the main 
obstacle to the inception of such a scheme is the fact that this work is women's 
work, and that basically there is no will to work for change. 
Many women wanted to learn new skills in agriculture and they also 
wanted to learn new skills that they could use to help their families financially. 
345 
Men and women complained about the same things. The political and socio- 
economic situation affected the entire family. It is important to state at this time 
that in nearly all of my interviews including group interviews, where men and 
women were present together, the women were very vocal and knowledgeable 
concerning how the local, national, regional and international political economy 
affected their lives. Many women, some illiterate, spoke with such incredible 
wisdom and insight. I could not help thinking throughout my fieldwork what a 
shame and waste of knowledge it was not to include these women, who are more 
than 50 per cent of the population in Lebanon, in discussions concerning their 
needs and priorities. They knew exactly what they needed and could have easily 
vocalised these needs to anyone who had bothered to ask. 
Moreover, there are a large number of women-headed households in the 
rural areas. This is overwhelmingly due to male migration, usually to Beirut, for 
work. Many of these women do all of the planting, harvesting and selling of their 
produce whilst maintaining their homes and taking care of their children. I met an 
incredible woman in Arsal, who had single-handedly built the second storey of 
her house by hauling cement blocks on her back. That was in her `spare' time as 
she had three children at home and farmed a number of crops, including cash 
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crops. Her husband has been away for years working in Beirut and returns to the 
village whenever he is able, which is again a very familiar story in rural areas. 
The Save the Children programme in the South, which was dedicated to 
young children's personality development, and depended primarily on the 
involvement of women as volunteer teachers and organisers, was particularly 
approved of and encouraged of by both women and men living in Rechananay 
and Siddiquine. Many stated that this programme was more important to them 
than infrastructure development projects, though their houses all had gaping 
holes, because their children had suffered so much due the atrocities of war71 
Although many of these organisations professed to be interested in 
women's participation, the serious involvement of women in these INGO projects 
was almost non-existent. 
6. 'Whatever happened to poverty alleviation? '72 
From the beginning it was obvious that the villages which the INGOs were 
working in, for the most part, were places where the INGOs had already had 
relationships, some of them long-standing. Additionally, many of the villages, 
71 According to a prominent physician working in the area, most of these children are suffering 
from post-traumatic stress disorder in variable degrees. 
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which were considered to be influential, received the bulk of development aid. 
Villages or areas home to current MPs or ex-MPs, wealthy landlords or large 
land-owners and powerful tribes, important and influential confessional leaders 
were the prime villages of choice. Another significant category of villages was 
those that were either the village where the field officer or other staff members 
were from, or a village in the near vicinity. 
As other analysts have pointed out the poorest villages often receive little 
or no benefit from NGOs working in development. (Tendier 1982,1989; 
Chambers 1983; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Weisgrau 1997) My fieldwork 
confirmed these findings. As part of my project, I travelled to villages not far from 
those where INGOs were working to assess the situation. In all cases the villages 
that I visited where the INGOs were not working were much worse off than the 
villages where they were working. Hosniye, one of the poorest villages in the 
Akkar region, is only 500 metres from Bkerzala, where several organisations 
have worked for decades. Hosniye is one of the few villages in Lebanon where it 
is typical to see children without footwear, even plastic footwear, which is pretty 
much the norm in rural areas here. This is a sizeable village without water, 
72 See Judith Tendier 1989. 
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sanitation, and electricity. There is no school, though many of the children walk to 
the school in Bkerzala, if they go to school at all. When we spoke to the local 
people about the situation in their village, they told us that there was a lot of clan 
fighting and that even the municipality had collapsed because the families did not 
agree on the outcome of the elections. They told us that INGOs would not work 
there because the `villagers were too poor'. If any village needed help in `good 
governance' then probably this village would have been an ideal place to start. 
The fact is a true programme of 'good governance' requires time, energy and 
professionalism. It takes dedication and accountability on the part of the INGO. 
They simply do not have the skills, time or motivation to do this kind of work. 
Claims towards working with the poorest of the poor or working for democratic 
change seem hollow. 
In other `projectless' villages that I visited, the men and women stated that 
poverty and powerlessness could be the only reasons that they were not getting 
any help. Local men and women perceived that they were at a disadvantage for 
development aid because they did not have the financial or political resources to 
attract aid organisations to their villages. They expressed frustration at this and 
their predicament. It was widely understood among the locals that unless they 
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were able to get some wasta, someone influential to speak for them, then the 
chance of seeing an INGO in their village was highly unlikely. 
This fact belies the rhetoric that comes out of the INGOs and especially 
the organisations working with USAID. They continually speak about reaching 
the poorest villages in Lebanon, however this is simply not true. They do reach 
some very poor villages, but definitely not the poorest. The poorest villages have 
little to offer the INGOs in return for their work, except possible opportunities for 
public relations. Besides, the time factor is crucial with organisations working with 
USAID funding, and the INGOs do not have the capacity to devote precious 
labour time to villages where there is a lack of political organisation or clan 
infighting. Moreover, the poorest villages typically do not have the 30 per cent 
cash or kind to invest in the project. Most are day labourers and do not own land. 
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D. Chapter Summary: Beneficiaries-between the State and INGOs 
These INGOs are a relief to us, but they don't take the place of the 
government. 73 
No organisation can take the place of the government. 74 
This chapter explored many of the various obstacles, constraints and factors that 
influence the multiple relationships, which constitute the essence of the 
development apparatus. The Lebanese State; notoriously weak, bureaucratic 
and based on patron-client practices impedes INGO development work, 
according to personnel from these organisations. INGOs tend to avoid the 
various government offices and ministries, and usually 'go straight to the top' if 
they need or desire clearance and/or consultation. This is clearly a political 
choice that has far reaching implications for the evolution of collaborative 
relationships with these organisations. 
Moreover, though the Lebanese government is extremely bureaucratic, 
paternalistic and difficult to deal with, setting up authentic partnerships with 
government personnel in the Ministries of Agriculture or agriculture extension and 
research centres, the Ministry of Public Works, Electricity and Water and the 
Ministry of Environment for example could have substantial positive 
73 Ali: married adult man, farmer from the South, 1999. 
74 Nadia: married adult woman, farmer/housewife from the Akkar, 1998. 
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repercussions for future planning and field projects. The sharing of information 
and lessons learned is essential so that precious resources (time and money) are 
not wasted. 
My fieldwork made it very clear that what the farmers of Lebanon really 
want is a well-managed, responsible and strong state that is interested in the 
future direction of the country in general and rural areas in particular. I am not 
suggesting that the work of the INGOs is not helpful, in many cases it is. It is just 
that there exists a patchwork of development projects and practices that do not 
necessarily contribute to the overall development of the country or its citizens. 
The complication with this is that for the most part total solutions to the 
predicament of the farmers require state intervention. These are massive 
problems requiring political will from the executive of the government of Lebanon. 
The people I spoke to usually did appreciate the work of the INGOs, but they 
expressed an overwhelming desire for government intervention. INGOs do not 
have the capacity to solve their problems comprehensively. INGOs can build 
agriculture roads, install water pipes, repair an irrigation network, or in rare cases 
even build a school. However, they cannot ensure that there will be qualified 
teachers to teach in the school, nor guarantee that water will flow through the 
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pipes or irrigation networks, nor ensure that the locals will find decent paid 
employment following training programmes. The often-asked question 
concerning plumber training courses75 was: `Okay now we have ten plumbers in 
the village and none of them work. What now? Anyway, we are farmers! ' 
Other pressures on the ground, like Syria, Israel and the political parties; 
Hizbullah and Amal are at the very least important considerations and at the 
most considerable obstacles to the development work of INGOs. The ongoing 
violence in the South, the agendas of the parties and the ubiquitous presence 
and influence of Syria in the Ba'albek/Hermel and Akkar regions force INGOs to 
`bargain their place' within the myriad of players in Lebanon's rural regions. Any 
one of these actors could potentially forbid an INGO from working in an area or 
cause their work to be halted at any time, according to their whims and wishes. 
The system of confessional `balanced' development costs the INGOs time, 
money and resources that could be invested into villages where needs are 
significantly acute. INGQs seem to participate willingly in this deficient balancing 
act. The opportunities for possible ties to religious and/or political patrons are 
typically the attraction. 
75 Training courses were mostly conducted by the YMCA. 
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Donor agendas are an additional consideration for INGOs working in rural 
areas of Lebanon. In order to secure funds for the survival of the organisation, 
donor agendas have to be adopted to a certain extent. The level of dependence 
on government aid, especially USAID, was extremely high for the organisations 
that I looked at in my fieldwork. Some of the INGOs came to or remained in 
Lebanon specifically because of USAID money. In nearly all cases, those INGOs 
getting funds from USAID were working as sub-contractors or PSCs. They were 
INGOs geared more to serving as non-profit market-oriented businesses working 
for public purposes. A social mission was clearly lacking from most of the 
organisation's development objective in rural areas of Lebanon. Only Save the 
Children, Mercy Corps in the villages of Tleil and Ghaitla and Oxfam UK 
demonstrated any sort of social mission. 
The only reason that Mercy Corps was included above is due to the work 
of one of their field officers. Field officers play a significant role in the overall 
success or failure of development projects. These people are usually the only link 
that local men and women have to the organisation in Beirut. Field officers can 
exert enormous influence in the field, especially if they are from the village or 
region that they are working in. Several field officers who were working with 
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USAID sponsored INGOs were elected as local municipality officials. USAID 
viewed this as a positive occurrence, however many observers voiced 
reservations and felt that these people had used their positions as `distributors of 
aid' to get elected. 
In terms of transparency and accountability, INGOs working with USAID 
appeared to be more transparent concerning their projects and programmes. 
None of the INGOs demonstrated high degrees of accountability according to 
local men and women, government personnel and INGO staff members 
themselves. Accountability was usually linked to the main donor and the 
existence of a powerful patron. 
Levels of community participation in development schemes varied. Some 
INGOs working with USAID tried to make an effort to include locals in needs 
assessment and project supervision, however many men and women did not feel 
that their needs had truly been assessed and implemented. Women's 
participation was almost non-existent, except for the programmes of the YMCA 
and Save the Children, and to a lesser extent Oxfam UK. 
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Finally the poorest villages received little or no help at all. This finding 
confirms others found all over the world and goes against INGO rhetoric of 
reaching the `poorest of the poor'. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the last two decades, the international development apparatus 
has been empowered by neo-liberal policy that has called for `rolling back the 
state. ' Juxtaposed to this policy have been concomitant calls from donors for 
NGOs-which it has been claimed are flexible, advocates for the poor, cost- 
effective, and innovative-to have a larger share of development responsibilities 
in developing countries. This is an internationally driven social system in which 
NGOs find themselves ever increasingly dependent on donor resources. 
In Lebanon, INGOs have gone from initially assisting the state in providing 
welfare and acting as safety nets for people who were not able to secure their 
own social services, to providing relief and supplies during a long, and 
destructive war. Today, in post-war Lebanon, INGOs are in a transitional phase 
in which they are attempting to transform themselves from relief distributors to 
full-scale development organisations. 
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A. The INGO Working Environment 
Lebanon is the smallest of the near-eastern countries lying at the eastern edge of 
the Mediterranean Sea. It is a multi-communal state made up of many ethnic and 
religious groups. Since its independence from France in 1943, Lebanon has 
witnessed numerous internal and regional conflicts that many times have turned 
violent. The culture is marked by persisting primary, familial, and religious 
identities. Lebanon's state is a weak one, with a high penetration of patron-client 
relationships. The clientelist system in Lebanon, a legacy leftover from the 19th 
century and even before, displays one constant theme in the evolving Lebanese 
political system; the presence of the patron who plays a fundamental role in 
mediating between the centre and periphery. Most of the political events that 
shaped the socio-economic foundation of Lebanon have contributed to and 
reinforced the concept of confessionalism and the practice of patronage, instead 
of building an institutionalised and unified system. 
Lebanon's laissez-faire market economy was created to support mainly 
the tertiary sector usually at the expense of the industrial and agricultural ones. 
The predisposition towards the near singular promotion and development of 
services, banking and tourism explains to a great extent why other sectors, 
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especially agriculture, remain weak and under-productive today. A Migdalian 
weak state with a market economy was consciously created and solidified in 
order to provide autonomy for the various confessional groups. Importantly, the 
demonstrated ability to make short-term profits from the laissez-faire economy 
was used to lure possible detractors into the confessional state arrangement. 
The precariousness of this system and its extreme vulnerability to the Middle 
East crisis has fuelled Lebanon's successive and violent internecine conflicts. 
Keeping this socio-economic and geo-political background in mind, I 
attempted to address a central and compound research question: Do specific, 
selected INGO programmes in rural Lebanon produce the desired results stated 
by their personnel, programme outlines and mission statements; and to what 
extent do their projects and programmes meet needs and expectations of local 
men and women who are the intended beneficiaries? 
In order to answer the question above, more than 400 interviews were 
conducted with local beneficiaries, INGO mission heads and field workers, 
Lebanese government representatives, and other individuals from institutions 
and organisations working in rural development in Lebanon. The bulk of the 
interviews, however, were conducted with local men and women. This study 
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focussed on the work of seven INGOs working in Lebanon: Mercy Corps 
International, Save the Children Federation (SCF), The Mennonite Central 
Committee (MCC), The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), The 
Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), Oxfam UK, and The Pontifical Mission 
(PM). The decision to look at these particular INGOs was based on the fact that 
they were working in rural development in Lebanon at the time of the study, and 
that they agreed to participate. Four of the seven INGOs examined received 
funds from USAID through the $60 million Rural Development Cluster 
development programme, which was part of their larger Reconstruction and 
Expanded Economic Opportunity programme. 
The methodology utilised in the field included semi-structured individual 
interview techniques and group interviews using both open and closed-ended 
questions. The decision to utilise semi-structured interviews for my fieldwork was 
based on positive previous fieldwork in Lebanon using this method. 
The study was conducted in various regions and focussed on five 
important agricultural areas in Lebanon: the Akkar, Ba'albek/Hermel, Hasbaya, 
the South (al Jnoub) and the Shuf. These regions were chosen because they 
represented rural areas where the selected INGOs were working, and each 
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region displayed a particular set of circumstances that impacted the work of 
these organisations. 1 
The Akkar, historically neglected and far from the centre, still maintains 
somewhat `traditional' landlord arrangements in its political economy. Its 
nearness to Syria provides an essential outlet for impoverished farmers who 
need to purchase less expensive food, medical care and other important 
resources. However, the steady inward flow of cheaper Syrian agricultural 
products destroys the Lebanese market. Moreover, due to a lack of control from 
the Lebanese central government, Syria is able to exert a tremendous amount of 
influence in the everyday political and socio-economic affairs of the people living 
in this region. 
The Ba'albek/Hermel region, long known for its hashish and opium 
production, is undergoing a dramatic transformation in its local political economy. 
The forced cessation of hashish cultivation without a concomitant replacement 
crop has left the majority of men and women in this region destitute, and some 
on the verge of starvation. Moreover, like the Akkar, many landlord arrangements 
remain in place and the nearness to Syria provides both opportunities and 
1 Please note that my fieldwork took place during the period of Israeli occupation. 
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obstacles. On one hand, the locals living in this area are able to purchase 
inexpensive Syrian goods and services to avoid absolute destitution. On the 
other hand, like in the Akkar, the massive influx of cheaper Syrian produce 
greatly reduces profits for local Lebanese agricultural producers. The pervasive 
presence of Syrian soldiers and secret service in the Ba'albek/Hermel region 
creates a tense atmosphere and disturbs the political organisation of this region. 
Additionally, this area is home to two important political parties/militias; Hizbullah 
and Amal, both of which are confessionally Shi'ite, at war with Israel, and have a 
commanding influence on most aspects of everyday life. The presence of these 
parties and other players produces a situation in which locals must negotiate 
their way through a web of alliances and powerful individuals in order to achieve 
a minimal semblance of a livelihood. 
Hasbaya, an area long known for its olive production, is cut-off from its 
administrative centre by Israeli occupation which has forced many of the locals to 
leave the area and their crops behind, thus creating ghost towns where once 
thriving village communities existed. 
The South has known almost nothing but war for the past 20 years. The 
Israeli occupation and ongoing war had forced many residents of the South to 
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flee to Beirut and its surrounding suburbs, putting additional pressure on the 
capital's insufficient resources. The activities of the two main political 
parties/militias in this region- Hizbullah and Amal- are mostly unwelcome to 
the local men and women that I spoke to living in rural areas due to their ongoing 
guerrilla operations and concurrent Israeli attacks and retributions. Moreover, like 
the Akkar and the Ba'albek/Hermel regions, some landlord arrangements persist, 
though the omnipotent power of most of these large ruling families has collapsed. 
It has been replaced by the ascendancy of Amal leader and now Speaker of the 
House, Nabih Berri. 
The Shuf was the site of hideous Druze/Christian massacres and the 
subsequent mass exodus of Christian communities from the region. The Shuf lies 
under the direct jurisdiction of Walid Jumbiatt; a Druze notable, leader of the 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), parliament member, and opposition leader. 
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B. Research Findings 
My research shows that longstanding inadequate state development 
programmes have impeded rural development in Lebanon. This factor has been 
reinforced by current reductions in agricultural funding, lack of co-ordination 
between the FAO, INGOs, local NGOs, other international organisations and 
institutions working in rural development, as well as various state bodies, 
including the Ministry of Agriculture. The lack of planning in addition to 
insufficient funding serve to exacerbate the hardship experienced by local men 
and women, who live far from the centre, Beirut. 
In Lebanon, as in many developing countries, there is a considerable 
waste of resources due to the duplication of work, absence of co-ordination, and 
corruption. In my fieldwork, nearly all of the local men and women that I spoke to 
complained about the insufficiency of basic needs; including lack of water 
resources for household and farm use, sewage treatment, electricity, medical 
facilities, public education for their children, agricultural inputs and training, and 
help in marketing their produce. I was repeatedly told that for the most part they 
provide many of these basic necessities for themselves. 
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In addition, my fieldwork showed that a healthy INGO-State relationship is 
lacking in Lebanon. INGOs do interface with the government, but mostly on a 
patron-client basis. Utilising patronage or wasta in the field helps to facilitate 
projects and programmes, whilst building relationships with influential people who 
could be helpful for future endeavours. This patron-client relationship is also 
manifest in confessional or `balanced' development, where some villages may 
get development help, not because they are necessarily needy, but because the 
INGO must satisfy confessional patrons, many of whom are also government 
officials. 
This concept of "balanced development", originally initiated by the state in 
order to satisfy confessional groups, was also adopted by the INGOs in order to 
maintain a facade of non-sectarianism. Along the same line, the poorest villages 
get very little or no development aid at all. In all of the `projectless' villages that I 
visited, which were near sites where INGOs were working, locals told me that 
INGOs would not work in their villages because they were too poor and 
powerless with no influential patron to attract these organisations. 
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Though the men and women living in rural areas of Lebanon appreciated 
the work of these INGOs, they desperately want a well-managed, responsible 
and unified state, which would be capable of developing their areas in a 
comprehensive way, instead of the patchwork development projects that they 
currently experience with INGOs. 
Donor agendas, especially those like USAID, which stress speed, 
efficiency and measure projects along the lines of quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis increase INGO personnel's reliance on patrons, who can facilitate their 
work. In my study, I observed that the INGOs working with USAID were for the 
most part functioning as PSCs. They were contracted businesses, which were 
accountable to the contractor--USAID. These INGOs were not value-driven and 
played almost no role as advocates for local men and women. The organisations 
did not exhibit accountability to local men and women nor to the corresponding 
state ministries (e. g. the Ministry of Agriculture). For the most part, the INGOs 
appeared to be accountable to powerful patrons in and outside the government 
and to donors as well. 
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The INGOS that I looked at which were working with USAID were to a 
certain extent more transparent than the INGOs not getting funding from this 
official aid source, especially when it came to facilitating my research project. 
This is due to the fact that USAID maintains an office in Lebanon, and its officials 
demanded transparency as a prerequisite to garner their funds. It came out 
during my fieldwork in interviews with other donor representatives that many 
NGOs in Lebanon are notorious for a lack of transparency, and this was seen as 
a persistent and destructive obstacle for foreign funding organisations. 
Evaluations, if conducted, were quantitative and speculative and appeared to be 
done in order to satisfy the needs of accounting departments. 
When looking at levels of participation, all of the selected INGOs-with the 
exception of one-claimed to include women in almost every aspect of their 
projects or programmes, only two of them made a serious effort. For the rest, 
women were simply not a part of their projects. Many of the women I spoke to 
complained that they had simply never been spoken to, and that they would have 
liked the opportunity to be included. 
367 
To sum up, according to the local men and women living in rural areas of 
Lebanon that I spoke to, the INGO programmes and projects that were a part of 
my study did not satisfy their most pressing development needs for a number of 
reasons; however, due to the near absence of state-led development, they were 
forced to be reliant on a combination of rare, if any, state programmes, INGO and 
local NGO programmes, local political agents (political parties, warlords, 
landlords, local strong-men, confessional leaders and power-brokers) for what 
scant developmental assistance they did get. The result is uncoordinated and 
sporadic development projects, many of which fail to reach their targeted 
clientele due to bureaucracy, corruption, lack of co-ordination and resources, the 
internal agendas of the providers themselves, the impact of international political 
demands/actions, and a fragmented and weak state. 
E. Future Research 
This research has broader implications for the study of INGOs working in 
development, state-society relations as well as for understanding the processes 
and relationships involved in sustainable development and local, regional and 
global political change. This analysis suggests enhanced possibilities for building 
368 
partnerships, co-ordination and co-operation within the context of a weak state. 
This study, of course, has focused on the case of Lebanon during a specific time 
period, and thus it is impossible to draw definite conclusions about the dynamics 
of how INGOs, donors, states, local citizens, and others shape the outcome and 
sustainability of the development process. The implications for countries, such as 
Jordan, Syria, Egypt and the West Bank and Gaza within the Middle East provide 
a basis for further scholarship and empirical research, especially as these 
countries witness the growth and emergence of groups from within and from 
outside of society addressing issues of poverty, environmental degradation, and 
human rights and open their borders to assistance from international donors who 
may seek to pursue several objectives, which may include among others regional 
security or even political and economic liberalisation. 
This study raises questions about the processes strengthening the 
relationships between all of the players involved in the development apparatus, 
and for the donor's role in promoting this process. 
Moreover, this work points to the importance of the international 
dimension in supporting local development and strengthening the links that could 
help to rebuild states and societies destroyed by war and made bankrupt through 
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corrupt practices. The international dimension and connection has not been a 
sufficient condition for reform in Lebanon, but it has contributed somewhat to the 
betterment of local men and women's lives. International financial, material and 
moral support is essential in the continued advancement of countries in the 
developing world. 
Lastly, it is my hope that the lives of men and women living in rural areas 
of Lebanon, as well as other developing countries, will somehow improve-even 
slightly-and that the spirit of human co-operation and partnership will prevail. 
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APPENDIX 
Laws regarding voluntary associations in Lebanon 
The 1909 Law of Associations applied to both non-political and political 
associations. It guaranteed the right of association and required only that the 
association notify the government of its by-laws and establishment. The basic 
principles of the laws governing civil associations did not change following 
independence, though some modifications did take place. However, because of 
the current regime's controversial interpretation and application of laws relating to 
the civil society many changes are now beginning to take place. for example, the 
Ministry of Interior, in violation of the law, has stated that new associations 
require a permit from the Ministry. The law on associations requires only that the 
association merely notify the Ministry of their existence. There are currently about 
1,100 associations registered at the Ministry of Interior. 
Stages in the development of associations 
(Adapted from Salam 1997: 29-31) 
During the period between 1900 and the 1930's, the first phase in the 
development of organised associations emerged. This time period was 
characterised by their rapid growth and legalisation. Several significant 
developments distinguished this period: 
" Rural Christian migrants formed co-operative family associations to 
consolidate their position in the capital; 
" Shi'ite emigrants from the south formed associations based on their villages 
and regions of origin; 
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" Armenian refugees fleeing the genocide established ethnic Armenian 
associations to protect and promote their interests; 
" The Sunni, Greek Orthodox, and Druze communities indigenous to Beirut 
established associations to deal with problems of youth, adolescence, and 
changing moral values in a modernising city; 
" Non-confessional associations were established to care for the blind; 
"A number of associations emerges to protect embattled handicraft artisans 
against the increasing spread of manufactured products; 
" Syndicates and labour unions began organising. 
The 1940s and 1950s marked the second stage in the development of 
associations. The most significant changes during this time were: 
" The birth of sectarian association. The different religious groups responded to 
Lebanon's independence, and the ensuing mix of communities in Beirut, by 
establishing associations to socialise and control members of their 
community; 
" The emergence of strong neighbourhood leagues. These were established to 
maintain solidarity among city dwellers, both as newcomers flooded into 
Beirut and as city dwellers moved from one neighbourhood to another; 
" The development of strong Sunni family associations. This resulted from the 
erosion of the authority of the traditional Sunni families and the rise of other 
families which sought to socialise and organise a new following; 
" The growth of more social welfare associations as the problems of rapid 
urbanisation multiplied; 
" The establishment in 1947 of the first organised women's association-the 
League of Women's Rights; 
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" The establishment of numerous cultural associations. These were formed by 
poets, writers, university graduates, etc... 
The third stage of development occurred sometime between 1960 and the break 
of war in 1975. It is during this period that the establishment of non-sectarian 
associations was most vigorous: 
" Labour unions emerged to play a strong role in the economic and political life; 
"A number of leftist political parties and movements gained prominence; 
9 Numerous professional associations were founded; 
" Unions and political parties, often on the left, became more influential among 
the Shiite residents of the city. This reduced the influence of traditional village 
and regional associations. 
The fourth stage took place during the years of war, 1975-1990, and was 
characterised by: 
" The decline of non-confessional associations as Lebanon split along 
confessional lines; 
" The revival of family and neighbourhood associations as the state's power 
was severely reduced; 
" The emergence of several Islamist groups - Hizbullah, the Ahbash, the 
Jama'a Islamiyya; 
" The emergence of welfare-oriented non-governmental organisations to deal 
with the conseauences of the war. These included associations for the 
handicapped, for the care of orphans, and for drug treatment; 
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" The emergence, especially toward the end of the war, of a number of non- 
confessional anti-war associations which brought together activists from 
various parts of the country. 
The fifth stage of development extends form the end of the war in 1990 to the 
present. This stage is characterised by: 
"A continuing trend toward the establishment of family associations in a 
persistent atmosphere of insecurity vis-a-vis the transformations in the post- 
war city; 
" The multiplication of confessionally-based associations as the centrality of 
confessionalism in the new political system becomes evident; 
" The downsizing of some private welfare associations as the state resumes 
services interrupted during the war; 
" The emergence of a number of environmental NGOs to address the growing 
environmental crisis in Lebanon; 
" The emergence of a number of human rights and politically-oriented NGOs to 
express concerns about the abuses of the post-war government; 
" The emergence of a number of neighbourhood business associations to pick 
the pieces left by the disintegration of Beirut's business centre during the war. 
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